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# **New Posture of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance and Taiwan Security**

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The U.S.-Japan security alliance is generally regarded as a security mechanism, combining the military strength and political determination of two major military and economic powers, to maintain regional peaceful status quo and political stability. During the Cold War period, when it was established after the signing of the San Francisco treaty, the bilateral security alliance was designed to protect Japanese homeland safety and then later to deter and contain communist expansion in East Asia. With its unique goal of maintaining regional security, the U.S. and Japan decided to strengthen their alliance after the Cold War to be the cornerstone of East Asia security architecture. Developments of the security alliance in recent years demonstrate further changes and enhancement to reassure Washington and Tokyos' willingness to consolidate the alliance to cope with the growing unstable security environment in the region and the world.

Military and political tension across Taiwan Strait is a major flashpoint in East Asia that may lead to major military conflict, with the possibility of escalating into military confrontation between the U.S. and China, which definitely will cause regional instability and major negative impact on regional economy and trade relations. In the past, Washington's military presences in the region and security support for Taiwan have so far deterred Beijing from using military means to solve the Taiwan question. Under the Taiwan Relations Act, the U.S. has legal obligation to help Taiwan to defend itself and major interests to maintain peaceful status quo across the Taiwan Straits.

In maintaining the current status of cross-strait relations, the US has adopted a clear dual strategic policy of balance and deterrence. One aspect of playing the part of balancer is maintaining a military balance between the two sides through arms sales to Taiwan and strengthening the island's defenses. The other aspect is the political balancing act. Utilizing diplomacy with Taipei and Beijing expresses a strong resolve to uphold cross-strait peace. As for the deterrence strategy, America's dual role is also clearly conveyed to both sides of the strait in that it opposes any unilateral action to change the status quo.

However, relations between Washington and Taipei have been changed during the Chen Shui-bian administration. Fighting for Taiwan's status and participation in international arena and rallying voters to support the ruling party, Democratic Progressive Party (DDP), in domestic elections, President Chen adopted many measures and statements, which are regarded by Washington and Beijing as initiatives appears designed to change Taiwan's status quo unilaterally and could undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. These actions have invited Bush administration to publicly condemn Taiwan in many occasions by various levels of American officials, including President Bush. Especially the referendum on using the name of Taiwan to join the United Nations, mutual trust between Washington and Taipei has been further infringed and brought relations to a new low.

Despite almost constant friction in U.S.-Taiwan relations in the past five years, President Bush continues to view Taiwan's democracy as a beacon for China. The U.S. and Japan have overlapping interests in maintaining cross-strait peace and preserving Taiwan's maturing democracy and free-market economy. Geographically, the location of Taiwan near vital sea-lanes in the region, not to mention that the PRC could further develop its navy forces if it has access to Taiwan's ports, therefore, for long-term strategic interests, the U.S. and Japan would like to maintain current status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Changes of the U.S.-Japan security alliance after the Cold War, including the 1997 New Guidelines, 2005 two-plus-two statement, and 2007 two-plus-two statement, have paved a new goal for the bilateral alliance in supporting regional peace and security and a new role for Japan to assist the U.S.'s military presence and strategy in the region.

The major argument of the paper is follow: with the development of U.S.-China relationship and the deterioration of U.S.-Taiwan relationship in the past several years, Taipei believes the recent developments of the U.S.-Japan security alliance can be viewed as major evidence that the U.S. commitment toward Taiwan security remain unchanged but to embed into regional context, that is, by making linkage between Taiwan security and regional security architecture, the U.S. put one more preventive measure on maintaining cross-strait peace and security, in addition to traditional trilateral security interaction among the U.S., China, and Taiwan. As to the changing nature of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, unlike traditional understanding of the bilateral alliance that serves as major security mechanism for maintaining peaceful status quo of East Asia, Taipei regards the recent changes of the security alliance, both in new statements and Japan's new role, as Washington's indirect commitment to

Taiwan security.

The paper will first discuss the changing nature of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, to understand the evolving and current meaning of the security pact in East Asia. Then, the development of the role of Taiwan in the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be reviewed to make clear the relations between the security arrangement and Taiwan security. Third, the paper will also examine Japan's role and interests in both the U.S.-Japan security alliance and the U.S.-Taiwan security relations. Finally, by examining some recent changes of the U.S.-Japan security alliance and other U.S. security postures in the region, which in fact building a new San Francisco system in the region, the paper argues that Washington remains its security commitment toward Taiwan under regional context.

## **Changing Nature of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance**

The meaning and nature of the U.S.-Japan security alliance have evolved over time. The U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in 1951, was first revised in 1960, and in 1978 the two countries used a joint declaration of their defense cooperation guidelines to give the alliance a new significance. The signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the cold war was based on the ideas of containment and collective self-defense. The goal of containment was to prevent the expansion of Soviet power, while the idea of self-defense was based on the fact that this treaty is a defensive military alliance, whereby both sides agreed to collectively defend against a possible foreign invasive threat.

With the end of the cold war, the threat from the Soviet Union towards the North Pacific has already dissipated or disappeared, and the U.S.-Japan security alliance had to be given a new direction and definition in order to reflect new changes and developments in the Asia-Pacific security environment. The 1997 revisions to the guidelines for defense cooperation were in effect a joint response to the new situation in the Asia Pacific region after the cold war. Generally speaking, the treaty still takes collective self-defense<sup>1</sup> and balance of threat as the basis for strategic planning, but includes more preventive and crisis-management measures.

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<sup>1</sup> For the discussion of collective self-defense, please see D. Bowett, "Collective Self-Defence Under the Charter," *British Yearbook of International Law*, Vol. 32, 1955-6, pp. 142-56; and Anthony Clark Arend & Robert J. Beck, *International Law and the Use of Force* (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 70-82.

This method of regional security organizations or bilateral or multilateral security agreements combines the abilities and determination among countries, raising the costs of future challenges to the peaceful and stable status quo, serves to preserve regional peace and security, and for the purposes of this paper is referred to as preventive collective self-defense. In other words, it is not a case of pure collective armed self-defensive behavior, but rather a preventive collective arrangement to ensure that the peace and security of a region are not harmed. This arrangement might take the form of regional security organizations or of bilateral or multilateral defensive military alliances. The reason for which states sign treaties to create regional security organizations or military alliances, aside from when they are under attack and need other states to commit to assisting in their defense, is primarily to share in the active prevention of possible military attacks prior to the actual attack, and also to improve their collective crisis management abilities in the event of future conflicts. The ideas of collective self-defense and preventive national defense go hand in hand with constructing and maintaining peace, and are a method for guaranteeing a stable and peaceful status quo, and for preserving international and regional security. .

The American collective security apparatus in the Asia Pacific region is based on strengthening existing bilateral military alliances, such as those with Japan, Korea, Australia and New Zealand, the Philippines, and Thailand. These bilateralist defensive military alliances on the one hand provide a basis for American troops to maintain their presence in the Asia-Pacific region, on the other serve as the ties for collective self-defense. Among these military alliances, the U.S.-Japan security system as constructed by the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance is the most important. In the 1997 New Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan security alliance are based on the idea of collective self-defense, a method combines the strength and determination of two Asia Pacific powers, and a strategic apparatus for preserving the peace and security of the Asia Pacific region.

Why does a hegemonic country like the United States need to construct a military alliance system centered on the idea of collective self-defense? This issue can be analyzed using a modification of the realist balance of power theory, namely balance of threat theory<sup>2</sup>. According this theory, a state will not necessarily alter its foreign policy based purely on whether another in the system is growing or shrinking in power, but rather on the aspirations and behavior of that state as manifested in its foreign policy. If a new power threatens to challenge a state with vested interests in the existing system, then the state or states in question will opt for balance of power

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<sup>2</sup> See Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987).

or active containment policies in response to this threat to guard against changes in the order or stability of the system.<sup>3</sup> The hegemon state will ally with those regional powers that are willing to accept the existing order, on the one hand assuring the security of regional status quo countries, and on the other hand combine forces to demonstrate the power and determination to preserve the peace and stability of the status quo. The U.S.-Japan security treaty is exactly an alliance of existing status quo states to maintain current peace and stability in the region.

## **Development of the Role of Taiwan in the US-Japan Security Relations**

### **Linkage between the US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty**

The US-Japan Security Treaty was signed at the same time with San Francisco Peace Treaty, and became effective on Apr. 28, 1952. Since Japan was persuaded by the US to sign a treaty with ROC instead of PRC, Japan had signed a Peace Treaty with ROC on Apr. 28, 1952<sup>4</sup>. With regard to the bilateral treaty between the United States and ROC, negotiations began after the PLA started the full-scale attack on Kinmen on Sept. 3, 1954 and caused the first Taiwan Strait Crisis. On Nov. 2 of that year, the US started the negotiation with Taiwan and formally signed the Mutual Defense Treaty on Dec. 2, 1954. Thus under the influence of US Far East strategy, the “Taiwan factor” was formed by the linkage of US-Japan Security Treaty and US defense commitment toward Taiwan.

One of the clear examples of this “Taiwan factor” in the linkage of US-Japan Security Treaty and US defense commitment toward Taiwan is the so-called “the Far East article.” The first article of the US-Japan Security Treaty refers to the function of US armed forces based in Japan in the Far East as follows; “Japan grants, and the United States of America accepts, the right, upon the coming into force of the Treaty of Peace and of this Treaty, to dispose United States land, air and sea forces in and about Japan. Such forces may be utilized to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East and to the security of Japan against

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<sup>3</sup> For a comparison of balance of power theory and balance of threat theory, see Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Christensen, “US-Japan Relations and China’s Strategic Thinking 1948-51,” [http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/TR\\_Christensen.htm](http://www.fas.harvard.edu/~asiactr/archive/TR_Christensen.htm)

armed attack from without, including assistance given at the express request of the Japanese Government to put down large-scale internal riots and disturbances in Japan, caused through instigation or intervention by an outside power or powers.” This is the so-called “Far East article.” Since the area of the “Far East” was not clearly defined, this article later became the central issue of the discussion on whether Japan would be involved when the United States decided to take actions in the Taiwan Strait.

From the US perspective, the importance of the US-Japan security system is to maintain the presence of US armed forces in Japan as an important element of its Far-East strategy. Under the US-Japan Security Treaty, the US is required to defend Japan. On the other hand, Japan secured US defense commitment, and by confining the area of “action against mutual danger” to the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea and airspace resolved the collective self-defense right problem.<sup>5</sup>

According to the Article 6, also referred as the “Far-East article,” of the revised US-Japan Security Treaty<sup>6</sup> (formally “Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between Japan and the United States of America”), “[F]or the purpose of contributing to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East, the United States of America is granted the use by its land, air and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan.” Japan is required to provide bases for US armed forces, and the US utilized the bases in Japan as an important basis for its Far-East strategy. As a result, even after the redefinition of US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, the basic structure of the linkage of US-Japan Security Treaty and US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty did not change at all, as long as the “Taiwan factor” concerns.

## **The “Taiwan Factor” in the US-Japan Security Treaty**

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<sup>5</sup> However, there still exists the question whether Japan can defend the US forces in “the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea and airspace” when it is under attack. Regarding this issue, Syuzo Hayashi, Director of Cabinet Legislation Bureau answered during the Budget Committee meeting on Feb. 13, 1960, “If “the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea and airspace” is not under attack, it is impossible to attack US armed forces stationing in Japan. Therefore, when the attack toward “the geographic scope of Japanese territorial land, sea and airspace” is excluded, Japanese action is equal to exercising the right of individual self-defense.” It means defending the US armed forces stationed in Japan is only the exercise of the right of individual self- defense. Akihiko Tanaka, *Anzenhoshō: Sengo 50nen no Mosaku* (Security: Fifty Years’ Search), Yomiuri Shimbun, 1997, p.178.

<sup>6</sup> To mend flaws of the US-Japan Security Treaty, the revised treaty was defined as follows:  
Article 1: The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international disputes in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

Article 10: After the Treaty has been in force for ten years, either Party may give notice to the other Party of its intention to terminate the Treaty, in which case the Treaty shall terminate one year after such notice has been given. Also, “internal riots” was deleted from the Treaty. Full text, see <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19600119.T1E.html>

The “Taiwan factor” formed by the linkage of US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty was first recognized in the Japanese Government’s official view on “the area of Far East” released on Feb. 26, 1960<sup>7</sup>. According to this official view, the Far East is not a “geographical” concept. The official view pointed out that “based on the Treaty, Japan and the United States share concerns on international peace and security in the Far East area,” but also pointed out that “generally speaking, this includes the area north of the Republic of the Philippines, Japan and its surrounding area, including Korea and the area governed by the Republic of China.” Later, “the area governed by the Republic of China” was rephrased into the “Taiwan area.”<sup>8</sup>

However, when Japan tried to normalize relations with China in the beginning of the 1970s, the “Taiwan factor” formed by this linkage of US-Japan Security Treaty and the US-Taiwan Mutual Defense Treaty became an obstacle. Japan nevertheless did not have a choice to risk the US-Japan security arrangement merely for establishing diplomatic relations with PRC. As a result, the Japanese government worked out a very articulate, yet very ambiguous concept: No conflict would happen in the Taiwan Strait. “Prime Ministers such as Kakuei Tanaka and Masayoshi Ohira, even a hawk-wing PM Eisaku Sato, never hoped to engage in war with China again. However, if the US was willing to involve in defending Taiwan, Japan could not say ‘we are unable to help concerning with Taiwan.’ Therefore, the strategy they applied was to say, “that kind of situation would not happen.”<sup>9</sup>

Hereafter, Japan has been maintaining the same ambiguous attitude toward this “Taiwan factor” and stresses that it is necessary for its strategic advantage. However, during the discussion of the new National Defense Program Outline in 1995,<sup>10</sup> the problem of defining “the area surrounding Japan” re-emerged, particularly the question on whether this “area surrounding Japan” includes Taiwan, which concerned China the most. Toward this question, the Japanese government repeated an ambiguous explanation that the expressions in the outline did not mean to change the

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<sup>7</sup> *Handbook for Defense 2001* (Asagumo Syuppan, 2001), 619-620.

<sup>8</sup> Philip Yang, “US-Japan Security and Asia Pacific Security,” *Journal of Political Science* 9 (Chinese), (June 1998): 291.

<sup>9</sup> “Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka remarked in the press conference on Sept. 30, 1972 upon the return from China, “the precondition the US assumes is that China will not use force against Taiwan and Taiwan also will not use force against the mainland. ... I assume that this kind of situation will be avoided and impossible to happen.” Press Conference by Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka, Sept. 30, 1972,” *Asahi Shimbun*, (June 14, 1998), <http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/JPCH/19720930.O1J.html>

<sup>10</sup> National Defense Program Outline was adopted in Nov. 1995. For the full Text, see [http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f\\_work/taikou/index\\_e.htm](http://www.jda.go.jp/e/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.htm)



government's official view on the definition of the Far East.<sup>11</sup> This episode demonstrated again the close connection between the "Taiwan factor" and the "Far East article," and for a long time, from the Japanese point of view, the "Far East article" is the price to be paid to obtain a US defense commitment. It was not a Japanese strategic choice, but merely a result which is of non-strategic nature.

### **1996 Missile Test Crisis**

The 1996 missile crisis, which happened in the Taiwan Strait area, was probably the first time Tokyo felt that the Japanese involvement in a military conflict between the US and China over Taiwan is a real possibility. The 1996 missile test crisis happened when the US-Japan relationship was in a kind of transition. To deal with the crisis, the US and Japan tried to maintain close interaction and kept the ambiguous attitude toward the Taiwan issue based on definitions of the US-Japan Security Treaty. This experience during the missile crisis indirectly encouraged the two nations to revise the Guideline and strengthen the US-Japan security alliance.

In March 1996, when China fired ballistic missiles near Taiwan before the island to hold its first popular presidential election, Japan joined the U.S. in condemning China's missile exercise. Yoichi Funabashi pointed out that the 1996 missile crisis was one of the three "security shocks" Tokyo government experienced in the latter part of the 1990s. Tokyo realized that military conflict in the Taiwan Straits would pose a major challenge for Japan's role and policy. The incident "prompted Japan to join the West in criticizing China for its missile diplomacy and added to Japan's motivation to formulate new Japan-U.S. defense guidelines."<sup>12</sup>

During the Missile crisis, the main concern for Prime Minister Hashimoto was how to rescue Japanese nationals in Taiwan if a military conflict occurred. Other possible issues are refugees, coastal safety, anti-terrorism, and how to support the US forces in the region.<sup>13</sup> Tokyo also found out that it does not have sufficient information sources to evaluate the developments of the tension across the Taiwan Strait. Washington provided only limited information, for the sake of its own strategic planning, for Tokyo about PLA's deployment and actions<sup>14</sup>.

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<sup>11</sup> Chief Cabinet Secretary's Press Conference, (Nov. 28, 1996), see <http://www.jda.go.jp/j/defense/policy/taikou/naikan.htm>

<sup>12</sup> Yoichi Funabashi, "Tokyo Temperance," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no.3 (Summer 2000): 135-136.

<sup>13</sup> See Yoichi Funabashi, *Domei Hyoryu* [Alliance Adrift] (Iwanami Shoten, 1997)

<sup>14</sup> "One Taiwanese magazine even reported that Japan played a crucial role in convincing the United States to dispatch aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait during the 1996 missile crisis, a local weekly

When the United States decided to dispatch the Independence Aircraft carrier to the region on March 3, Washington did inform Tokyo in advance, but not as a form of “prior consultation” which is a requirement or precondition for any changes and deployment of the US forces stationed in the Japanese bases in accordance with the 1979 Guidelines of the Japan-US Security Treaty. As to the dispatch of the Nimitz aircraft carrier, due to the delay caused by the American Ambassador W. Mondale, Tokyo did not receive any notice before the Nimitz’s dispatch on March 11 though the Self-Defense Force received some information from its US counterpart through private channels about US decision and strategies. This situation made many Japanese politicians and officials surprised about the lack of connection and information exchange between Washington and Tokyo.

The 1996 Missile Crisis in the Taiwan Strait crisis injected a security dimension into the Japanese debates on Taiwan and created further strains on Japan’s existing Taiwan policy as many draw serious security implications for Japan from the incident. The Missile Crisis demonstrated that post-cold war turbulence could also occur in Asia, bringing with it the potential for causing damage to both the economies and political stability of the region. Japan has learned from this experience that any military conflict in the region will cause tremendous damage on Japan’s own interests and stability. Therefore, how to express its own position and attitude in the complex cross-strait issue and US-Taiwan security issues has become one of the major concerns for many Japanese scholars and politicians.

### **The 1997 New Guidelines**

In the past, the US expected Japan to provide operational bases or necessary equipments and costs without participating in the decision-making process if the US engages in a situation in a remote part of Asia. However, early as the first Gulf War had demonstrated that this kind of bilateral cooperation was already not enough. Japan would not welcome a US request for assistance without any involvement in the decision-making process.<sup>15</sup> Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, Japan started to shift its focus from its heavy reliance on the US-Japan Security Treaty System to multilateral security systems, based on its self-confidence acquired through economic success. After the Gulf war, the voice, both in the U.S. and Japan, to require Japan to carry more burdens to defend itself and support US’s regional security actions has risen, and

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magazine reported,” *China Times*, March 25, 2002.

<sup>15</sup> James Morley, “Nihon no anzenhosho mondai niokeru chiiki kyoryoku no yakuwari,” [Japan’s Role in Security Regional Cooperation], in *Ajia Taiheiyo ni okeru Kokusai Kyoryoku* [International Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: Japan’s Role], ed. Seigen Miyasato (Tokyo, Sanrei Publisher, 1998), 214-215.

the 1996 Missile crisis provides the background for the conclusion of the 1997 new guideline of the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

The 1997 revision of the guidelines included the study of possible ways of military cooperation in case of regional emergencies, and Japan's role under the new security arrangement is significantly different. Before, it was simply a provider of bases for American forces to advance troops; now, it provides support for American military actions. Both countries understand that in the post-Cold War period, the primary threats and greatest military hotspots in East Asia are the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, not Japan itself. Yet secondary regional military conflicts will influence the security and stability of the entire region; for this reason, Japan, under the new security alliance, agrees to provide necessary supports and bases to American troops, allowing the United States greater flexibility and assistance in facing potential military conflicts. Accordingly, the New Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are still based on the idea of collective self-defense, a strategic plan for combining the strength and resolve of Asia-Pacific's two power countries to preserve the peace and security of the region.

Whether the US military action in the Taiwan Strait can be included in the “prior consultation” requirement of the Article 6 of 1960 Japan-US Alliance Treaty is a major debate among Japanese officials and academia. Nonetheless, under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S. Third Marine Expeditionary Forces are stationed on Japanese bases in Okinawa Prefecture -- close to China, underscoring Japan's possible entanglement in U.S.-China conflict because the furthest reach of the Okinawan archipelago extends southeast of Taipei. Generally, it is accepted that the United States government would be the one that ultimately decides whether the New Guidelines will apply to Taiwan and whether the US needs Japan's logistic support in the region.

Nevertheless, many commentators reckon that U.S.-Japan security alliance is not only a bilateral arrangement, but also a regional balancing mechanism. As a matter of fact, simply by maintaining this unique security alliance with the US and providing bases for the U.S. military forward deployment in East Asia, Japan has already indirectly involved in the cross-strait security issues. With the mechanism of prior consultation and concept of surrounding area, Japan can play a more active role in the cross-strait and US-Taiwan security issues. Many Japanese also believe that the US-Japan security treaty is the best answer to dealing with a more threatening China, given the constraints of their domestic legal stipulation. They stressed the need to reinforce the US-Japan security treaty and strengthen the Japanese military role under

the treaty as a deterrent against China's potential use of force against Taiwan. To show Tokyo's support for the regional and global leadership of the United States, therefore, it will be legitimate to expect Japan's new role and posture in the cross-strait security issue.<sup>16</sup>

## **2005 "Two-Plus-Two" Statement**

In February 2005, the United States and Japan issued a joint statement, after a top ministerial meeting in Washington of the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee between Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura and defense chief Yoshinori Ono, stated that "encourage the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" as a "common strategic objective" of the U.S. and Japan.

It is the first time that the governments of the United States and Japan have ever issued a joint statement concerning the Taiwan Strait in the half-century US-Japanese alliance. In the past, the Taiwan Strait is seldom, if at all, referred to in a formal document in the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This was described by U.S. officials as a new element in a close military association that dates from the aftermath of World War II.<sup>17</sup>

In addition, senior officials of the two countries also talked about China's rapid military modernization program, calling it a matter of concern, and urged Beijing to be more transparent in its military planning and weapons procurement. But the statement also said that one of the common strategic objectives in Asia was to "develop a cooperative relationship with China, welcoming the country to play a responsible and constructive role regionally as well as globally."<sup>18</sup>

The general reactions in Taiwan toward this statement are positive. Besides signaling that the US wants to strengthen cooperation with Japan and increase mutual defense responsibilities, the statement also highlights two key issues: the normalization of Japanese security policy, and; a new trend in the development of the US-Japan security alliance. While the statement isn't a direct reaction to Beijing's new

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<sup>16</sup> See Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, and Ashley Tellis, *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2001), 70.

<sup>17</sup> Edward Cody, "China Protests U.S.-Japan Accord -Ministry Cites Stance on Taiwan, Criticism of Military Buildup," Washington Post, Feb. 21, 2005.

anti-secession law, its content and timing can easily be interpreted as aimed at sending a message to Beijing.

For Washington, the U.S. has often encouraged Japan to play a more active role in regional security. Bush administration officials close to Japan have consistently pressed it to participate more fully in international and East Asian security affairs. Given that North Korea and China's rising military power represent challenges to the security order in East Asia, the US sees it as imperative that it strengthens its security relationship with Japan to deal with any possible changes in the status quo.

Also, the focus of the second Bush administration's Taiwan policy is to deter both Taipei and Beijing from unilaterally changing the status quo, especially given the enactment of Beijing's anti-secession law and Taipei's intention to revise its Constitution and to hold a referendum on rejoining the United Nations. Since there remains explosive potential for conflict in the Taiwan Strait, strengthening the US-Japan military alliance is a realistic strategy for the US.

For Japan, Tokyo has wanted to effect a change in Japanese security policy to put it on the path towards becoming a 'normal' great power. Mentioning Taiwan by name in the statement of the U.S.-Japan security alliance was a shift for Japan. The Japanese government has previously called unilaterally for peace in the Taiwan Strait, and in 1997 New Guidelines has offered logistical but not military support to the United States in case of a conflict between Taiwan and mainland China. But Japan has been much more cautious about including any reference to Taiwan in bilateral security statements with the United States. The statement represented a departure from the previous stance that Japan will only work together with the United States by providing logistic and base supports in areas surrounding Japan.

Although it has continued to emphasize self-defense, both the Defense White Paper and Defense Guidelines published in recent years contained a new, active Japanese defense policy, which pays close attention to challenges in the regional security environment. For example, the Defense Guidelines stated that 'there exist extremely murky and uncertain factors in the situations on the Korean Peninsula and in the Taiwan Strait'. It also stated that 'China's direction is worth watching', and that 'China not only has nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, but also continues to push the modernization of its navy and air force and further expand its activities in the Pacific'. These statements are consistent with the recent joint statement of concern about the Taiwan Strait, and display an attitude towards regional security that Tokyo feels a normal country ought to have.

Furthermore, there is of course a deeper reason for this change in Japanese policy. In the late 1980s, the US often criticized Japan for unfair trade practices, and exerted much political and diplomatic pressure on Japan to revalue the yen and adopt voluntary export quotas. In the book *Japan Can Say No*, the authors - Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara and Sony founder Akio Morita - expressed dissatisfaction that Japan had to follow American directives, and hoped that Japan could escape the self-imposed limits of its diplomacy and become a normal country.

These days, Japanese nationalism and conservatism are again on the rise. Although this trend has been influenced by various international factors, in particular the North Korean nuclear and hostage issues, it can be accounted for mostly by the potential China threat and Beijing's unending criticism of historical issues. As a result, government contacts between China and Japan have reached their lowest level in recent years, despite the increasing interdependence of their economies. Using the US-Japan alliance to express concern about the Taiwan Strait is thus another way for Japan to say no, but this time to China rather than to the US.

With respect to the US-Japan alliance, the joint statement clearly indicates that security in the Taiwan Strait is the common strategic goal of the US and Japan. The sixth clause of the 1960 US-Japan Security Treaty, the famous 'Far East Clause', specifies that the purpose of stationing US troops in Japan is to protect the peace and security of the Far East region. In the 1997 US-Japan New Security Guideline, however, the 'Far East' was changed to 'Japan's Surrounding Areas'. The key issue is that of what exactly constitutes the 'Far East' and 'Japan's Surrounding Areas'.

The US and Japan have emphasized that these terms refer not to a geographic concept, but a situational concept - whatever directly impinges on the peace and security of Japan. Thus, the recent joint statement represents a further specification of what constitutes 'Japan's Surrounding Areas', to a certain extent replacing strategic ambiguity with strategic clarity. It also shows that the US and Japan will be in closer consultation and cooperation on regional security matters, including the Taiwan Strait.

If the United States were to defend Taiwan in a major crisis, the 2005 Two-Plus-Two statement would almost certainly obligate Japan to assist U.S. forces. This is not a circumstance and choice that Tokyo would welcome, and this judgment leaves unstated the precise role Japan would assume under such circumstances. Given the extreme sensitivities associated with U.S. contingency planning for a Taiwan scenario, this lack of Japanese specificity seems doubly understandable. The 2005 Two-Plus-Two joint statement by the US and Japan has at least clearly indicated that

any action influencing the status quo in the Taiwan Strait will arouse the mutual concern of both powers.

### **2007 Two-Plus-Two Statement**

However, in May 2007, the two plus two statement issued by the US and Japanese foreign and defense ministers after wrapping up the US-Japan Security Consultative Committee talks in Washington did not include the sentence "encouraging the peaceful resolution of issues concerning the Taiwan Strait through dialogue" as part of a common strategic objective, as it did in the statement issued two years ago. This has been noted and interpreted variously on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as well as in other East Asian states.

This could be a tactical change in response to situational changes involving three factors. First of all, cross-strait security was included in the US' and Japan's common strategic objectives in 2005 in response to Beijing's passage of its "Anti-Secession" Law legalizing military action against Taiwan. Beijing seemed to believe that the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) continued hold on power following the 2004 presidential election might increase the risk for unilateral changes to the cross-strait "status quo."

Thus the situation in the Taiwan Strait was addressed in the US-Japan security treaty with emphasis on the strategic benefits of a peaceful resolution. Today, two years later, Beijing has adopted softer policies, and US restrictions have pushed Taiwan back inside the "four noes" framework. Although the cross-strait stand-off remains, it seems there is a slight decrease in the risk of military conflict.

The second reason is the recent improvement in bilateral Sino-US and Sino-Japanese relations. The China policies of former Japanese prime minister Junichiro Koizumi and former US secretary of defense Donald Rumsfeld were filled with suspicion, but the appointments of US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick and US Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson have led to a redefinition of the Sino-US relationship.

During his visit to China, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe also proposed that Japan and China establish a mutually beneficial strategic relationship, which seems to imply the beginnings of trilateral interaction between the US, China and Japan. Abe's meeting with US President George W. Bush in Washington was

probably the final crucial meeting to decide that the cross-strait relationship should not be included in the "2-plus-2" statement this time, which shows that the US and Japan want security cooperation with China.

The third reason is a preventative tactical adjustment, since the Chinese government was very displeased with the 2005 Two-Plus-Two statement and has questioned the real intentions behind the US-Japan security treaty. If the cross-strait issue is mentioned again, it could instead lead to the People's Liberation Army testing the treaty by strengthening military deployments and even initiating a minor incident, thus creating a tense situation that could erupt into war.

From another perspective, the US and Japan do not want to send the wrong message to Taiwan. Faced with the presidential election in Taiwan in 2008 and the calls for a United Nations referendum, they worry that making the cross-strait situation a common strategic objective once again will be seen as an endorsement in Taiwan and may cause the government to commit actions that change the cross-strait status quo. To avoid sending wrong signals, the US and Japan would probably refrain from mentioning the cross-strait issue even if the first two factors didn't exist.

The strategic intent of the US-Japan security alliance, however, has not changed. When taking questions at the press conference for the talks on military and security issues, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stressed that the US' Taiwan, cross-strait and East Asia policies remained unchanged and they still adhered to the "one China" policy. She also urged the two governments to avoid unilateral changes to the status quo and said that she did not want to see military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. This was followed by US officials stressing that it would be a mistake to think that US policy has changed just because the cross-strait situation was not mentioned in the statement this time around.

One should of course not make the mistake of thinking that the objective of the US-Japan treaty is to contain China or build an alliance with Taiwan. The purpose of the treaty is, on one hand, to maintain the current peace in East Asia by legalizing the US military presence there and, on the other hand, to let Japan participate in the logistics and base operations supporting US actions.

The treaty stipulates that the two countries' military forces -- lately with the addition of Australia -- comprise a military mechanism for the active defense of the status quo in order to stabilize the regional situation and to prevent war from breaking out. The key point remains that there has been no major change to the US' East Asia and cross-strait policies.



Unless the US and Japan make a clear negative statement to reject the 2005 statement, policy intent and strategic effects remain on record. Taiwan should thus look at the issue from the international, regional and cross-strait perspectives, as well as big power relations and the security strategies for regional stability. This would give a deeper understanding of the relationship between the US-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security and cross-strait security. We must not misinterpret the significance of the 2005 statement, nor should we be worried that this year's statement makes no mention of the cross-strait issue<sup>19</sup>.

## **Japan's Role and Interests in the US-Japan Security Alliance and the US-Taiwan Security Relations**

Japan's role in the US-Taiwan security relations is a rarely discussed but increasingly more important topic. Discussions of Japan-Taiwan-US security relations mostly focus on either the Taiwan factor in the Japanese security policies or whether and how the Japan-US security alliance covers Taiwan. The role of Japan in the cross-strait and US-Taiwan security issues has not been examined thoroughly in many academic researches. Though Beijing has admitted and taken every possible opportunity to remind US officials that Taiwan is the central and most sensitive issue in Sino-US relations, Beijing does not allow any interference or existence of Taiwan factor in the bilateral relationship between China and Japan. Traditionally, therefore, Japanese government remains passive and exercises strong self-constraint in spelling out its own attitude with regard to cross-strait security issue and US-Taiwan security relations. However, with the development and changes of regional security environment, Japan's role in US-Taiwan security relations is gradually expanding.

As mentioned that the U.S. and Japan have overlapping interests in maintaining cross-strait peace and preserving Taiwan's maturing democracy and free-market economy. Geographically, the location of Taiwan near vital sea-lanes in the region, not to mention that the PRC could further develop its navy forces if it has access to Taiwan's ports, therefore, for long-term strategic interests, the U.S. and Japan would like to maintain current status quo across the Taiwan Strait. Since normalizing relations with the PRC in 1972, Japan has maintained an unofficial and commercial ties with Taiwan.

The role of Japan is always a major concern in the U.S.-Japan security alliance.

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<sup>19</sup> Philip Yang, "The US-Japan Cross-Straight Nod," Taipei Times, May 10, 2007.

In the past, the US expected Japan to provide operational bases or necessary equipments and costs without participating the process of decision-making, if an emergent situation that the US identifies its necessity to engage happens in a remote part of Asia. However, the Gulf War demonstrated that this kind of bilateral cooperation was already not enough. Japan would not welcome US request for assistance without any involvement in the decision-making process.<sup>20</sup> After the Gulf war, the voice, both in the U.S. and Japan, to require Japan to carry more burdens to defend Japan and support US's regional security actions has become the major theme in the new guideline of the U.S.-Japan security alliance. Meanwhile, in the early 1990s, Japan started to shift its focus from its heavy reliance on the US-Japan Security Treaty System to multilateral security systems, based on its self-confidence acquired through the economic success<sup>21</sup>.

In the 1997 New Guidelines, Japan's role is significantly different. Before 1997, Japan was simply a provider of bases for American forces advance troops; now, it provides support for American military actions. Both countries understand that in the post-Cold War period, the primary threats and greatest military hotspots in East Asia are the Korean Peninsula and the Taiwan Strait, not Japan itself. Yet secondary regional military conflicts will influence the security and stability of the entire region; for this reason, Japan, under the new security alliance arrangement, agrees to provide necessary supports and bases to American troops, allowing the United States greater flexibility and assistance in facing potential military conflicts. Accordingly, the New Guidelines for the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance are still based on the idea of collective self-defense, a strategic plan for combining the strength and resolve of Asia-Pacific's two power countries to preserve the peace and security of the region. The aim of the newly revised U.S.-Japan alliance is to be able to guarantee a peaceful and stable environment in the East Asia region, thus benefiting all countries in the region. The United States has pledged to help in the defense of Taiwan, potentially including the dispatch of military forces to counter any attack by China across the 100-mile-wide Taiwan Strait. In that light, Japanese help in defending the sea lanes north of Taiwan would be of great value to the U.S. military if the U.S. Navy were ordered into the area.

U.S.-Japan security alliance is not only a bilateral arrangement, but also a regional balancing mechanism. In terms of US-Japan security alliance, though a major arrangement for maintaining regional stability, it is the United States government that will ultimately decide whether the New Guidelines and 2005 Two-Plus-Two statement

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<sup>20</sup> James Morley, "Nihon no anzenhosho mondai niokeru chiiki kyoryoku no yakuwari" (Japan's Role in Security Regional Cooperation), *Ajia Taiheiyo ni okeru Kokusai Kyoryoku* (International Cooperation in Asia-Pacific: Japan's Role), Seigen Miyasato Ed., Sanrei Publisher, Tokyo, 1998, pp.214-215.

<sup>21</sup> Ted Osius, *The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2002), p.6.

will apply to Taiwan and whether the US needs Japan's logistic support in the region. As a matter of fact, simply by maintaining this unique security alliance with the US and providing bases for the U.S. military forward deployment in East Asia, Japan has already indirectly involved in the cross-strait security issues.

Though Japan has a military comprising 240,000 personnel -- more than Britain -- and a defense budget of about \$50 billion, yet military activities are restricted by the constitution, which renounces war as a means to settle disputes. Its domestic pacifism and party politics also exclude Japan's active participation in international and regional security activities. Only after the Gulf war, Japan has started to expand its contribution to the UN peacekeeping missions and activities.

The Sept. 11 terrorist attack helped Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi push legislation expanding the role of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) through the Diet. It signaled a major turning point in Japanese security and foreign policy<sup>22</sup>. In response to the anti-terrorism, Koizumi government adopted some new legal framework to implement its new security policy and posture. First, The Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law<sup>23</sup> intends to enable Japan to contribute actively on its own initiative to the efforts of the international community for the prevention and eradication of international terrorism, thereby ensuring the peace and security of the international community including Japan itself, through such activities as (1) cooperation and support activities for the armed forces of the United States and other countries, which aim to eradicate the threat of the terrorist attacks, (2) search and rescue activities for such foreign forces, and (3) relief activities for affected people. Second, an amendment to the Self-Defense Forces Law<sup>24</sup> allows military forces to protect U.S. military facilities in Japan, and an amendment to the Maritime Safety Agency Law permits the coast guard to use weapons against suspicious ships in Japanese waters.

As to Japan's role and position in the cross-strait issue, due to domestic considerations and China's pressure, Japanese government remains passive and exercises strong self-constraint in spelling out its own policy. However, with the changes of regional security environment and Japan's security posture, Tokyo gradually comes to the realization that it has to face new challenges in the cross-strait security issue. Economic interests and regional stability are the two reasons mentioned by commentators for Japan to play a role in the cross-strait security issue.

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<sup>22</sup> Daniel M. Kliman, *Japan's Security Strategy in the Post-9/11 World* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006), pp. 67-92.

<sup>23</sup> Full Text in Japanese; see <http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/kakugikettei/2001/1102terohou.html>

<sup>24</sup> Full text of the amendment in Japanese; see *Gaiko Forum*, Special Issue of 1999, Toshi Syuppan, 1999, p. 139.

Indeed, Japan's economic and trade interests in the region depend upon peaceful cross-strait situation. And a balanced and stable US-Taiwan security relationship can contribute to the maintenance of regional stability. However, China is re-rising as both a regional political actor and international economic power in the new century. Japan is also reluctant to jeopardize its vital economic and geopolitical relations with China.

There are three other new factors for Japan to play a more active role in the US-Taiwan security relations. First, a growing pro-Taiwan sentiment shared by many Japanese people and politicians has become a strong voice in Japan. Secondly, a more active role in the US-Taiwan security relations could support US regional policy and enhance US-Japan security alliance. And thirdly, Japan has become more confident in its new international and regional security posture.

However, some other factors may prohibit Japan to play a more active role in the US-Taiwan security relations and cross-strait issues. These include legal constraints and pacifism, domestic politics considerations, and the China factor. Though Japanese government has passed legislation to assist US forces in the event of a regional conflict, Japan's constitutional limitation, domestic politics, and pacifism make it very difficult and ambiguous for the Japanese government to help the US military involvement in the Taiwan Strait.

Japan's intention to remain a strong bond of alliance with the United States lies in a growing complex regional security environment, if not military threat, and also a need to have a more active voice in international and regional affairs. With regard to its role in the cross-strait and US-Taiwan security relations, however, Japan is traditionally viewed as an invisible factor behind the scenes -- by supporting US military forward deployment in the region and maintaining close informal ties with Taiwan.

As a RAND report issued in September 2001 indicates, Japan's geographical location itself is vital, because US bases in Okinawa would play a crucial part, to maintain the option to assist Taiwan in case of a possible conflict China. The report even suggests that the USAF needs a new base in some of the southwestern islands of Okinawa archipelago (the report cited Shimoji-Jima as an ideal candidate site), and a quid pro quo arrangement, such as the removal or reduction of U.S. forces elsewhere in the islands, would be required to acquire a foothold in the critical area surrounding the Taiwan Strait.<sup>25</sup>

Some argue that Japan and Taiwan have long been referred to as "silent alliance" and it is only natural to express Japan's concern of Taiwan's self-defense

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<sup>25</sup> Khalilzad and others, *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, *op cit.*, p.73.

capability and its security relations with the U.S. However, while this may be true in Japanese defense establishment, who would like to make sure that the sea-lanes in the Taiwan Strait and beyond remain safe, should the situation get rough, but in policy and strategy circles, such expression is still a bit too optimistic.

US-Japan security alliance is the cornerstone for maintaining peaceful status quo in Asia-Pacific region, in which the bilateral security arrangement combine the strength and determination of two major countries in the region. To show its support for the regional and global leadership of the United States, therefore, it will be legitimate to expect Japan's new role and posture in the cross-strait security issue. It is true that Japanese government would rather not to choose between preserving the US-Japan alliance and friendly relations with China. However, if the situation forces Tokyo to make a decision, the choice is clear<sup>26</sup>.

## **U.S. Security Commitment Toward Taiwan Remain Unchanged?**

In the past several years, dramatic changes regarding both the U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships happened simultaneously. Changes in the U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan relationships in the past five years can no longer be regarded as a zero-sum game, which had been the case during the cold-war era of the strategic triangle relationship among Beijing, Taipei, and Washington. In fact, U.S.-China and U.S.-Taiwan bilateral relationships have become two independent sets of bilateral relationships. In other words, improvement or deterioration of any one set of bilateral relationship does not necessary lead to changes of the other set bilateral relationship.

### **Deterioration of Washington-Taipai Relations and Changes of Security Commitment for Taiwan?**

During President Chen two terms, so far, in order to expand Taiwan's status and participation in international arena and to rally voters to support the ruling party,

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<sup>26</sup> For example, US experts view that Japan might not permit strikes against China launched from its territory, but would permit its facilities to be used in the cross-strait military conflict, as long as Taipei had not done anything unreasonably provocative. Zalmay Khalilzad, David Orletsky, Jonathan Pollack, Kevin Pollpeter, Angel Rabasa, David Shlapak, Abram Shulsky, Ashley Tellis, *The United States and Asia: Toward a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture*, RAND, 2001, p.70.

Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), in domestic elections, President Chen adopted many measures and statements, which are regarded by Washington and Beijing as initiatives appears designed to change Taiwan's status quo unilaterally and could undermine peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. These measures and statements include rejection of the so-called "1992 consensus"<sup>27</sup>, support of "one country on each side" of the Strait, initiation of a defensive referendum on issues of cross strait relations and Taiwan's security,<sup>28</sup> abolition of the National Unification Council and the guidelines<sup>29</sup>, and, lately, support of holding a referendum on the country's bid to join the United Nations under the name "Taiwan." These actions have invited Bush administration to publicly condemn Taiwan in many occasions by various levels of American officials, including President Bush. Especially the referendum on using the name of Taiwan to join the United Nations, mutual trust between Washington and Taipei has been further infringed and brought relations to a new low.

The United States has made clear that it opposes the initiative because it appears designed to change Taiwan's status quo unilaterally. For the United States and possibly other countries, the issue goes far beyond Taiwan's domestic affairs, as they fear it could spark unnecessary tensions across the Taiwan Strait. From the U.S. perspective, Chen's initiative violates the spirit if not the letter of his "four no's" pledge, enunciated in 2000 when Chen was inaugurated as Taiwan's first DPP president. He said that he would not declare independence, change the national title, incorporate the concept of state-to-state relations between the island and the mainland in the Constitution of the Republic of China, or promote any referendum on independence or reunification. President Bush sees the "four-no's" as a commitment not just to the Taiwan people, but also to the international community and to himself.

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<sup>27</sup> Beijing and KMT officials maintained that in 1992, the two organizations authorized by each side to conduct cross-Strait negotiations, i.e. Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and China's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), had reached an agreement on the issue of "one China." However, the two sides differed in their understanding of the agreement—what became known as "1992 consensus." Beijing insisted that the formula meant "each side, through verbal means, expresses its insistence of one China." In contrast, the KMT said that it meant "one China, with each side having its own meaning." In other words, the 1992 consensus was an agreement to disagree - a *modus vivendi* that allowed the two sides to move forward in their dialogue.

<sup>28</sup> On Jan. 16, 2004, Chen announced the two questions of the now re-named "peaceful referendum". The first and main question was "Should mainland China refuse to withdraw the missiles it has targeted at Taiwan and to openly renounce the use of force against us, would you agree that the government should acquire more advanced antimissile weapons to strengthen the country's self-defense capabilities?" The second question, clearly intended to attract moderate Taiwan voters, as well as allay concerns in Washington and Beijing, read, "Would you agree that our government should engage in negotiation with mainland China to establish a peace and stability framework for cross-strait integrations in order to build a consensus for the welfare of the peoples on both sides of the strait?"

<sup>29</sup> The National Unification Council was set up in 1990 as an attempt to convince the Chinese authorities that Taiwan was committed to reunification, and it helped kick-start landmark talks between the two sides in the early 1990s.

Washington has come to believe that President Chen's moves to conduct referendum and other provocative actions are to alter the current dynamic that exists between the two sides. This is like driving through a long tunnel, where no matter what section of the tunnel you are in, the status quo remains the same. Upon reaching the end of the tunnel, however, one finds the destination to have changed. In May 2006, the US rejected Taiwan's request for Chen's jet to land in New York or San Francisco on his way to visit Latin America, allowing the plane to land only in Alaska. Calling the arrangement humiliating, Chen dropped his US transit plan and made surprise stops in Dubai, Holland, Libya and Indonesia. All these countries recognize China and do not have diplomatic ties with Taiwan.

Any discussion of the cross-strait situation and Taiwan's safety should touch on three aspects: structural, domestic and personal. First, the structural aspect includes three sets of bilateral relations: Taiwan-US, Sino-US and cross-strait relations. This is the fundamental structural factor dominating the cross-strait issue and Taiwan's safety. Second, the domestic aspect refers to internal factors. In recent years, Taiwan's democratization and elections have turned local politics into a crucial element in the cross-strait issue and Taiwan's safety. Third, the personal aspect refers to individual political leaders. Thus, the personal character of Chen, Chinese President Hu Jintao and US President George W. Bush have gradually become key factors affecting stability across the Taiwan Strait.

Though we may argue that most these incidents are mainly caused by personal factors, and it also involves domestic factors to some extent, it has not yet affected the structural-level bilateral relations between Taiwan and the US. However, the mutual trust between the two sides has been in decline. Poor communication and lack of trust caused by domestic political maneuvering and personal disagreements -- from Chen's "one country on each side" dictum, the 2004 defensive referendum to the recent United Nations referendum -- has led to a serious decline in Taiwan-US relations. The Bush administration has gone from being the US administration most friendly to Taiwan, when Bush first became president, to seeing Taiwan as a thorn in its side.

On June 14, 2007, President Chen urged the United States to reaffirm at an opportune time the "Six Assurances" it made to Taiwan in 1982 so as to underscore that there has been no change in its stance on Taiwan. Chen's insistence on the Six Assurances was to make sure the U.S. will not change its position on Taiwan's sovereign status and prevent China from downgrading Taiwan in the international

community.<sup>30</sup> In 1982, during negotiations for the Third United States - China Joint Communiqué on Arms Sales to Taiwan, the Taiwan government presented the United States with six points that it proposed the United States use as guidelines in conducting United States - Taiwan relations. The Six Assurances include:

1. The United States would not set a date for termination of arms sales to Taiwan.
2. The United States would not alter the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act.
3. The United States would not consult with China in advance before making decisions about U.S. arms sales to Taiwan.
4. The United States would not mediate between Taiwan and China.
5. The United States would not alter its position about the sovereignty of Taiwan which was, that the question was one to be decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves, and would not pressure Taiwan to enter into negotiations with China.
6. The United States would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan.

As Randall Schriver points out, the debate over these six assurances is misleading. Schriver asks “[t]he more important questions relate to why government officials in Taiwan feel so insecure and so in need of public reassurance, and what the US can say and do to help provide genuine reassurance.”<sup>31</sup> While President Chen concerns more about the U.S. position on Taiwan’s sovereignty and whether there is a trend of “co-management” of Taiwan issue between the U.S. and China, the major question, for most Taiwanese, is that whether the deterioration of mutual trust between Taipei and Washington would cause negative impact on the U.S. security commitment toward Taiwan? Whether the U.S. could reassure number 2 of the Six Assurances - that whether the United States would not alter the security commitment terms of the Taiwan Relations Act?

Due to the deterioration of Washington-Taipei mutual trust and the developments of Washington-Beijing engagements, Washington no longer maintains its traditional security commitment toward Taiwan unconditionally. The United States has never

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<sup>30</sup> “President urges US to reaffirm six assurances to Taiwan,” Central News Agency, June 16, 2007.

<sup>31</sup> Randall Schriver, “Taiwan Needs ‘Six New Assurances’” Taipei Times, Aug. 22, 2007.



wavered from its commitment to the one-China policy, and Washington's commitment to Taiwan's security is predicated on the premise that Taiwan does not provoke Beijing with independence.

### **Building a New San Francisco System**

The San Francisco system refers to a series of bilateral defense agreements reached in the course of developing treaty relationships between the United States and the governments of Japan, the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand. The system was expanded in 1953 to include the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and in 1954 to include Taiwan. By the mid-1950s, US have consecutively signed multilateral or bilateral Mutual Defense Treaties with Southeast and Northeast Asian countries such as US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty (Aug. 30, 1951), ANZUS (Sept. 1, 1951), US-Japan Security Treaty (Sept. 8, 1951), US-ROK Mutual Defense Treaty (Oct. 1, 1953) and South East Asia Treaty Organization (Australia, France, New Zealand, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand, Britain and US signed on Sept. 8, 1954). The US-Japan Security Treaty was signed at the same time with San Francisco Peace Treaty, and became effective on Apr. 28, 1952.

As mentioned above, the meaning and nature of the U.S.-Japan security alliance have evolved over time. The U.S.-Japan security treaty, signed in 1951, was first revised in 1960, and in 1978 the two countries used a joint declaration of their defense cooperation guidelines to give the alliance a new significance. The signing of the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the cold war was based on the ideas of containment and collective self-defense. The goal of containment was to prevent the expansion of Soviet power, while the idea of self-defense was based on the fact that this treaty is a defensive military alliance, whereby both sides agreed to collectively defend against a possible foreign invasive threat.

The San Francisco system has provided Washington with political and economic leverage over the years. It is easy to understand why the United States has attempted to preserve the San Francisco system into the 21st century. Also, America's friends and allies prefer the system remain unchanged, since the United States is a familiar and benign hegemon in a time of unpredictable regional change. And it is precisely because the region is undergoing such fundamental change that a new San Francisco system is needed to maintain status quo.

Washington has built a new San Francisco system by: enhancing its bilateral military relations with Japan, Australia, and South Korea; maintaining strong military cooperation or linkage with Philippines, Thailand, and Taiwan; forming trilateral military cooperation, though not yet military alliance, among the U.S., Japan, and Australia; and helping Japan and Australia to sign security pact to enhance military relationship.

The major strategic purpose of the new San Francisco system is to maintain peaceful status quo in the East Asia. Facing a possible military conflict in the region, either a traditional armed conflict or a terrorist attack, the U.S.-centered San Francisco system will cope with any security challenges that may disturb regional peace and security. Following the strategic design of the 1997 New Guidelines of the U.S.-Japan security alliance, the new San Francisco system also takes preventive collective self-defense and balance of threat as the basis for strategic planning, but includes more preventive and crisis-management measures, by combining the abilities and determination of countries involved, raising the costs of future challenges to the peaceful and stable status quo, and serves to preserve regional peace and security. The new San Francisco system on the one hand provides a basis for American troops to maintain their presence in the East Asia region, on the other serves as the cornerstone for maintaining regional peaceful status quo.

### **China's Rise and Cross-Strait Relations and Security**

With the rise of Chinese economic capability and regional influence and the US is diverted to issues in the Middle East, Sino-U.S. relationship also has entered a new era. The new Sino-U.S. relationship is one of confrontation, cooperation and engagement on three levels: the international, the East Asian regional, and the bilateral. The international structure is based on two major international security issues that now dominate the international strategic relationship between these two major powers. These two issues are cooperation in counter-terrorism and confrontation over proliferation of WMD. In regional level, cooperation in solving North Korean nuclear issue has provided Washington and Beijing with opportunity to work together on regional crisis management.

In terms of bilateral relationship, economic and trade relationships have become major issues between these two major powers. In September 2005, Robert Zoellick,

U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, stated that "it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China's membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system."<sup>32</sup> This new Bush policy toward China, "a responsible stakeholder" or a responsible major world citizen, asks China to be more mature and supportive of the international system and norms. This means China has to not only comply with international law but also more actively support international responsibilities and the U.S. policies. In other words, China should not hinder UN Security Council action on Iran and should exert its influence over North Korea to entice the latter to accept denuclearization. China should also assume responsibility for reassuring other Asian countries, including Taiwan, of its military buildup and security posture.

The United States is thus seeking a cooperative relationship with China and wants to encourage constructive action of Beijing, including democratic reforms. If China can indeed rise to be a responsible stakeholder, it will be more likely to become a status quo country, which will favor solving its disputes with other countries through peaceful means. Beijing has demonstrated its capability to negotiate with neighbor countries, such as Russia and India, in resolving chronic border disputes, but to what extent does Beijing accept a negotiating approach to solve the "Taiwan question" remains unknown. Nevertheless, it seems that while enhancing its defense capabilities as part of a hedge, Washington has made extra efforts to assure that a "stronger China" will also be a peaceful power.

However, on the other hand, there is a growing concern in Washington that China is accumulating power, both economic and military, to make China the dominant power of East Asia. This sort of development may not only lead to regional instability but also might challenge the role of position of the United States in the region.

In terms of the impacts of China's rise on cross-strait relations, China's surging economy and newfound political clout expand its tool box in handling cross-strait relations and complicate U.S. role in dealing with the cross-strait political and military stalemate. With its missile deployments directed at Taiwan and the adoption of an anti-secession law threatening the use of force to deter Taiwan's pursuance of *de jure* independence, China's coercive cross-strait policy could severely challenge the island and its most important ally, the United States. However, China's rising economic

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<sup>32</sup> Robert B. Zoellick, "Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?" Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, September 21, 2005.

power and political status in the region have also been translated into a growing pool of “soft” power, affording Beijing increasing leverage on cross-strait issues.

Five major areas can be identified as the immediate impacts of China’s rise on cross-strait relations: 1. continuing increase of cross-strait economic interdependence; 2. shrinking room for Taiwan’s aspiration for independence; 3. gradual shifting of cross-strait military balance; 4. further isolation (marginalization) of Taiwan in regional organizations; and 5. increasing cooperation between Beijing and Washington on the management of the Taiwan issue.

From China's perspective, the Taiwan issue is a matter of sovereignty and territorial integrity, but how would Beijing deter Taiwan independence without alienating the increasingly assertive Taiwanese from the mainland? Even though leaders in Beijing have learned from past experiences that overt saber-rattling would only push Taiwanese people further apart from the unification, threat of force is still the cornerstone of Beijing’s policy toward Taiwan.

The enactment of the Anti-Secession Law on March 4, 2005 was regarded as Beijing’s effort to demonstrate its determination to deter Taiwan independence through legal and physiological measures. The law enlists three scenarios as preconditions for the use of “non-peaceful means” against Taiwan: efforts taken by the separatists to split Taiwan from China under whatever means or by whatever names; any major incidents that could lead Taiwan towards splitting from China; and the possibility of peaceful unification is entirely exhausted.

In recent years, China's defense capability has improved significantly, thanks to a strong rise in defense expenditure accompanying its economic growth. Between 2000 and 2005, China's official defense spending doubled to \$29.6 billion, allowing the military to spend on weapons procurement and upgrading, troops training and communication, computer and intelligence improvement. The focus of cross-strait military balance has shifted from quantity to quality in the past few years. With the PLA’s aggressive modernization program, the military strength of China is likely to surpass that of Taiwan in the coming years if Taiwan could not acquire enough advanced defensive weapons in time.

## 2007 年 訪問研究

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2007 年 3 月 25 日：飛到東京。

3 月 26 日：上午訪問東京大學國際教養學部川島真教授。作者與川島教授討論台日關係的發展。川島教授的觀察是在日本隨著對中關係的重要性提升台灣議題越來越邊緣化。對作者提出台日之間存在對彼此的認識態度之複雜度，川島表示同意，他指出歷史因素來解釋他的看法。他同時指出台日雙方部分人士跟他透露對缺乏年輕世代的人才的憂慮。

下午到池袋 JUNKU 堂書店購買美日關係、東亞安全等領域的書籍。

3 月 27 日：上午訪問早稻田大學亞太研究科天兒慧教授。天兒教授指出 2+2 共同聲明的共通戰略目標包含台灣海峽也許是只不過公開表明理所當然的事，而且克制中國的一些過度的行為上會有效果。但是因為這種動作會影響到日本的未來，需要各界進一步的討論。他強調相互依賴度極高的新世紀，外交戰略應該是動態的，不能只靠跟世界第一強大國家的同盟，同時表示日本應該重新檢討過去跟週邊國家缺少溝通而造成的悲劇，也要重視建立日本與亞洲各國的互信。

下午訪問日本防衛廳防衛研究所研究員松田康博，討論台日關係的

安全層面。他指出日本國內部分人士過於強調台灣對日本安全的重要性，2+2 共同聲明的共通戰略目標發表之後，日本政府也沒有實施任何措施，事實上主要目的是和美國的關係強化。日本政府表面上完全否認基本立場沒變，但是松田分析日本政府其實在個案上對台灣的具體反應越來越有彈性，台日關係的發展上會有正面的影響。

3 月 28 日：上午訪問慶應大學法學部添谷芳秀教授。添谷教授認為 2+2 共同聲明中的「共通戰略目標」包括台灣海峽是值得注目的動作，這意味著小泉政府再度表明把美日同盟為日本安全戰略之核心，尤其是按照他個人過去行為來說他也許同時意圖有意地提敏感得議題來公開表示推動更自主的日本外交安全政策的決心。另外，作者與添谷在日本外交安全戰略議題上交換意見，有關他之前在他的著作提出的日本 Middle Power 論，進一步討論。

下午訪問同志社大學法學部村田晃嗣教授。村田認為 2+2 共同聲明中美日兩國表明「共通戰略目標」證明兩國透過共有的自由與民主主義等基本政治價值，願意在亞太地區維持戰略上的穩定。村田的分析是日本並不盲目地跟隨美國，在 21 世紀的國際政治舞台上價值與理念等 soft power 是不能忽視的因素。透過 2+2 共同聲明，美日兩國表明美日同盟在全球戰略上的意義，加強同盟關係也是從全球戰略的觀點為出發，並不是所謂中國所批判的圍堵中國為目的。他同時強調日本需要再度檢討自己享受的自由與民主主義的意義。

3 月 29 日：下午到國會圖書館，收集期刊資料。

3 月 30 日：上午訪問東京大學東洋文化研究所所長田中明彥教授。田中指出現在的兩岸可說是所謂「更新的威脅」，迎接後冷戰時代浮現的新

的狀況。有關 2+2 共同聲明中的「共通戰略目標」包括台灣海峽，他表示這是很重要的動作，也可能是兩國老早該做的事。如果沒這麼做反而不太符合現狀，因為能夠應對後冷戰時代浮現的威脅的國家只有一些，美日兩國的合作在亞太地區當然最重要的因素之一。雖然中國強烈抗議這個「共通戰略目標」包括台灣海峽，但「共通戰略目標」要列舉地區的安全問題的時候不包括台灣海峽是理所當然的事。他同時強調說日本貢獻不一定要透過自衛隊，需要日本政府運用整體資源。

3 月 31 日~4 月 8 日 中國大陸出差

4 月 9 日：到新宿紀伊國屋書店購買美日關係、太平洋安全等領域的書籍。  
準備回國。

4 月 10 日：由東京回台灣。

### 感想與建議：

這次訪問中作者感受到日本國內對 2+2 共同聲明中的「共通戰略目標」包括台灣海峽有不同聲音，但學界而言多數意見是正面，而且主張不公開表明反而不自然的意見很普遍。本來預期中國的抗議，因此日本國內也沒有像前幾年的對中反感。作者分析小泉推動、安倍所繼承的傾向「正常國家」的外交安全策略已經得到相當的支持，連學界也相當多數給予正面的評價。但是具體措施不明確、安倍暫時優先對中關係的狀況之下，將來會走如何方向是值得關注。

至於「共通戰略目標」對台日關係的影響不像一些媒體所報導的直接，

日本學者多數迴避當場分析，但都會承認間接的正面效應。作者分析過去日本選擇比較逐漸的變化累積的方式來加強雙方關係，但這次發表「共通戰略目標」公開正式的動作顯示日方對應變化之傾向。