https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414939
標題: | Banking panics: The role of the first-come, first-served rule and information externalities | 作者: | YEH-NING CHEN | 公開日期: | 1-十二月-1999 | 卷: | 107 | 期: | 5 | 起(迄)頁: | 946 | 來源出版物: | Journal of Political Economy | 摘要: | This paper proposes that both the first-come, first-served rule and information externalities are important in causing contagious bank runs. The first-come, first-served rule creates a negative payoff externality among depositors. This payoff externality forces depositors to respond to early noisy information such as failures of other banks. Therefore, failures of a few banks may trigger runs on other banks. Contagious runs may occur even if (i) depositors choose the Pareto-dominant equilibrium when there are multiple equilibria and (ii) the deposit contract is chosen to maximize depositor welfare. The feasibility of reforming the FDIC to impose market discipline is also investigated. |
URI: | https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/414939 | ISSN: | 00223808 | DOI: | https://api.elsevier.com/content/abstract/scopus_id/0033398232 10.1086/250086 |
顯示於: | 財務金融學系 |
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