https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/607947
標題: | Remanufacturing authorization strategy for an original equipment manufacturer-contract manufacturer supply chain: Cooperation or competition? | 作者: | Zhou Q Meng C Yuen K.F JIUH-BIING SHEU |
關鍵字: | Competitive CM;Contract manufacturing;Nash bargaining game;Remanufacturing authorization;Costs;Game theory;Supply chains;Contract manufacturers;Original equipment manufacturers;Price setting;Remanufactured products;Supply chain competitions;Whole sale prices;Manufacture | 公開日期: | 2021 | 卷: | 240 | 來源出版物: | International Journal of Production Economics | 摘要: | Due to the supply chain globalization, technology-oriented original equipment manufacturers are focusing on their core competencies by outsourcing the production to contract manufacturers. Many contract manufacturers also engage in remanufacturing and provide high quality remanufactured products in the market posing competition to the new products. This paper considers a supply chain with an original equipment manufacturer and a contract manufacturer. The contract manufacturer produces new products for the original equipment manufacturer and may compete with the original equipment manufacturer by producing and selling remanufactured products. The original equipment manufacturer can determine whether to authorize the contract manufacturer's remanufacturing. This paper investigates the wholesale price and retail price decisions for the new product and the conditions under which an authorization agreement can be reached between the two parties. In the analysis, two wholesale price settings are considered, the exogenous wholesale and endogenous wholesale price settings. In addition, three authorization decision bargaining scenarios are examined, including the original equipment manufacturer determining the authorization fee, the contract manufacturer determining the authorization fee, and two parties negotiating the authorization fee, to analyze the authorization cooperation outcomes via the generalized Nash bargaining framework. The results show that when the contract manufacturer determines the authorization fee, an authorization cooperation can never be reached whether in the exogenous or endogenous wholesale price setting. The original equipment manufacturer is more likely to set an authorization fee that leads to an authorization cooperation between the original equipment manufacturer and the contract manufacturer, especially when the contract manufacturer collects and remanufactures all the used products. Multiple factors influencing authorization cooperation decision are investigated, including the exogenous and endogenous wholesale price, production cost of new and remanufactured products, bargaining power of the two parties, and consumers' preference for remanufactured products. ? 2021 |
URI: | https://www.scopus.com/inward/record.uri?eid=2-s2.0-85110494539&doi=10.1016%2fj.ijpe.2021.108238&partnerID=40&md5=2ae5939b8722ec38f108d314e3b1342a https://scholars.lib.ntu.edu.tw/handle/123456789/607947 |
ISSN: | 09255273 | DOI: | 10.1016/j.ijpe.2021.108238 |
顯示於: | 工商管理學系 |
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