https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414427
標題: | Insurance bargaining under ambiguity | 作者: | Huang R.J. Huang Y.-C. Tzeng L.Y. |
關鍵字: | Ambiguity;Ambiguity aversion;Cooperative bargaining;Insurance bargaining;Non-cooperative bargaining | 公開日期: | 2013 | 卷: | 53 | 期: | 3 | 起(迄)頁: | 812-820 | 來源出版物: | Insurance: Mathematics and Economics | 摘要: | This paper investigates the effects of an increase in ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity in an insurance bargaining game with a risk-and-ambiguity-neutral insurer and a risk-and-ambiguity-averse client. Both a cooperative and a non-cooperative bargaining game are examined. We show that, in both games, full coverage is optimal in the presence of ambiguity, and that the optimal premium is higher in the presence of ambiguity than in the absence of it. Furthermore, the optimal premium will increase with both the degree of ambiguity aversion and an increase in ambiguity. ? 2013 Elsevier B.V. |
URI: | https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414427 | ISSN: | 01676687 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.insmatheco.2013.10.001 |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
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