

## 論卮言——《莊子》之共存與寫作

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### 摘要

本文嘗試重塑有關《莊子》卮言之研究。近年來，學界大多將卮言視為《莊子》中特殊文體形式，如兩難問題及悖論。本文對於是否能輕易地將這些形式視為卮言存疑，進而試圖論證卮言基本上是簡單形式的言辭，其特色為明確但暫時性的，作用於日常互動與共存上。於此層面，特殊文體形式可謂無用武之地；然而，於探討並進而提倡卮言之時，特殊文體形式便成為不可或缺的一環。正是於此後設之層次——就《莊子》而言，則是寫作之層次——我們發現特殊文體形式之運用。基於結構上之相似度，我們或能將此等文體稱為「卮言」，但同時不應忘記，其乃從屬於與他者共存時所運用之語言。

**關鍵詞：**《莊子》、卮言、共存、寫作、溝通

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## On Goblet Words: Coexistence and Writing in the *Zhuangzi*

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### Abstract

This article attempts to reframe the state of research on the notion of goblet words (*zhiyan*) in the *Zhuangzi*. Recent studies predominantly view the notion of *zhiyan* as referring to peculiar stylistic forms exhibited in the *Zhuangzi*—forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. In this article, I question the quick identification of these forms as *zhiyan*. I argue that *zhiyan* are essentially definite yet provisional simple-form utterances located on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms do not play their part. However, such stylistic forms do become indispensable in discussing and recommending *zhiyan*. It is on this meta-level—for the *Zhuangzi*, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. Based on structural similarities, we may stretch the label ‘*zhiyan*’ to include such forms but should keep in mind that any such extension is secondary to the use of language in coexisting with others.

**Keywords:** *Zhuangzi*, goblet words (*zhiyan*), coexistence, writing, communication

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## I. Introduction

The term *zhiyan* (卮言, variously translated as “goblet words,” “tipping-vessel words,” and “spillover saying”) only appears twice in the *Zhuangzi* (《莊子》).<sup>1</sup> Despite this poor number, it is arguably one of the volume’s critical notions. It is listed in the short summary of Zhuangzi’s philosophical position in *Zhuangzi* 33, and it is discussed in *Zhuangzi* 27 in terms that reveal a close affinity with the famed second chapter of the book. As a result, the notion of *zhiyan* has attracted increasing attention in the field, leading to a number of recent studies that either take *zhiyan* as their exclusive focus or discuss it in combination with *yuyan* (寓言, “imputed words”) and *zhongyan* (重言, “weighty words”), the two other types of discourse mentioned alongside *zhiyan* in the *Zhuangzi*.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The majority of scholars picture *zhi* (卮) as a container that tips over when full and rights itself when empty. The most common translation of *zhiyan* is “goblet words.” Daniel Fried (2007) has argued on the basis of archaeological evidence that *zhi* refers to a “tipping-vessel” used in irrigation. “Spillover saying” is Angus C. Graham’s translation (1981: 26, 107; 1989: 201-202). For the early history of the term, see Fried (2007).

<sup>2</sup> The main recent studies referred to are Wang, Youru (2003: 139-160; 2004), Yearley, Lee H.

In spite of important differences, these recent studies on *zhiyan* tend to converge on the following three points. First, the notion of *zhiyan* refers to a philosophical style exhibited in the *Zhuangzi*.<sup>3</sup> This style is said to include the use of paradox, denegation, and dilemmatic questions, as well as, on a larger scale, the mixture of genres and seemingly unconnected passages.<sup>4</sup> Secondly, *zhiyan* are characterized by instability or indeterminacy.<sup>5</sup> And thirdly, *zhiyan* create an openness that thoroughly transforms the reader's personality as well as his understanding of the world.<sup>6</sup> These three points in turn define what *zhiyan* are, how they work, and what function they perform.

In this article, I attempt to reframe the discussion on *zhiyan*. To be clear, I do not challenge the view that the *Zhuangzi* does contain philosophically relevant stylistic forms, and that these forms work and function in part as described in the literature. What I question is rather the quick identification of these forms as *zhiyan*. I will argue that *zhiyan* are essentially definite yet

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(2005), Fried (2007) and Chiu, Wai Wai (2015). Wang's work is a systematic elaboration of Wu, Kuang-ming's (1982: 31-39). For entries into Chinese-language discussions, see Yang, Rur-Bin (1992; 2007).

<sup>3</sup> While not exclusively bound to writing, some of these stylistic forms are more naturally expressed in writing. Most scholars think of writing rather than speech. This is most explicit in Chiu (2015), but also assumed in Yearley (2005) and Fried (2007). Wang (2003: 139-160; 2004) is more ambiguous.

<sup>4</sup> Wang (2004: 206-212) discusses denegation and paradox; Wang (2003: 151-160) adds irony to the list. Chiu (2015: 259-264) examines dilemmatic questions, oxymora, and double denial. Denegation and double denial overlap, and so do paradoxes and oxymora. Yearley's (2005: 522-524) example operates on a larger scale and covers a couple of sections at the end of *Zhuangzi* 2.

<sup>5</sup> Chiu (2015), emphasizing indeterminacy, is most explicit on this point. Fried talks of "a never-stable word" and observes that "there is general agreement that "goblet words" are unstable language," though he criticizes the lack of detail on the part of other scholars when it comes to how this "instability of language is to be likened to the instability of a goblet" (Fried, 2007: 150-151).

<sup>6</sup> This point is made in Wang (2003: 139-160; 2004) and Yearley (2005). Chiu agrees that the *Zhuangzi* may have this effect but holds that we cannot claim that *Zhuangzi* "intends such a transformation" or that "the text *asserts* that one ought to be open-minded" (2015: 267).

provisional simple-form utterances that operate on the primary level of basic human coexistence. On this level, the peculiar stylistic forms listed above do not play their part. Such stylistic forms do, however, become relevant when one sets out to discuss or recommend the use of *zhiyan*. It is on this meta-level—for the *Zhuangzi*, the level of writing—that we find these forms employed. While these forms resemble *zhiyan*, the similarities are predictable and are based on the features of *zhiyan* as used in everyday interaction. We may stretch the label ‘*zhiyan*’ to include such forms but do well to keep in mind that doing so introduces an extension to the term’s primary use. *Zhiyan*, in other words, are not primarily a matter of philosophical style.

The article takes up the three points mentioned above in reverse order. Thus, instead of stipulating at the very outset what *zhiyan* are, I will start, in a first part, by examining their function. I attempt to show that *zhiyan* are associated with the goal of completing one’s natural life span, understood negatively as avoiding untimely death. In a second part, I examine how *zhiyan* operate to perform this function. I will argue that *zhiyan* are both provisional and definite, and that it is the combination of these two features that allows one to defuse disagreement and conflict. In a third and final part, I come to a final appraisal of what *zhiyan* are, and I provide two examples of peculiar forms of expression and argument in order to show how these relate to *zhiyan*.

The discussion in the first two parts will center on the defining statement on *zhiyan* as found in the *zhiyan* passage in the opening section of *Zhuangzi* 27. For ease of reference, I here present the defining statement, followed by the same idea formulated as a rhetorical question a few lines further down.

卮言日出，和以天倪，因以曼衍，所以窮年。……非卮言日出，和以天倪，孰得其久？ (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/23-27)<sup>7</sup>

*Zhiyan* are uttered on a daily basis and harmonize by means of *tianni*; they follow along by means of *manyan* and are the way to live out your years. ... If not for *zhiyan* uttered on a daily basis and harmonizing by means of *tianni*, who could reach his full span?

Two observations are in place before we proceed. First, it should be clear that my rendering is already an interpretation: it is based on a number of semantic and syntactic choices that will be clarified in due course. Secondly, here and elsewhere, I prefer to simply transliterate some terms. Sometimes this is a matter of convenience, but equally often it is because I wish to avoid fixing a term before explaining it (as in the case of *zhiyan*), or because a direct translation without further context is unproductive and even obscures the overall meaning of the phrase in which it appears (as with *tianni* and *manyan*). In any case, all these terms will receive attention at some point in the article.

## II. A Functional Characterization

The notion of *qiong nian* (窮年), rendered above as “to live out your years,” has not received much attention in the recent literature on *zhiyan*. Even when it is not plainly ignored, which often it is, *qiong nian* is mostly mentioned without further discussion and rarely occupies any place of

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<sup>7</sup> All references to primary sources are based on the concordance series compiled by the Institute of Chinese Studies (ICS, Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1992-).

relevance in interpretation. This is unfortunate, not only because *qiong nian* can be identified as the main function of *zhiyan*, but also because its semantic associations strongly suggest that the function of *zhiyan* is different from what is ascribed to it in the literature. I will clarify these two points in succession.

The opening section of *Zhuangzi* 27 introduces three types of discourse. They are distinguished by frequency of use and function. I will here only concern myself with their function. The first type, imputed words (*yuyan*), is characterized as *jie wai lun zhi* (藉外論之, “to rely on the outside to *lun* something”) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/18-20). The example provided is that of a father who relies on a matchmaker for his son since his own praise as a father is likely to be rejected. The function of this type of discourse, and hence the import of *lun* (論), is to make a persuasive case so as to gain acceptance. The second type of discourse, weighty words (*zhongyan*)—understood as the words of experienced elders—is defined as *suoyi yi yan ye* (所以已言也, “that by which one puts an end to discourse”) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/20-21).<sup>8</sup> It is wisdom discourse that stops the discourse of the less experienced. Imputed words and weighty words each perform a function within a social setting. Following this setup, one would expect *zhiyan* to have a particular function of its own as well, and one would moreover expect this function to be performed in a social context. Looking at the defining statement on *zhiyan*, the natural candidate for this function is *qiong nian*: it concludes the defining statement, and it is introduced by the same *suoyi* (所以, “that by which,” “the way to”) construction that introduces the function of weighty words.

<sup>8</sup> An alternative reading of *zhongyan*, here translated as “weighty words,” is *chongyan*, commonly taken to mean “repeated words.” These two meanings are compatible: weighty words are worthy of being repeated.

The notion of *qiong nian* appears once more in an almost identical line towards the end of *Zhuangzi* 2. (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/7/11-12) However, since its meaning cannot be decisively established by a direct analysis of either context, we need to take an indirect route.<sup>9</sup> The closest alternative comes in the form of two phrases equivalent to *qiong nian* in both form and meaning—to be more specific, phrases that equally contain a verb expressive of the idea “pursuing to the limit” followed by the noun *nian* (年, “years”) as its object. The first of these phrases is *jin nian* (盡年). We find this phrase in the short opening fragment of *Zhuangzi* 3. (ICS *Zhuangzi* 3/7/27-28) Since this fragment advises on how to avoid exposing oneself to danger, we can straightforwardly render *ke yi jin nian* (可以盡年) as “[you] can, by this, exhaust [your] years.” Elsewhere, in *Zhuangzi* 4, 6 and 20, we find several instances of the phrase *zhong qi tian nian* (終其天年). One of the cases in *Zhuangzi* 4 describes the good fortune of a cripple who is able to avoid conscription and forced labour—potential death sentences—on account of his deformities. (ICS *Zhuangzi* 4/12/19-22)<sup>10</sup> In the first passage in *Zhuangzi* 20, *zhong qi tian nian* appears in the context of a discussion about being worthless.<sup>11</sup> It is there contrasted to *si* (死, “die”). Finally, and most pertinent to the present discussion, in each of the three remaining passages—two in chapter 4 and one in chapter 6—*zhong qi tian nian* is within the scope

<sup>9</sup> One direct reading of *suoyi qiong nian* (所以窮年) may be something like “[this] is how I spend [my days] to the end of my years.” The problem with this reading is that it does not, in any meaningful sense, interpret *qiong nian* as a function.

<sup>10</sup> At the end of the passage, we find *zhong qi tian nian* preceded by the phrase *yang qi shen* (養其身, “nourish his body”). I take these phrases to refer to different elements of the story: *yang qi shen* connects to the ability of the cripple to earn or receive enough food; *zhong qi tian nian* relates to his ability to avoid conscription and forced labour.

<sup>11</sup> For the relevant part of the passage, see ICS *Zhuangzi* 20/53/6-10, esp. lines 9-10.

of a single complex sentence contrasted to *zhong dao yao* (中道夭, “dying early in mid-journey”) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 4/11/28-29, 4/12/15-16, and 6/15/30). This contrast not only marks the literal meaning of *zhong qi tian nian* as “lasting out your heavenly years” but also makes explicit its hidden import. That is, even though *zhong qi tian nian* literally refers to living out one’s natural life span, it also conveys the idea of avoiding untimely death as its negative counterpart. This meaning structure—living out one’s years by avoiding untimely death—is coherent with all passages that contain *jin nian* and *zhong qi tian nian*. Crucially, since *qiong nian* is equivalent to the latter phrases in terms of its structure as well as the basic meaning of its components, “completing one’s life span by avoiding untimely death” is a plausible reading of *qiong nian*. Indeed, this interpretation is compatible with the contexts in which *qiong nian* appears: the passage in *Zhuangzi* 2, which we will discuss later on, outlines how to dissolve disagreement and conflict; and the *zhiyan* passage in *Zhuangzi* 27 not only marks the function of *zhiyan* as *qiong nian* but also identifies *zhiyan* as a determining factor in *de qi jiu* (得其久, rendered in the introduction as “reaching one’s full span”).

We inferred that *zhiyan* likely perform a specific function in a social setting, we identified this function as *qiong nian*, and we offered textual grounds in favour of understanding *qiong nian* as completing one’s life span by avoiding untimely death. While it remains to be seen how *zhiyan* operate to perform this function, *qiong nian* is as a matter of fact the only function explicitly attributed to *zhiyan* in the *Zhuangzi*. It should therefore be given priority over any other function. In particular, *qiong nian* seems at variance with the function associated with *zhiyan* in recent studies: whereas the

function of *zhiyan* is often seen as producing a transformative effect in the recipient of *zhiyan*, *qiong nian* rather establishes the function of *zhiyan* as raising the survival chances of the *zhiyan* user. The notion of *qiong nian* appears to entail a shift in content (from transformation to survival) and focus (from the recipient to the user of *zhiyan*).

### III. Modus Operandi

In the previous section, we identified the function of *zhiyan* as completing one's life span by avoiding untimely death. The question of how *zhiyan* perform this function forms the subject of the present section. I will address this question by providing some context for *he yi tianni* (和以天倪, "harmonize by means of *tianni*") and, to a lesser extent, *yin yi manyan* (因以曼衍, "follow by means of *manyan*")—the two parallel phrases that lead up to *qiong nian* in the defining statement on *zhiyan*. I attempt to show, first, that these phrases outline how *zhiyan* succeed in defusing conflict, thus making *qiong nian* possible, and second, that *zhiyan* are, and indeed need to be, both provisional and definite.

The first phrase, *he yi tianni*, is the more prominent of the two phrases: it is the only phrase that appears together with *zhiyan* in the very opening line of chapter 27, and in a passage in chapter 2 that contains both phrases in a slightly variant form, only *he yi tianni* is explained. (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/18 and 2/7/11-15) The relative prominence of *he yi tianni* over *yin yi manyan* is in line with the interpretive effort made to clarify their constituent notions. Whereas *manyan* is simply used at three occasions in the *Zhuangzi*, none of

which sheds much light on its meaning, *tianni* is directly contextualized at the very end of the *zhiyan* passage in *Zhuangzi* 27. (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/18 and 2/7/11-15)<sup>12</sup>

萬物皆種也，以不同形相禪，始卒若環，莫得其倫，是謂天均。  
天均者，天倪也。(ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/27–80/1)

The myriad things are all seeds, succeeding each other in unlike forms, beginning and ending as on a circle (*huan*), none having its own fixed identity (*mo de qi lun*). This is called *tianjun*. *Tianjun* is equivalent to *tianni*.

This unit equates *tianni* with *tianjun* (天均, literally, “heavenly equality,” or metaphorically, via the variant graph *jun* (鈞), “the heavenly potter’s wheel”) and pictures the latter notion as a sequence of seed-like things that succeed each other as on a circle (*huan* 環).<sup>13</sup> The crucial phrase is *mo de qi lun* (莫得其倫, “none having its own fixed identity”). Two passages—one from the *Yanzi chunqiu* (晏子春秋) and one from the *Liji* (禮記)—contain closely similar phrases and hence provide a background to its meaning.<sup>14</sup>

- The *Yanzi chunqiu* passage posits two groups (*zong* 宗, the king’s sons with his formal wife, and *nie* 孽, the sons with his concubines)

<sup>12</sup> For the other two occurrences of *manyuan*, see *ibid.*, 2/7/12 and 33/100/8.

<sup>13</sup> Please refer to Brook Ziporyn (2009: 24, n. 16) and Wim De Reu (2010: 63, n. 41) for the relation between the literal and metaphorical readings of *tianjun*.

<sup>14</sup> With the exception of the first phrase about the myriad things and the mention of *tianjun* and *tianni* at the end, all of which are left out, the unit under discussion reappears almost verbatim in ICS *Huainanzi* (淮南子) 7/58/2. However, the *Huainanzi* parallel is part of a long eulogy on a single subject—the *zhenren* (真人, “authentic person”)—and is in this regard very different from the *Zhuangzi*, *Yanzi chunqiu* and *Liji* units, all of which describe a variety of things or people.

and implies that they *de qi lun* (得其倫) when they receive their proper places in the ranking—the system of discrimination (*bie* 別)—that serves to define their relation. (ICS *Yanzi chungiu* 1.11/5/5-15 (esp. lines 8-10))<sup>15</sup>

- The *Liji* passage stresses the importance of a particular spatial arrangement (the so-called *zhaomu* 昭穆 system) of descending generations during sacrifices at the ancestral temple and suggests that the tablets of secondary ancestors would *shi qi lun* (失其倫, lose their proper places/identities) within the hierarchy if they were positioned wrongly to the left or right of the primary ancestor's shrine. (ICS *Liji* 26.16/132/4-5)

The *Yanzi chungiu* and *Liji* passages sharply distinguish between different groups of people, each of which has an identity that is fixed by its position in a system of inequality. The unit in *Zhuangzi* 27 likewise assumes a variety of things and forms, but its nature imagery—things as seeds that grow into one another as on a circle—appears designed to shake up rather than to enforce discriminations. It suggests that things are not locked in one position, standing out as being uniquely this or that in a hierarchy of things, but that they transgress their boundaries and naturally transform into new forms and identities, none of which is privileged. Instead of a strict hierarchy of unequal identities, what we have here is a sequence of equal identities.

It is important to note that the idea of a sequence does not imply an absence of distinctions. A sequence of identities assumes a definite identity at

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<sup>15</sup> This passage deals with a case of succession. It is argued that the king's beloved son with his concubine should not replace the heir apparent fathered with his formal wife.

each stage: the text itself posits a variety of things with unlike forms and talks about beginnings and endings. The point is not that there are no distinctions, but rather that the end of one form or identity constitutes the beginning of another, so that forms and identities, while being definite at each stage, are also provisional in that they change and shift over time. This reading of *tianjun* as a sequence of definite yet provisional identities, all of which are equal, has the advantage that it accommodates for *tianni* in its literal sense of “heavenly divisions”—a division in a sequence is both a marker of identities and a point where an old identity is turned into a new identity.<sup>16</sup> While *tianjun* and *tianni* may put a different emphasis—*tianni* foregrounding the idea of a division as a point where identities are exchanged—they are nevertheless, as the text indicates, compatible notions.

The unit just discussed clarifies the notion of *tianni* and provides a first indication of the idea of definite and provisional categories. Yet, it offers no clue as to what could constitute a meaningful context for the phrase “harmonize by means of *tianni*” (*he yi tianni*). That is, it does not indicate what possible use *tianni* could be put to.<sup>17</sup> Nevertheless, it mentions the image of the circle (*huan*) as well as the notion of *tianjun*, both of which appear in *Zhuangzi* 2 in passages that shed light on the pragmatic relevance

<sup>16</sup> For glosses of *ni* (倪) as *fen* (分, “distinction,” “division”) and *ji* (際, “boundary”), see Guo (2008: vol. 1, p. 109, n. 1). My reading of *tianni* is comparable to Ziporyn’s “transitions” (2009: 20, n. 32). For a metaphorical reading of *ni* as “grinding wheel,” see De Reu (2010: 10-11, 61-62, n. 10).

<sup>17</sup> I explicitly adopt an instrumental reading of the coverb *yi* (以, “by means of”). One could also translate *yi* as “with,” but the English is ambiguous in a way the Chinese is not. “With X” can mean “by means of X” as well as “together with X.” For the latter sense, the Chinese uses *yu* (與), as can be witnessed in the phrase *yu tian he* (與天和, “to be in harmony with heaven”) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 13/34/23). If *yi* is instrumental, then the verb *he* (和, “harmonize”) in *he yi tianni* takes an implicit object, and it indeed does take a pronoun object in the variation on *he yi tianni* in *Zhuangzi* 2 (infra).

of *tianni*. Including the passage that directly explains a slightly variant form of *he yi tianni*, we thus have three passages from *Zhuangzi* 2 to work on. I will discuss them in the order in which they appear in the text. The first two passages—staging the circle and the notion of *tianjun*—can be analyzed along similar lines and serve as background for the passage that mentions *tianni* near the end of the chapter.<sup>18</sup>

The first passage of interest starts and ends with a recommendation to “use clarity” (*yi ming* 以明). The two units below suffice to address what is meant by clarity and what it is used for. The image of the circle (*huan*) shows up in the latter unit.

道惡乎隱而有真偽？言惡乎隱而有是非？……故有儒墨之是非，以是其所非而非其所是。欲是其所非而非其所是，則莫若以明。  
(ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/13-14)

How could paths be so obscured that we have genuine and fake ones? How could words be so obscured that we have right and wrong ones? ... Thus we have the rights and wrongs of the Confucians and Mohists, by which they call right what the other calls wrong and call wrong what the other calls right. If you want to call right what they call wrong and call wrong what they call right, then nothing compares to using clarity.

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<sup>18</sup> I have elsewhere pursued the metaphorical connections among *tianjun*, *tianni* and the image of the circle (De Reu, 2010). The current paper takes a more analytic approach. My argument here does not rely on the imagery involved. I merely use *tianjun* and the image of the circle as stepping-stones that allow me to reliably enlarge the scope of my investigation.

彼是莫得其偶，謂之道樞。樞始得其環中，以應無窮。是亦一無窮，非亦一無窮也。故曰莫若以明。(ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/19-20)

Where neither ‘that’ nor ‘this’ is matched as opposite against its other, refer to this as the axis of paths. Once the axis is located at the centre of its circle, it responds, by virtue of this [pivotal position], to all without limit: both one limitless ‘right’ and one limitless ‘wrong.’ Thus, I say, nothing compares to using clarity.

The latter unit consists of two segments connected by the anaphoric use of the coverb *yi* (以, here rendered as “by virtue of this”). The first segment describes a pivotal position—the axis at the centre of the circle—that allows for the responding (*ying* 應) mentioned in the second segment. I interpret the first segment to explain the notion of clarity (*ming* 明) and the second segment to specify what it means to *use* (*yi* 以) clarity.

The pivotal position is a point where contrasts do not longer stand in opposition. The paradigm case is one of demonstratives: ‘that’ (*bi* 彼) and ‘this’ (*shi* 是). Immediately after the former unit, it is claimed that “there are no objects that are not ‘that;’ there are no objects that are not ‘this’.” (*wu wu fei bi, wu wu fei shi* 物無非彼，物無非是) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/16) We may infer that ‘that’ and ‘this’ are said of objects and that any object called ‘that’ may also be called ‘this.’ Revisiting the opening phrase of the latter unit: two sides of a pair of contrasts may equally—without excluding one another—be applied to any object. I take this point of insight as the import of ‘clarity’ (*ming*).

The second segment describes the use that is made of clarity as “responding to all without limit” (*ying wu qiong* 應無窮). It adds a pair of

contrasts—right (*shi* 是) and wrong (*fei* 非)—that features prominently in the former of the two units. The former unit contains at least two relevant elements. First is the context of disputing parties, each calling right the words/utterances/sayings (*yan* 言) the other calls wrong and vice versa, in the same way each probably also calls fake the paths (*dao* 道) the other calls genuine, and vice versa. Second is the statement that clarity is the best means to call right (the sum total of) what the disputers call wrong (contextually determined as: all words) and to call wrong what they call right (here as well: all words).<sup>19</sup> Drawing on these two elements, I propose to flesh out the latter of the two units in the following way:

- (i) ‘That’ (*bi*) and ‘this’ (*shi*) are words/utterances/sayings (*yan*) that represent alternative and equally valid paths or approaches (*dao*) to objects.
- (ii) Disputing parties view ‘that’ and ‘this’ as incompatible and insist on the exclusive validity of their own words in relation to objects, which in effect means that the scope of the words they call right (*shi*) and wrong (*fei*) is limited.
- (iii) Someone who realizes that ‘that’ and ‘this’ represent equally valid paths is not limited (*wu qiong*) in terms of the scope of the words he may call right or wrong: in a dispute about whether to

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<sup>19</sup> The interpretation of this statement hinges on what the pronouns *suo* (所) and *qi* (其) are taken to refer to. Since the phrases at the beginning of the unit imply that ‘right’ and ‘wrong’ are said of words (*yan*), *suo* refers to “words.” I further take *qi* to refer to “Confucians V Mohists” (there is nothing they *jointly* call right or wrong). My reading here matches the pair of phrases at the end of the latter unit: *shi* and *fei* can both be said of all (words) without limit. Note, moreover, that the statement implies that someone who uses clarity (the Zhuangzian sage) also makes *shi-fei* judgments.

call some object ‘that’ or ‘this,’ he may respond with a ‘right’ to ‘that’ and a ‘wrong’ to ‘this,’ or he may apply a ‘right’ to ‘this’ and a ‘wrong’ to ‘that.’ This, I believe, is what is meant by ‘using clarity’ (*yi ming*).

Set in a context of how to respond to disputing parties, the pragmatic implication of using clarity is that it allows for the dissolution of conflict. The second passage, the well-known monkey keeper story, may be read as an illustration of the ‘using clarity’ passage. At the end of the passage, we find the notion of *tianjun*, here written with the graph for “heavenly potter’s wheel.” As with the circle in the ‘using clarity’ passage, the potter’s wheel is used to convey a central point of stability.

狙公賦芋，曰：「朝三而莫四。」眾狙皆怒。曰：「然則朝四而莫三。」眾狙皆悅。名實未虧而喜怒為用，亦因是也。是以聖人和之以是非而休乎天鈞，是之謂兩行。(ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/5/4-6)

The monkey keeper distributed nuts, saying: “Three in the morning and four in the evening.” All monkeys got angry. “If so, then four in the morning and three in the evening,” he said. The monkeys were all pleased. Without a discrepancy in number or substance, joy and anger were put to use—also a case of calling right by following along (*yin shi*). Thus, the sage harmonizes with things by means of a right and a wrong (*he zhi yi shi fei*) and stays at rest on the heavenly potter’s wheel. This is what is called “walking both [paths]” (*liang xing*).

The monkeys represent a disputing party. They insist on receiving the bigger part of their daily ration of nuts in the morning. The monkey keeper, by contrast, does not insist on a particular way of dividing the nuts. He is fine with walking both paths (*liang xing* 兩行): while his original proposal reveals a preference for 3/4, he eventually settles on a 4/3 arrangement.<sup>20</sup> In line with the analysis of the previous passage, we may read the story as follows:

- (i) The two proposals—3/4 and 4/3—are utterances (*yan*) that stand for alternative paths, approaches, or perspectives (*dao*) on the division of nuts as objects.
- (ii) The monkeys do not see 3/4 and 4/3 as equal alternatives and limit their ‘right’ to 4/3 and ‘wrong’ to 3/4.
- (iii) The monkey keeper, realizing that 3/4 and 4/3 are interchangeable, is in a position to respond to either alternative with a right and a wrong: he can, as he does first, apply ‘right’ to 3/4 and ‘wrong’ to 4/3, and he can, as he does later on, respond with a ‘right’ to 4/3 and a ‘wrong’ to 3/4. The monkey keeper thus harmonizes with the monkeys by applying right and wrong (*he zhi yi shi fei* 和之以是非).<sup>21</sup>

<sup>20</sup> The phrase *liang xing* is here interpreted as “walking both *paths*.” This reading is based on the statement a few lines earlier in the text that “paths are formed by walking them” (*dao xing zhi er cheng* 道行之而成) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/24).

<sup>21</sup> The former unit of the “using clarity” passage already made it clear that the Zhuangzian sage also makes right and wrong judgments. Making such judgments is not indicative of being a disputer. Note, moreover, that the verb *he* 和 can also be read as the more active “harmonize” instead of “harmonize [along] with.” I adopt the latter reading mainly because of the parallel with *yin* (因, “follow along with”) in the defining statement on *zhiyan* (chapter 27) and in the *tianni* passage in

The monkey keeper story makes explicit the concern with practical coexistence hinted at near the end of our discussion of the previous passage. Rather than being arbitrary, the final settlement is a case of calling ‘right’ by following a situational given (*yin shi* 因是)—an approval of 4/3 that is based on the monkeys’ anger with 3/4 and their anticipated satisfaction with 4/3.<sup>22</sup> Faced with the anger of the monkeys and prompted by a disposition to avoid conflict, the monkey keeper turns his 3/4 into 4/3. Note that while the monkeys undergo a change in emotional state, they do not end up seeing the equivalence of 3/4 and 4/3. Their mental horizon has not expanded. The communicative strategy of the monkey keeper does not have a didactic function. It furthers peaceful coexistence, which for the monkey keeper means that he does not put himself in harm’s way by insisting on a 3/4 arrangement.

Before proceeding to the final passage, it is important to make one further observation: the person who uses clarity not only views alternative positions as equal and interchangeable, he also relies on the difference between them. Recall the monkey keeper. On the one hand, the monkey keeper treats 3/4 and 4/3 as equal—he sees no substantial difference between the two. Yet, on the other hand, in facing the monkeys, he has to decide on how to distribute the nuts, and in each case—before and after the monkeys display their anger—his proposal is based on a difference between 3/4 and 4/3 and on calling ‘right’ (*shi*) one alternative and calling ‘wrong’ (*fei*) the

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chapter 2 (infra). Note, however, that the two readings are compatible: harmonizing with the monkeys harmonizes the monkeys.

<sup>22</sup> Graham (1978: 470-471, 491) identifies two instances of the adverbial use of *yin* in what he reconstructs as the *Names and Objects* part of the Later Mohist works (see NO 2 and NO 17). The instance in NO 2 is particularly instructive: *qu zhi yin fei ye* (去之因非也, “If they have left this place, by this criterion they are not”). I follow Graham (1981: 54) in also reading *yin shi* here as an adverb-verb construct (his translation: “the ‘That’s it’ which goes by circumstance”).

other (see point (iii) above). In specific situations, then, the sage proceeds on the basis of a difference between alternatives. He asserts definite positions. To posit a difference between alternatives is unproblematic as long as one's position is open to change so that it can be made to conform to the rival position in a dispute.

The passage that directly relates to the defining statement on *zhiyan* comes near the end of the second chapter. It starts by reflecting on the impossibility of knowing right (*shi* 是) from wrong (*fei* 非) in a dispute (*bian* 辯). Even if a dispute produces a winner—say, you win and I lose—one may still ask: “Are you indeed right, am I indeed wrong?” (*ruo guo shi ye, wo guo fei ye ye* 若果是也，我果非也邪) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/7/6). The matter cannot be decided, not even by a third party, for he, too, will occupy some position. The passage then continues by giving advice on how to handle other voices. The relevant unit, quoted below, consists of an introductory segment that is nearly identical to the defining statement on *zhiyan*, followed by a segment that explains *he zhi yi tianni* (和之以天倪, “harmonize with them by means of *tianni*”). It is the explanatory segment—itself made up of two parallel strains—that demands our attention. For ease of exposition, I focus on the *shi* (“this,” “right”) strain and take the *ran* (然, “so,” “correct”) strain as making the same point.

和之以天倪，因之以曼衍，所以窮年也。何謂和之以天倪？曰：是不是，然不然。是若果是也，則是之異乎不是也亦無辯；然若果然也，則然之異乎不然也亦無辯。(ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/7/11–13)<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> I follow the widely accepted rearrangement of the passage also adopted by the ICS editors.

Harmonize with them by means of *tianni* and follow along with them by means *manyan*: the way to live out your years. What is meant by “harmonize with them by means of *tianni*?” “A ‘this’ turned into a ‘not this’ (*shi bu shi*); a ‘so’ turned into a ‘not so’.” If you consider ‘right’ “you are indeed right” (*ruo guo shi ye*), there will be no dispute in spite of the difference of a ‘this’ from a ‘not this;’ if you consider ‘correct’ “you are indeed correct,” there will be no dispute in spite of the difference of a ‘so’ from a ‘not so.’

Three points inform my reading of the explanatory segment. First is the explicit but largely ignored verbal connection (*ruo guo shi ye*) between the conditional clause in the second sentence (of the *shi* strain) and the opening part of the entire passage. The idea expressed in the conditional is that you affirm (*shi* “consider right”) the validity of the other’s position (*ruo guo shi ye* “you are indeed right”).

The second point is that *shi* (“this”) and *bu shi* (不是, “not this”) in the main clause following the conditional are basic contrastive positions equivalent to 3/4 and 4/3 and to ‘that’ and ‘this.’ While such positions commonly form the subject matter of a dispute (*bian*), it is here stated that there is no such dispute in spite of the difference (*yi* 異) of ‘this’ from ‘not this.’<sup>24</sup> We can make sense of this in the light of the previous passage. In proposing his final 4/3 arrangement, the monkey keeper proceeds on the basis of a difference, yet this difference does not generate a dispute. This is

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<sup>24</sup> I here translate *yi* (亦) as “in spite of” in order to fully bring out its adversative connotation. See Harbsmeier (1981: 136-152) for a detailed study of *yi*. Entries (91) and (92) are particularly helpful, even though *yi* is in those examples used in concessive clauses.

because his 4/3 is, in the words of the current segment, predicated on his “considering ‘right’ ‘you are indeed right’,” that is, on his considering ‘right’ the monkeys’ insistence on 4/3.

Finally, I take the first sentence as the central part of the explanation. The components *shi* and *bu shi* are the basic contrastive positions taken up in the main clause of the second sentence, with one of the components here functioning as a verb. In line with the monkey keeper’s shift from 3/4 to 4/3, I read *shi bu shi* (是不是) as “a ‘this’ turned into a ‘not this’.”<sup>25</sup> In other words, a *shi* is turned into its negative counterpart—into the position held by an opponent in a dispute. This characterization is coherent with the notion of *tianni* as it is contextualized in *Zhuangzi* 27: a point in a sequence where an old identity (or category) is turned into a new one. What is added is the pragmatic implication, made explicit in the conditional clause, that to shift positions allows you to agree with—to harmonize with (*he* 和)—the position of an opponent.

To sum up, the structure of the explanatory segment, as I propose to read it, runs as follows: (i), a characterization of *he zhi yi tianni*; (ii), an explication of (i): to change your position to its negative counterpart—to the position held by an opponent—means that you affirm the validity of his position; (iii), the outcome of (ii) and (i): the absence of disagreement and conflict.<sup>26</sup> Note, moreover, that the absence of conflict connects with the

<sup>25</sup> I propose to read *shi bu shi* and *ran bu ran* as patient (*shi/ran*)-verb (*bu shi/bu ran*) phrases. Refer to ICS *Lüshi chunqiu* (呂氏春秋) 16.8/97/24-25 for another example of *shi bu shi* and *ran bu ran* as passive constructions.

<sup>26</sup> For a very different reading of the argument structure, see the translations of Mair (1994: 23) and Ziporyn (2009: 20). The difference hinges on how one interprets the conditional. Mair and Ziporyn read it as a counterfactual conditional, while I read it as an ordinary conditional which

function of *he zhi yi tianni* and *yin zhi yi manyan* (因之以曼衍, “follow along with them by means *manyan*”) as it is identified in the introductory segment: to complete your life span by avoiding untimely death (*qiong nian*).

The discussion in the preceding pages focused on *he yi tianni*, the first of the two parallel phrases in the defining statement on *zhiyan*. Indirectly, though, our discussion also provides some context for the second phrase—*yin yi manyan*—not only because a nearly identical phrase is embedded in the third passage of chapter 2, but also because its verbal component—*yin* (因)—shows up in the monkey keeper passage as part of the expression *yin shi* (“calling right by following along”). At the very least, the ideas expressed by these two phrases should be thought of as compatible, a view that is supported by the shared meaning of *he* and *yin* as adaptive interaction with one’s environment.<sup>27</sup> To this purpose, a possible reading of *manyan*, a notion that conveys an endless stream of water, is the image of water shifting its course as it flows from one place to the next without end: just as the course of water adapts to the topography of the land, so the language of the sage follows along with the situations he encounters.<sup>28</sup>

We started this section by asking how *zhiyan* are able to perform the function of *qiong nian* attributed to them in *Zhuangzi* 27. The answer to this

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explicitly takes up the opening part of the entire passage.

<sup>27</sup> The parallel structure of *he (zhi) yi tianni* and *yin (zhi) yi manyan* makes it plausible to read these phrases as grammatically identical. I think of *tianni* and *manyan* as background notions that provide an insight on the basis of which one engages adaptively with one’s environment.

<sup>28</sup> The connection between *manyan* and water is, to my knowledge, undisputed. Fried (2007: 165) proposes to read *manyan* as the spreading out of water in irrigation. Early glosses associate *manyan* with “not having an end/boundary” (*wu ji* 無極) and with change (*hua* 化, *bianhua* 變化), see Guo (2008: vol. 1, p. 109, n. 4). *Zhuangzi* 33 establishes a direct connection between *zhiyan* and *manyan* (ICS 33/100/7-8). I have tried to capture the connection after the colon.

question comes in two parts. The simple part of the answer is that *zhiyan* are instrumental in avoiding or dissolving conflict: the daily use of *zhiyan* in social settings enables one to harmonize (*he*) and to follow along (*yin*) with other people. The benefit of avoiding or dissolving conflict may be directly physical (the absence of assault or punishment) or psycho-physiological (the lack of mental friction that causes an unbalance in one's vital energies).<sup>29</sup> In either case, it reduces the risk of untimely death. The more intricate part of the answer is that in order to avoid or dissolve conflict, *zhiyan* need to be both definite and provisional. They need to be definite for disputing parties to calm down and give up their fight, and they need to be provisional since if they are not, one is confined to a single position and bound to run into conflict. *Zhuangzi* scholarship tends to give prominence to the provisionality of language, and the recent studies on *zhiyan* reflect this tendency by highlighting the instability and indeterminacy of *zhiyan* understood as literary forms. Yet, while this is indeed the aspect in which the Zhuangzian sage differs from those who rigorously stick to their positions, it is equally true that *zhiyan* need to be definite at each stage in order to be effective. Indeed, even the very image of a *zhi* (卮)—a vessel that alternates between distinct stages of being emptied and filled up—suggests the use of language advocated in the *Zhuangzi* to be both definite and provisional. What defuses a conflict is the ability to shift between definite points of view.

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<sup>29</sup> These two kinds of danger are verbalized in chapter 4 as *rendao zhi huan* (人道之患, “suffering caused by the way of man”) and *yinyang zhi huan* (陰陽之患, “suffering caused by yin and yang”) (ICS *Zhuangzi* 4/10/11-16). Both dangers are also negatively present in the monkey keeper story. The monkey keeper not only avoids attack, he is also able to stay at rest (*xiu* 休), unlike the monkeys who are emotionally unbalanced.

## IV. *Zhiyan* and Philosophical Form

We saw, in section one, that completing one's natural life span by avoiding untimely death is the sole function explicitly attributed to *zhiyan*. An analysis of relevant passages in section two revealed that *zhiyan* are well suited to perform this function. Being provisional and definite, they adapt to the unambiguous position of an opponent in a dispute and thereby remove the source of conflict. They further coexist. From the preceding discussion and from the passages that have been quoted, we can gather two more bits of information.

- *Zhiyan* have as their natural habitat the complex social world of everyday human interaction. They are hence more likely a matter of speech than a matter of writing.<sup>30</sup>
- Typical instances of *zhiyan* are simple-form utterances (e.g. 'that,' 'this,' 3/4, 4/3) that resemble the operation of a *zhi*-vessel in the way they are used—that is, definite yet provisional.

We can now come to an overall understanding of *zhiyan*. A prototypical description may run as follows: *zhiyan* are simple-form verbal utterances located on the level of everyday human interaction (what they are); by virtue

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<sup>30</sup> This also seems supported by the description of frequency (*ri chu* 日出, "uttered on a daily basis") in the defining statement on *zhiyan*. Note, moreover, that a non-textual, temporal frame of reference bypasses a statistical conflict between the frequency descriptions of imputed words (*shi jiu* 十九, "nine out of ten") and weighty words (*shi qi* 十七, "seven out of ten"). A temporal reading (nine or seven days out of ten) is more elegant than a textual frame of reference (respective proportions of the *Zhuangzi* text, in this case adding up to more than 100%, so that we need to assume that *yuyan* and *zhongyan* overlap, something which is not suggested in the text).

of being both provisional and definite, they adapt to the unambiguous position of an opponent in a dispute (how they work); by thus removing the source of conflict, they reduce the risk of untimely death and allow the language user to complete his natural life span in peaceful coexistence with others (the function they perform).

The account of *zhiyan* offered here is markedly different from the account given in the introduction. Instead of taking for granted the common reading of *zhiyan* as philosophically relevant forms of expression found in the *Zhuangzi*, we have come to see *zhiyan* as simple-form utterances that operate outside of the *Zhuangzi* text. This shift in interpretation problematizes the status of philosophical form. Are the stylistic forms found in the *Zhuangzi* related to *zhiyan*? If they are, in what respect and how do they resemble *zhiyan*? And finally, could they not after all, perhaps through an extension of the term, still be regarded as a kind of *zhiyan*?

The first question is the easiest and can be answered in the affirmative. In both the “using clarity” passage (chapter 2) and the *zhiyan* passage (chapter 27), we find an instance of a peculiar stylistic form identified as such in the recent scholarship. This is a strong indication of at least some kind of relation between such forms and *zhiyan*. I will here briefly present and analyze these instances in order to arrive at an answer to the other two questions.

The first instance is a case of what Chiu has identified as a pair of “dilemmatic questions,” that is, “questions inviting incompatible judgments ... both of which seem hard to accept without reasonable doubt” (2015: 259-260). They directly precede the second unit of the “using clarity” passage. I adopt Chiu’s style of analysis.

果且有彼是乎哉？Is there really a ‘that’/‘this’？ 果且無彼是乎哉？  
Is there really no ‘that’/‘this’？ (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/19)

We saw that ‘that’ and ‘this’ are words (*yan*) that are applied to objects. The dilemmatic questions turn language on itself. They ask whether the linguistic object ‘that’/‘this’ should be said to *you* (有, “there is,” “have,” “exist”) or to *wu* (無, “there is not,” “have not,” “not exist”). The question of the *you* or *wu* of ‘that’/‘this’ is relevant because the “using clarity” passage sets out to change the reader’s perception of ‘that’ and ‘this:’ when ‘that’ and ‘this’ are seen as interchangeable and provisional, is there still a ‘that’ versus a ‘this?’ We might be inclined to answer the first question negatively—we go for the *wu* alternative because a ‘that’ can also be a ‘this,’ and vice versa. Yet, the second question compels us to reconsider our answer. Even when we use ‘that’ and ‘this’ interchangeably, we still make definite choices in specific situations, and any such choice assumes a difference between ‘that’ and ‘this’ that is in turn predicated on a pair of *shi fei* judgments.<sup>31</sup> We thus also have a reason to answer the second question negatively and to go for the *you* position: there is still a ‘that’ versus a ‘this.’ This answer, though, leads us back again to the first question, and so on.

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<sup>31</sup> It is quite possible that the two pairs of phrases (ICS *Zhuangzi* 2/4/18-19) that precede the dilemmatic questions detail the lines of reasoning that support those questions. Read in this way, the interchangeability of positions suggested in 是亦彼也，彼亦是也 (“‘this’ is also ‘that;’ ‘that’ is also ‘this’”) provides the reason for doubting the difference between ‘that’ and ‘this’ in the first question; and 彼亦一是非，此亦一是非 (“a set of *shi* and *fei* both there and here”) is the ground for doubting the absence of a difference between ‘that’ and ‘this’ in the second question (recall the monkey keeper: he had to make a choice in two cases (“there and here”), and in both of these cases his choice (3/4 and 4/3, equivalent to ‘that’ and ‘this’) involved a set of *shifei* judgments).

The ingenuity of the dilemmatic questions, I believe, is that they trigger in the reader an experience that matches the intended point about ‘that’ and ‘this.’ The core message about ‘that’ and ‘this’ is that a definite choice in a specific situation is also provisional—we are not stuck with our choice over time—so that it is possible to move from ‘that’ to ‘this,’ and vice versa. The dilemmatic questions have the reader experience this message. In going through the questions, the reader moves from choosing *wu* to choosing *you* and back again, never able to settle on one position indefinitely. Having the particular perspective on the use of ‘that’ and ‘this’ outlined above, the author of the “using clarity” passage can be expected to design a stylistic form that effectively communicates his position. The dilemmatic questions perform this function.

The second instance of a special stylistic form appears in the *zhiyan* passage in *Zhuangzi* 27 and may therefore be taken as a direct elaboration on *zhiyan*. It starts with a phrase referred to as a paradoxical notion by Wang, Youru (2003: 155; 2004: 209).

言無言：終身言，未嘗言；終身不言，未嘗不言。(ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/79/24)<sup>32</sup>

In speaking, do not speak: all your life you speak without ever speaking; all your life you do not speak without ever failing to speak.

This elliptic unit opens with a paradoxical exhortation not to speak in speaking (*yan wu yan* 言無言). Does someone who follows this advice

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<sup>32</sup> I follow the generally accepted emendation, also adopted by the ICS editors, to delete the negation particle *bu* (不) after the first occurrence of *wei chang* (未嘗, “not yet,” “never”).

speak or not? The next two phrases, being equally paradoxical, lead us through the alternatives by skipping from one horn to the other, and back again. These phrases do make sense within the *zhiyan* passage, not only because someone who utters *zhiyan* does indeed *not speak* according to the standards of conventional rectified speech,<sup>33</sup> but also because their stylistic form displays a sequence of contrastive positions that may be regarded as a condensed picture of *zhiyan*. The paradoxes allow the composer to establish a consistency between message and form, and they let the reader experience the point of *zhiyan* in the very act of reading.

The dilemmatic questions and paradoxical statements trigger and display, respectively, a sequence of contrastive positions, with each position being a simple-form utterance. It should come as no surprise that we find such stylistic forms employed in the *Zhuangzi* in the context of discussions on language. Put the other way around, to discuss or to recommend language that is both definite and provisional predictably leads to the creation of literary forms such as dilemmatic questions and paradoxes. The resemblance between these stylistic forms and *zhiyan* is formal and is based on the features of *zhiyan* as used in everyday interaction.

At the end of a discussion on *zhiyan*, it is perhaps fitting that we may come to ask *whether or not* the stylistic forms employed in the *Zhuangzi* are instances of *zhiyan*. That is, given the close resemblance between these stylistic forms and *zhiyan*, may we not also come to regard such forms as

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<sup>33</sup> Since '*zhiyan*' refers to a particular use of language, 'not speaking' should not, I believe, be interpreted literally as refraining from the physical act of uttering sounds. The paradoxes play on different modes of language use. For more on paradoxes in early Daoist sources, see De Reu (2006).

*zhiyan*? This is indeed an appealing position, and we could on the basis of this resemblance stretch the label ‘*zhiyan*’ to include such stylistic forms. But note that, even if we choose to do so, a set of subtle differences remains in place. One difference is that stylistic forms seem to have more of a didactic function. Rather than saying that paradoxical statements and dilemmatic questions serve to *qiong nian*, it is more plausible to say that they serve to move the reader towards a state of mind conducive to the use of *zhiyan*, a view which compares well with the function attributed to the philosophical style of the *Zhuangzi* in most of the recent studies on this topic.<sup>34</sup> Correspondingly, there seems to be a subtle difference in target audience. Whereas the notion of *qiong nian* suggests an opponent ready to strike back at the hint of disagreement, a didactic function suggests a target audience that is not all that hostile and that may at least be shaken into a different conception of how to use language.<sup>35</sup> And finally, whereas harmonizing with

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<sup>34</sup> One may object that the philosophical style of the *Zhuangzi* serves the ultimate aim of *qiong nian* for the user of such style indirectly through a process of transforming the attitudes and intentions of the recipient. But note that there is no need for a peculiar philosophical style if the aim is simply to avoid conflict; such style may even worsen the situation. All that is needed and required, witness the monkey keeper, is that one adapts to the unambiguous position of the other party. The use of a paradox or a dilemmatic question therefore foregrounds another, didactic function. Of course, the philosophical style of the *Zhuangzi*—as a didactic tool—is instrumental in helping the recipient to avoid untimely death in his future dealings with others. This latter view is indeed perfectly compatible with the position I develop here.

<sup>35</sup> A related issue here is who is teachable and who is a (potential) opponent. The *Zhuangzi*, I think, assumes a teachable audience, though there is no control over one’s readership. One direction to develop this issue is to examine records of (actual or imaginary) dialogues. Developing this issue falls outside the scope of this paper. Yet, two sections in *Zhuangzi* 27 may provide some insight. The final section consists of a dialogue between Yang Ziju (陽子居) and Lao Dan (老聃). Yang Ziju, who puts himself up as a disciple, is shocked into a different mode of interacting with others. The central part of Lao Dan’s teaching involves a paradox (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/80/26-81/4). The second section, following right after the *zhiyan* passage, is a dialogue between Zhuangzi and Huizi (惠子), his purported friend, about how to interpret the changing *shifei* judgments of Kongzi (孔子). Zhuangzi uses, among others, a combination of dispute and self-irony to convince Huizi that Kongzi’s changing judgments are a matter avoiding opposition from others. We could reconstruct

a belligerent opponent only requires a single shift of one's position to the unambiguous position held by the opponent, leading someone to adopt the use of *zhiyan* in daily interaction necessitates the invention of more intricate strategies and structures, of which paradoxes and dilemmatic questions are prime examples.<sup>36</sup> These differences serve as a reminder that extending the label 'zhiyan' to include such forms should not obscure the fact that *zhiyan* primarily refer to the use of language on the level of everyday interaction and coexistence. It is only on the meta-level of discussing and recommending *zhiyan*—for the *Zhuangzi*, the level of writing—that we find the dilemmatic questions and paradoxes introduced above.

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this section as Zhuangzi's teaching about Kongzi's *zhiyan* (ICS *Zhuangzi* 27/80/3-7). None of the didactic forms in these two sections would be possible with an audience like that of the monkeys in chapter two.

<sup>36</sup> For recent discussions of literary forms of argument on the level of individual *Zhuangzi* chapters, see De Reu (2015) and Meyer (2015).

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### 二、現代資料

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