

4. Taiwan's Strategy towards the EU: from Hallstein Doctrine to Workable Diplomacy

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Constrained by its one-China policy until early 1980s, the then European Economic Community (EEC) did not intend to establish any semi-official relations with Taiwan.¹ Since then, the European Union (EU) and Taiwan have held annual consultations and have established, step-by-step, *de facto* delegations with one another. In January 2007, the Council of the EU issued its first formal policy concerning the situation across the Taiwan Strait – a document which constituted the foundations of its foreign policy with regards to Taiwan. Over the years, the debate over EU-Taiwan relations has, little-by-little, been raised and penetrated into studies of EU-China or EU-Asian relations. However, no academic work was ever contributed to Taiwan's EU policy. Therefore, this article will analyze the EU-Taiwan relationship from a Taiwanese perspective in order to clarify Taiwan's national interest and its strategy with respect to the EU. I will first explain the evolving definition of Taiwan's national interest and then divide Taiwan's evolving EU policy into four periods for further analysis before drawing some conclusions.

NATIONAL INTEREST AND TAIWAN'S EU POLICY-MAKING

To explain the Republic of China's (ROC) EU policy and external actions, I employ a realist concept of national interest. Classical realism is based upon the anarchical nature of international relations, in which all states ceaselessly pursue power to establish absolute security. This ceaseless quest for power constitutes the highest national interest priority for all states (Morgenthau, 1948). Classical realism was reshaped by Waltz's neo-realism, which emphasizes the structure of international community. In this structured world, states pursue relative security rather than absolute power. National security is always assumed to be the paramount national interest, followed by politico-economic interests, ideological preferences and cherished values (Waltz, 1979). However, outside of the pursuit of national security, the choice of priority of other interests depends upon the decisions of state leaders. For instance, ideologically zealous leaders eager to pursue revolution are likely to

¹ Afterwards, I will use the term EU (European Union) to indicate the EEC before entry into effect of Single European Act in 1986, the European Community between 1986 and 1993, the European Union and European Community between 1993 and 2009, and the European Union after entry into effect of Lisbon Treaty in December 2009

support far off armed revolutionary forces, even if the politico-economic interests are not evident or even negligible. Leaders who emphasize politico-economic interests might cooperate with countries founded upon opposing values (Ming, 2011: 36-40 ; Sadat & Daniel, 2009: 93-105).

Though challenged by institutionalism and constructivism, this reshaped realist concept is still widely used in analyses of foreign policies and external actions in world politics (Pham, 2008: 256-265 ; Garrison, 2007: 105–126). Institutionalism highlighted the influence of institutions, which effectively limit, shape and even reorient people’s decisions and state actions. But none of the institutionalist approaches have ever denied the primacy of national interest as the core concept in the studies of foreign policy, despite the introduction of the institutional context (Laffan, 2001: 709-727). Constructivism pays much attention to the mindset of decision-makers, and it argues that objective context simply does not exist in the foreign policy-making processes of sovereign states. That context is always perceived, interpreted, and defined by political leaders who are influenced by their own cultures and identities (Wendt, 1999: 254-255). However, constructivism cannot neglect the extent to which national interests still guide decision-making with respect to foreign policy, though these interests may be interpreted and defined inter-subjectively.

For the Republic of China in Taiwan, the definition of national interest has always been in the hands of the president of the republic (Hickey, 2007). According to the Constitution of 1947, the president is the supreme commander of the armed forces and “shall represent the Republic of China in foreign relations” (art. 35 and 36). More importantly, the prime minister “shall be nominated and appointed by the President of the Republic” (art. 55), and all ministers shall be nominated by the president upon the recommendation of the prime minister (art. 56). Since 1996, the president has been elected directly by the people of Taiwan, which not only granted the presidency greater political influence but also *de facto* suspended the National Assembly which is the only organ capable of controlling the president. Most often, the fact that the president assumes at the same time the presidency of the ruling party allows him or her to intervene in the nomination of party candidates and to influence the agenda of the ruling party in the Legislative Yuan. As head of state and president of the ruling party, the President is responsible for setting Taiwan’s foreign and EU policies.

Thus, the President’s mindset and interpretation of national interest guides Taiwan’s foreign and EU policies. As Taiwan’s national security is dependent upon the US, interpretations of Taiwan’s politico-economic interests and the consolidation of its ideologies and values have been influencing the definition and redefinition of Taiwan’s national interest vis-à-vis the EU.

1950-1980: FROM HALLSTEIN DOCTRINE TO THE COLLAPSE OF ROC

DIPLOMACY IN EUROPE

Defeated by Mao's army in Mainland China, Chiang Kai-Shek and the ROC government fled to Taiwan in 1949. Chiang regarded the Cold War as an uncompromising bipolar system and the communist countries as a block under the leadership of the ex-Soviet Union. Mao's victory in Mainland China, the successive wars in East Asia, the up-and-down tensions between Eastern and Western Europe, and the anti-Western guerrilla movements in the Third World were, according to him, integral parts of Kremlin's global strategy to provoke worldwide communist revolutions (Chiang, 1957; Taylor, 2009). Therefore, all compromises and *modus vivendi* with Communists were expected to lead to the collapse of the non-communist camp, paving way for communist dictatorship. Seen in this way, the only option for the non-communist world, and particularly countries on the front lines like the ROC, was to be united together in their fights against the Soviet Union and its communist allies. As the US was the leader of the non-communist world and the only credible defender against communist aggression in Asia, the ROC should work closely with the US in all fields. Close cooperation with the US would not only allow the ROC to consolidate its national security and international status but would also be benefited in a material way. More importantly, firm anti-communism constituted a common ideology and value between the US and the ROC, which was then an authoritarian state under martial law.

As a result of Chiang's orientation, the ROC supported passionately American military containment in Asia and American intervention in the Vietnam War. In return, the US supplied the ROC with massive economic and military aid. In diplomacy, the American government supported the claim of the ROC in Taiwan of being the only legitimate government for all Chinese in the world, and on that basis, the ROC occupied the China seat in the UN and all international organizations (Kozlowski, 1990). Under these circumstances, Chiang adopted the Hallstein Doctrine in the conduct of ROC foreign policy. According to this doctrine, the ROC in Taiwan was the only legitimate government representing all Chinese in the world. The ROC suspended diplomatic relations with any country that recognized Beijing (Fell, 2011: 10-27).

In this circumstance, the ROC's European policy was never aimed at obtaining security guarantees. Even in economic terms, the non-communist Europe as a whole occupied less than 10% of Taiwan's external trade, and European enterprises never used Taiwan as an important base of production (Ash, 2002: 156). For example, in 1961, France exported US\$ 35 million to the PRC but only US\$ 2.8 million to Taiwan (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1961). The then EEC and its member states never granted Taiwan the privileged trade treatment that it extended to all countries of ACP

(Asia, Caribbean and Pacific) in the 1960s. In the end, ROC engagements with the then EEC and its member states were aimed at strengthening bilateral relations and particularly its status in international organizations. After the Common Market was created and the ROC successfully defeated the People's Republic of China (PRC)'s last attacks in the Strait in 1958, the ROC proposed the establishment of diplomatic relations with the then EEC. The European Commission welcomed this proposal and initiated studies. In October 1963, COREPER endorsed this proposal and submitted it to the Council of Foreign Ministers. At the same time, the ROC also decided to persuade member states of the EEC, and France in particular, to upgrade their diplomatic relationship with the ROC from the *charge d'affaires* to the ambassadorial level (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1963).

Unfortunately, the ROC's plans to establish diplomatic relationship with the EEC and upgrade its relationship with member states encountered opposition from France which was formulating its new China policy under De Gaulle (Fondation Charles de Gaulle, 1995: 155-156). France and the PRC had begun negotiating secretly in the summer of 1963, subsequently announcing simultaneously on 27 January 1964 that they had agreed to establish diplomatic relations at the ambassadorial level within three months. Accordingly, France continued to refuse to upgrade diplomatic relations with the ROC throughout 1963, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs Couve de Murville fiercely opposed the proposal from COREPER to establish diplomatic relations with the ROC in February 1964 (French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1964).

Even worse, this failure was a prelude to the final collapse of ROC diplomacy in Europe in the early 1970s. Soon after the US announced in July 1971 that Nixon would pay a visit to Beijing within a few months, the General Assembly of the UN adopted the 2758th resolution in October 1971 to exclude the ROC and grant the China seat to the PRC. All European countries voted in favor of the resolution, except for Spain, Greece and Cyprus, which abstained from voting (Wang, 2010: 131-176). During the following two years, all European countries except the Holy See switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.² In 1975, the then EEC and PRC established diplomatic relations.

1981-1988: FLEXIBLE DIPLOMACY AND REESTABLISHMENT OF EU-TAIWAN RELATIONS

The ROC's Hallstein Doctrine finally collapsed in 1979 when the US switched recognition from Taipei to Beijing. Diplomatic failure also weakened the legitimacy of the ROC government and even its national identity. Elected as the ROC president

² Spain, as the last European country that had maintained diplomatic relationship with the ROC, recognized the PRC in 1973.

in 1978, Chiang Jing-Kuo, or Chiang the Junior, was conscious of the need for a new approach to governance and diplomacy.

Between 1982 and 1983, a fierce debate broke out within the ROC government. Some hardliners proposed transforming anti-communism into anti-PRC actions, and developing relations with the ex-Soviet Union to counterbalance America's new China policy, and even producing atomic bombs as an ultimate deterrent (Marks, 1998). It was Chiang the Junior's personal intervention that buried this dogmatism and redefined the national interests of the ROC. According to him, the ROC could not regain recognition in the international community in the near future, and the US would not revise its China policy. The ideal solution for the ROC and Taiwan to survive and develop would be abandoning the zero-sum competition with the PRC in the quest for legitimate representation of the whole China, strengthening Taiwan's economic power and reforming ROC governance within Taiwan (Chiang, 1979).

Based upon these redefined national interests, the ROC finally replaced its Hallstein Doctrine with the so-called 'flexible diplomacy'. From that point forward, the ROC government insisted that it was the legitimate representation of the people living on the island and decided to establish relations of various types with all non-communist countries (Hsiung, 2000: 118-19). It was thought that the reestablishment of relations would benefit Taiwan economically. Forced to reduce its trade surplus with the US since the early 1980s, Taiwan was thirsty to find new markets and destinations in which to invest (Baldwin, 1991: 257-288). It also needed to attract more international investments and technology transfers in order to upgrade its industry. This trade and investment-driven diplomacy would permit Taiwan to reestablish *de facto* consular relations with other countries (Mengin, 1996: 141). In international organizations, Taiwan began to seek to coexist with the PRC (Tubilewicz, 2007: 422-24). In 1979, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) forced the ROC to be renamed 'Chinese Taipei' and abandon its national flag and national anthem when the PRC became a full member of the IOC. The so-called 'Olympic model' was then applied to all international sports committees and a majority of international non-governmental organizations (Chan, 2002: 141-148). But Taiwan's pursuit of flexible diplomacy stopped short of co-existing with the PRC in these non-governmental organizations. The only exception was the Asian Development Bank (ADB). Under increasing pressure, and with the help of the US, the ROC agreed to remain in the ADB under the new name, 'Taipei, China', after PRC entered into this regional organization (Hsiung, 2006: 255-268 ; Chao, 1986: 1-17). Such flexible diplomacy was accompanied by a very timid, tentative *détente* with the PRC and the beginning of democratization in Taiwan. As early as 1982, Taiwan established the Research Institute of Chinese Economy with the aim of studying the economy in the

PRC under Deng's reform (Wu, 2012). In 1987, Taiwan lifted the martial law and the ban on visits by its citizens to the PRC for family reunions.

The ROC's flexible approach to diplomacy was welcomed and supported by the US, which itself invented a formula to maintain its semi-official relationship with this former ally (Chiu, 1991: 23-58). After the US's normalization of diplomatic relationship with the PRC in January 1979, the US Congress adopted the Taiwan Relations Act that permitted the American government to create the *American Institute in Taiwan* (AIT) as the *de facto* American embassy and consulate in Taipei. In reciprocity, the ROC established the *Coordination Council for North American Affairs* (CCNAA) in Washington DC as the counterpart of AIT. The United States inspired other countries to follow suit and facilitated Taiwan's efforts to reestablish semi-official relations with non-communist countries in Europe. Taiwan began establishing liaison offices in European capitals, all of which were registered as non-governmental organizations or corporations, and it worked as *de facto* consulates to issue visas, serve Taiwanese overseas, and certify documents. At the same time, Taiwan's Ministry of Economic Affairs sent delegations to European capitals to promote trade and attract investment though it took nearly half a year for Taiwanese delegations to obtain visas from European countries. (Siew, 2013) Taiwan's new trade orientation resonated well with the development of the Single European Market, which immediately made the EEC a priority for Taiwan's new trade policy.

From the perspectives of European countries, Taiwan had become an attractive market and trade partner as it was one of the largest holders of foreign reserves and among the top twenty trading nations after 1984-1985 (Ministry of Economic Affairs of ROC, 2009 ; Ash, 2002: 157). These abundant foreign reserves allowed the Taiwanese government to invest heavily in the basic infrastructures and Taiwan's people to consume more luxurious imported goods. Consequently, some European states agreed to establish carefully defined relations with Taiwan and create offices in Taipei, albeit offices which enjoyed very limited support from their governments (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1997b). Before 1979, only the UK and Spain had established such offices: the *Spanish Center for Commercial and Cultural Promotion* in 1974, and the *Anglo Trade Taiwan Committee* in 1976. Between 1979 and 1988, seven other member states of the then EEC installed such offices in Taiwan. In 1979, Belgium created the *Taipei Office of Belgian Trade Association*, and Greece founded the *Hellenic Organization for the Promotion of Export in Taipei*. Two years later, France installed the *Centre Culturel et Scientifique Francais de Taipei*, followed by creation of *Taipei Office of Netherlands Council for Trade Promotion* and *German Trade Office in Taipei* in 1981, and the *Italian Trade Promotion Office* and *Institute for Trade and Investment for Ireland* in 1989 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC,

1997b). Most importantly, Taiwan's government and the European Commission agreed, in 1981, to hold an annual closed door consultation conference on trade and investment, albeit outside of Taiwan. The EU-Taiwan semi-official relationship was then established.

1988-2000: PRAGMATIC DIPLOMACY AND UPGRADING OF EU-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP

The world experienced unprecedented transformation between 1989 and 1991 when structural transformations were occurring inside Taiwan and in its relationship with the PRC. Taiwan held its first free parliamentary elections in 1991 and elected its first president by free, direct, and universal suffrage in 1996. During the same period, détente was rapidly replacing tension across the Taiwan Strait after the ROC unilaterally put an end to the civil war with the PRC, and Beijing and Taipei started semi-official dialogues in 1991. Exchanges between these two semi-official organs succeeded in reestablishing direct contact between the PRC and Taiwan, severed since 1949.

Between 1988 and 2000, Taiwan's foreign policy was, without doubt, in the hands of Lee Teng-Hui, the first universally elected president of ROC, and the president of the ruling party. According to his analysis, the international status and power of the PRC were both severely weakened in the aftermath of Tiananmen Square massacre, the end of the Cold War, and the disappearance of the triangular great power structure that had favored Beijing. Lee decided to seize this opportunity to strengthen Taiwan's identity, domestically and internationally, though under the name of the Republic of China (Lee, 1999 ; Wang, 2002: 71-108).

In terms of national security, Lee consolidated the US-Taiwan implicit *de facto* alliance, echoing the US's new foreign policy in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. In September 1992, George Bush announced publicly that the US would sell 150 F-16 A/B to Taiwan, the first sale of jet fighters to Taiwan since 1979. In parallel with acquiring an American promise to help defend Taiwan, Lee agreed to deepen détente with the PRC in order to enlarge Taiwan's scope for maneuvering in the international sphere, upgrade its relationships with third countries, and facilitate Taiwan's participation in international organizations. Personal representatives of Lee and Jiang Zemin even met clandestinely several times in Hong Kong in the early 1990s (Wei, 2005). At the same time, in Taiwan, Lee accelerated the process of democratization and *Taiwanization* to consolidate those Western-cherished values such as human rights and democracy to build up Taiwan's normative power in its external relations and exploit the value-based sympathy in the West.

Lee also defined the new guiding doctrine of Taiwan's foreign policy in the late 1980s. Building upon the legacy of flexible diplomacy in the early 1980s, Lee's 'pragmatic diplomacy' became more ambitious and more aggressive. While flexible diplomacy was only a policy supportive of Taiwan's economic development, pragmatic diplomacy was a political strategy designed to secure full membership in the UN as a long-term and final objective (Chang, 2008 ; Southerland, 1989). In 1991, the ROC parliament adopted a resolution that urged the government to make all possible efforts to obtain UN membership. After 1993, nations maintaining diplomatic relations with the ROC proposed annually at the General Assembly of UN that the body reconsider the absence of Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 2007). In its bilateral relationships, Taiwan sought dual recognition (Tubilewicz, 2002a: 791-810). During bilateral negotiations between Mandela's South Africa and the PRC, Mandela even once agreed to work with Taipei to persuade Beijing to accept dual recognition (Qian, 2004). In its quest for membership of international organizations, Taiwan exploited the possibility of 'dual representation' without challenging the legitimate representation of the PRC in the same organization. For example, in its application for membership in the GATT, Taiwan unilaterally identified itself as 'TPKM (Taiwan, Penghu, Kimen and Matsu) autonomous customs entity'. In negotiations for membership APEC, Taiwan accepted the ADB formula to obtain full membership while lacking recognized statehood. Last but not least, on the basis of pragmatic diplomacy, Lee paid a series of 'private but high profile' visits to countries that had no diplomatic relationship with the ROC, including Singapore, Indonesia and finally the US as a Cornell alumni in 1995.

This diplomatic pragmatism permitted Lee's Taiwan to adopt a pro-active strategy to exploit its relationship with the EU and its member states. The non-official linkages between Taiwan and member states of the EU were impressively upgraded between 1987 and 1995 (Tubilewicz, 2007: 422-24). The representations of both sides were formalized to a great degree, with all Taiwanese missions in European capitals being renamed firstly 'Taipei Economic and Trade Office' and later the 'Taipei Representative Office'. All of the heads of these offices were designated as 'Representatives', and all the officials working there were granted certain diplomatic privileges and immunities. Most importantly, Taiwanese diplomats were allowed to visit Ministries of Foreign Affairs and meet directly with their European counterparts. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1998) On the other hand, European offices in Taipei were handed over from their commercial chambers or economic departments to the concerned countries' Ministries of Foreign Affairs, and leadership of all offices were successively assumed by career diplomats as their offices were given mandates to perform consulate functions (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1997a). The

European missions were then renamed following the American formula, with the creation of the *Institut Français à Taipei* (IFT) in 1989 ahead (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1990) and *Deutsches Institut Taipei* in 2000. (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 2001) The annual consultant conference between Taiwan and the EC was upgraded from the senior official to vice-ministerial level, and it is now led by Deputy Director General of DG Trade of the Commission and Taiwan's Vice Minister of Economic Affairs respectively. These meetings have been held alternatively in Taipei and Brussels since 1992 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1993). In June 1991, the Association of Taiwan's Friends was created in the European Parliament and later renamed the EP-Taiwan Friendship Group, a *de facto* inter-parliamentary delegation of European parliamentarians to Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1992). In 1993, after years of hesitation, the European Commission agreed to begin negotiations with Taiwan on the latter's quest for membership of the GATT (The Taiwan WTO Center, 2009). In April 1993, the European Parliament adopted its first resolution concerning Taiwan, in which it called for establishment of an EC delegation in Taipei as soon as possible and more support of EC to Taiwan's bid for GATT membership (European Parliament, 1993). Visits by high-ranking officials, which had been taboos during the 1980s, became frequent occurrences during the first half of the 1990s. Several commissioners of the EU and ministers of its member states paid visits to Taiwan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1997c). France even sold six Lafayette cruisers and sixty Mirage 2000 jets to Taiwan in spite of severe warnings and protests from Beijing (The Asian Wall Street Journal, 1992 ; Wu, 1992).

Lee's pragmatic diplomacy and his EU policy was proved fruitful, and it reached its peak in 1994-1995 when a majority of Taiwan's missions in European capitals were renamed as 'Taipei Representative Offices'. In 1999, the ROC Foreign Ministry even announced the establishment of diplomatic relations with Macedonia, with the aim of gaining a new foothold in the EU, which could constitute a front in Taiwan's diplomacy struggles with respect to the EU over the long run (Tubilewicz, 2006: 891-906).

Nonetheless, alerted by Lee's pragmatic diplomacy in Europe, the PRC decided to counterattack and block any probable penetration of Taiwan's diplomacy in European capitals. In 1994, French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur signed a joint communiqué with his Chinese counterpart Lee Peng, in which France adhered, for the first time, to the one China policy (Cohen, 1994). In June 2001, in his letter to the Danish Parliament, the Danish Foreign Minister was reported to reveal that the Council of the EU had reached a consensus, according to which no Member State would issue a visa to Taiwan's President, Vice President, Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Defense Minister (*Central News Agency*, 2001). In the same year,

Macedonia suspended diplomatic relations with the ROC, putting a brake to Taipei's pro-active pragmatic diplomacy in Europe. (Tubilewicz, 2002b: 31-38)

The rise of the PRC and increasingly conflict-ridden relations across the Strait might have contributed to a slowdown of EU-Taiwan exchanges. In the second half of the 1990s, the PRC was surpassing Taiwan, and later Japan, as the second largest trade partner of the EU. Beginning with the missile crisis in 1995 and 1996, tensions increased continuously across the Strait (Tubilewicz, 2007: 423-424). With his pragmatic diplomacy efforts frustrated, and on the eve of presidential elections in which he would not stand, Lee announced to the *Deutsche Welle*, in 1999, his most pro-independence proclamation that there was a 'special state-to-state relationship' across the Strait. In March 2000, the pro-independence Chen Shui-Bien was elected as successor to Lee as the president of ROC.

2000-2008: CONFRONTATIONAL DIPLOMACY AND RISE OF NORMATIVE DIMENSION OF EU-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP

International relations entered into a new era in the aftermath of terrorist attacks in the US in September 2001 when the US-led war against terror restructured global geopolitics. In Europe, the spectacular entry into circulation of the Euro, between 1999 and 2002, marked the unprecedented success of European integration, albeit a success followed by the abortive constitution-making movement. In Asia, the PRC enjoyed speculative economic expansion after its accession to WTO in 2001, and Asian integration developed rapidly after the ASEAN plus one agreement was signed in 2002. In Taiwan, the victory of pro-independence DPP (Democratic Progress Party) in the presidential elections in March 2000 turned a page in the history of the ROC, bringing an end to KMT-dominated politics and diplomacy since 1949.

Being a former lawyer who never studied abroad and had never assumed any post that required dealing with international community, Chen was believed to be less interested in international affairs and unfamiliar with diplomacy (Chen, 2004: 85-120). Insisting upon the Taiwan's independent sovereignty and its right of self-determination, Chen and the Democratic Progress Party (DPP)-led government seemed to define national interests on the basis of their ideology and domestic political calculation more than their evaluations of international context. Chen and his party officially opposed unification with China and advocated strenuously for Taiwan's independence. According to the resolution adopted by the National Congress of the DPP in 1999 on the future of Taiwan, Taiwan is an independent sovereign state whose official name is, for the moment, the Republic of China. It is up to the people living in Taiwan to decide the future of Taiwan. Chen's interpretation of international relations was therefore structured by the ideology of the DPP and heavily depended

upon his calculations of domestic politics (Chang & Holt, 2009: 301-330; Hsiao, 2009: 41-47).

As Taiwan's security and the DPP's pursuit of independence depended heavily upon Washington's policy, Chen regarded continuous US's support as a top diplomatic priority after his inauguration. Therefore, between his inauguration in May 2000 and October 2002, Chen and the DPP adopted a moderate stance in domestic politics and diplomacy in exchange for US's support, Beijing's tolerance, and goodwill and cooperation from the opposition. Chen promised in public that he would not announce *de jure* independence so long as the PRC had no intention to invade. He nominated a retired general Tan, a KMT member, as his first prime minister and held summits with opposition leaders. In response, the American government gave firm support to Chen between May 2000 and August 2002. In an interview at ABC in April 2001, George W. Bush even made it clear that US would adopt "whatever it takes to help Taiwan defend itself". Under the Bush administration, the US agreed to sell arms that were worth US\$ 6 billion to Taiwan, including some offensive weapons, such as eight submarines. In May 2001, Chen paid a high-profile visit to New York where he gave a 30-minute public speech to overseas Taiwanese. In March 2002, Taiwan's Minister of Defense Tang was 'invited' to participate in an academic workshop in Florida where he 'coincidentally' encountered the American Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz. Chen's visit contributed to the erosion of restrictions on visits, which had been in place since the missile crisis of 1996, by Taiwanese leaders to the US. These events were interpreted as signals of firm American support of Taiwan in response to Chen's adoption of a compromising stance, as advised by the US (Sutter, 2006: 417-441).

Once assured that the US would help defend Taiwan, Chen and the DPP proceeded with their political agenda, domestically and diplomatically (Ross, 2006: 443-458). In August 2002, Chen abandoned his earlier, compromising stance for a more pro-independence position by publicly redefining the relationship between the PRC and Taiwan as 'two states on each side' and adopted a confrontational diplomatic stance. According to Chen's strategy, though confrontation would provoke conflict, it would also result in compromise and finally, progress (Chen, 1990).

This formula of 'confrontation, compromise and progress' constituted the core of Chen's strategy of confrontational diplomacy between October 2002 and May 2008, according to which Taiwan's diplomacy should focus upon promoting Taiwan's identity and independence from the PRC in the international community. These actions should, at the same time, mitigate the legitimacy of the ROC claim over Taiwan and pave way toward future *de jure* independence of Taiwan outside of both the PRC and the ROC (Hsu, 2010, 705-706). As the PRC economy began to develop

rapidly, and it accumulated vast foreign reserves, Taiwan could no longer base its diplomacy upon its economic power. Chen and the DPP then decided to exploit Taiwan's 'soft power' and emphasize that, as a democracy, Taiwan shared common values with the West, and Taiwan could serve as a bulwark against the rising 'China threat' (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2006a: 267 ; The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2006b: 83-84).

In response to advice from the EU, Chen and his government agreed to the "gradual abolition" of the death penalty as early as his inauguration in May 2000. By 2004, all laws in Taiwan that imposed the death penalty as the only punishment were abolished. By 2008, those articles that included the death penalty were reduced to fifty (twenty of which were limited to the military only). More importantly, since 2006, Chen and his government implemented a moratorium on the death penalty until the end of his second term, on 20 May 2008 (Liao, 2010: 1-22). In parallel, Chen and his government decided, as early as 2001, to 'ratify' the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which were signed by the ROC in 1967 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of ROC, 1967). A special team was constituted under the president with the aim of drafting a 'Basic Law on Human Rights' in Taiwan. Though this drafting was also interpreted as a conspiracy to hollow out the current constitution, mitigate the legitimacy of the ROC in Taiwan, and prepare for the future drafting of a new constitution for *de jure* independence (Wu, 2002: 634-635), Chen's strategy to strengthen protection of human rights in Taiwan was hailed in the EU. In 2004, the Group of Liberal Parties in the EP granted Chen its annual liberty prize and permitted Madam Chen to visit Brussels in person.

Chen and his government also worked hard to persuade leaders of the EU and its member states to support Taiwan's quest for membership in the UN and its specialized institutions. After 2001, Chen and his government applied the model of Taiwan's lobby at the US Congress, regularly inviting MEPs to visit Taiwan. Throughout 2006, as the EU was reformulating its new China policy and its attitude towards relations across the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan's government mobilized all its friends and supporters in the EU to lobby the Commission, the Parliament and the Council of the EU, and parliaments and governments of its member states. Taiwan's efforts were well rewarded in the Commission's communication to the European Parliament and Council on the subject of the EU's China policy. According to the Commission, the EU opposed "any measure which would amount to a unilateral change of the status quo", strongly "opposed to the use of force", encouraged any "pragmatic solutions and confidence building measures", supported "dialogue between all parties" and would "continue strong economic and trade links with Taiwan" (European

Commission, 2006). Concerning Taiwan's quest for membership in international organizations, and particularly the WHO, the EU adhered to the principle of so-called 'meaningful participation', according to which the EU supported Taiwan's participation in international fora in which statehood was not a pre-requisite and Taiwan's participation would result in some positive contribution. In brief, based upon its adherence to one China policy, EU identified Taiwan as an economic entity, with which it would maintain non-diplomatic relationship. On the subject of cross Strait relations, it echoed US's insistence upon the peaceful resolution and granted a very limited support to Taiwan's quest for membership of international organizations. Accordingly, in 2006, the Council of Ministers, under the German presidency, agreed to support Taiwan's participation as an observer in the WHA (World Health Assembly). The German ambassador even went to see the Director General of the WHO, Madam Fon, and later the PRC ambassador to the UN in Geneva, in order to persuade the latter to give a green light to Taiwan's participation.³

Chen's EU policy did bear some fruits. In 2001, the 'Taipei Representative Office in Belgium' was upgraded to the status of 'Taipei Representative Office in the EU and Belgium'. And in 2002, Taiwan became the 144th member of the WTO. In 2003, the EU established its delegation -- the European Economic and Trade Office -- in Taiwan. In the same year, the European Parliament adopted several resolutions echoing Taiwan's quest for membership in international organizations. In April 2005, Chen paid an official visit to the Vatican to participate in the funeral of the late Pope John Paul II. In spite of Beijing's strong protest, the Italian government granted Chen and his Foreign Minister a reception befitting a state visit in accordance with the agreement between Italy and Vatican. It was the first time that the ROC head of state had paid an official visit 'in' Europe. Ironically he was received by the Vatican as 'President of China', which dissatisfied Chen himself and antagonized the PRC.

Unfortunately, heightened tensions between Taiwan and the PRC, particularly after August 2002, deterred the EU and its member states from upgrading their relations with Taiwan. Even worse, at the initiative of French and German leaders, the EU had planned to lift the arms embargo on the PRC between 2003 and 2005, at a cost to Taiwan's core interests (Hehenberger, 2007). Throughout this crisis, Taiwan intensively lobbied officers of the European Commission, its supporters in the European Parliament, and the parliaments of some member states and think tanks in Brussels, to dissuade the EU from lifting its arms embargo on the PRC. The adoption of the 'Anti-Secession Law' by the PRC, in May 2005, facilitated Taiwan's lobbying in Brussels. Chen and his government even ordered the Taiwan delegation to the US to express their deep concern on this issue, in hopes that the US would bring pressure

³ Interview with EU China desk officer by the author in January 2013.

to bear on European leaders on this subject. But Chen's administration was pessimistic, supposing that the EU arms embargo would be lifted sometime before 2006 (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China. 2005: 169-170).

Since then, Chen seemed to adopt a more confrontational diplomacy. In 2007, he personally intervened in the process of the Ministry's preparations for Taiwan's attempt to gain membership in the WHO and the UN. His Foreign Minister ordered Taiwan's delegate to the WTO to veto the nomination of a PRC national as member of the appellate body of the DSB (*France News Agency*, 2007). Suspending negotiations with member states of the EU on these issues, Chen wrote to the Secretary General of the UN and the Director General of WHO respectively, demanding that Taiwan be permitted to participate as a full member under the denomination of Taiwan. At the same time, Chen and the DPP launched the 'Back to the UN Movement' and proposed that a referendum be held on Taiwan's quest for UN membership on the same date of the presidential elections in March 2008. Chen's provocative diplomacy was interpreted as an electoral tactic to mobilize those pro-independence supporters of the DPP in the coming presidential elections, rather than a genuine effort to develop Taiwan's diplomacy.

Chen's increasingly provocative stance worried, and even antagonized the EU and its member states. Accordingly, during the years 2003-2004 and 2007-2008, leaders of the EU and some of its member states publicly condemned the holding of a referendum on the Taiwanese government's bid for membership in the UN as "dangerous" and "irresponsible" (*Le Figaro*, 2004 ; *United Daily News*, 2004). The European Commission also condemned Taiwan's veto in the WTO. Even the European Parliament, the most pro-Taiwan institution in the EU, owing to its pro-democracy tradition and its promotion of human rights protections, failed to adopt any resolutions to support Taiwan in 2007-2008. On the eve of Taiwan's presidential elections on 17 March 2008, only 51 out of 776 MEPs agreed to sign the declaration in support of Taiwan's quest for membership of UN (Copper, 2008: 179-192). EU-Taiwan relations were at an impasse.

2008-PRESENT: WORKABLE DIPLOMACY AND ITS IMPACT UPON THE EU-TAIWAN RELATIONSHIP

With the wisdom of hindsight, the year 2008 might have marked a historical turning point for the EU and its relationship with Taiwan. The outbreak of the financial tsunami in October 2008 severely weakened the US's power in all fields, put into doubt the Western-hailed new economy based upon credit and consumption, gave birth to quantitative easing in the US, Europe, and Japan, put a brake upon globalization, and strengthened the influence of the PRC and BRICS. In the US,

Obama was elected as the first African American president. He adopted a 'rebalancing strategy' and introduced the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) scheme which made it clear that Asia-Pacific politics had replaced the war on terror as the new focus of the American diplomacy. The fact that the PRC surpassed Japan as the third largest economy after the EU and the US in 2010, and the rise of tensions resulting from territorial disputes in Asia has been challenging and reshaping the regional geopolitics of the region, was overseen by the US since the end of WWII.

In Taiwan, the KMT won the parliamentary elections in January 2008, and its candidate, Ma Ying-Jeo, was elected president of the ROC two months later, bringing an end to DPP policy and confrontational diplomacy. With a Ph.D. in International Law from Harvard, responsible for the external relations of the KMT between 1984-1988, and having been a deputy minister of mainland affairs between 1988 and 1991, Ma is believed to be, among the ROC leaders, most familiar with international affairs and cross Strait relations. He is also a KMT moderate, who has maintained some distance from the party's mainland-born old guard and those most passionate for Chinese unification. As he never hides his admiration of Chiang the Junior, his doctrine for ROC diplomacy might well be inspired by Chiang the Junior's flexible diplomacy of the 1970s and 1980s. Like all of his predecessors, he hopes that the US will continue to play a dominant role in Asia, on which Taiwan's national security depends. But unlike Lee and Chen, Ma does not suppose that the PRC will soon collapse or evolve into a democracy. On the contrary, he is impressed by the rapid rise of the PRC economy and growing interdependency across the Strait.

According to Ma, Chen's confrontational diplomacy put Taiwan in a very dangerous situation. In diplomacy, the US and the EU both opposed Taiwan's provocative stance. Economically, while Taiwan's dependency on the mainland was growing, its industries made progress only slowly. In domestic politics, society was increasingly divided and polarized along its party identity. According to Ma, Taiwan's priority is upgrading its industry and further developing its economy, to which end détente in the Strait is indispensable. To promote détente, Taiwan firstly needs the firm support of the US. As soon as he was inaugurated as ROC president in May 2008, Ma's government presented a diplomatic doctrine, named 'workable diplomacy', which features 'alliance with the US, détente with the PRC, closer relationship to Japan and more cooperation with ASEAN'. According to this doctrine, Taiwan's relationship and *de facto* alliance with the US remains the top priority. Once assurances were received from the US, Ma pursued détente with the PRC on all fronts. Since then, Taiwan and the PRC have nearly normalized their commercial relations, particularly after the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) entered into effect in October 2010. Sixteen agreements and three memoranda have been

signed between two sides during Ma's presidency (Mainland Affairs Council of ROC, 2013) and visits from the mainland to Taiwan rose from less than 100,000 per year in 2007 to 2,586,428 in 2012 (Tourism Bureau of Ministry of Transport and Communication of ROC, 2013).⁴ Liaison offices are to be established in Taipei and Beijing before the end of 2014, for which the first informal meeting between Beijing and Taipei was held on 28 January 2013 (*United Daily News*, 2013). Taiwan's minister of Mainland Affairs 'encountered' the PRC minister of Taiwan Affairs in Bali, Indonesia, outside of APEC Summit in October 2013 while the first cross-Strait formal ministerial is scheduled to be held in Beijing in early 2014 (*Chinanews*, 2013).

In diplomacy, a *de facto* diplomatic truce was established silently between Taipei and Beijing in their bilateral relations with third countries. Since 2008, no country has switched its recognition between Taipei and Beijing. Beijing firmly refused to establish diplomatic relationship with Gambia after the latter unilaterally withdrew its recognition of the ROC in Taiwan in October 2013. Concerning Taiwan's quest for membership in international organizations, Ma decided to stop knocking directly on the door of the UN General Assembly and to shift focus to specialized institutions of the UN and demand 'effective participation' in them (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2009: 414). The WHO, ICAO (International Civil Aviation Organization) and UNFCCC (United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change) were selected by Taiwan as its top priorities (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2012: 3 ; The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2010: 214). According to Ma's strategy, *détente* with the mainland should enlarge Taiwan's room to maneuver in its external relations, which would, itself, strengthen Taiwan's position vis-à-vis the PRC (Wang, Lee & Yu, 2011: 254-255).

Ma's EU policy aims to use *détente* in the Strait to strengthen Taiwan's functional relations with the EU and promote Taiwan's economic interests without raising any political issues. Securing visa-waiver treatment, the signing of Economic Cooperation Agreements (ECAs), increasing investment, and winning support for Taiwan's membership in international organizations were regarded as priorities. Ma's administration lobbied hard in Brussels and all European capitals on the visa-waiver issue between the second half of 2008 and end of 2011 (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2010: 199-201). It firstly persuaded the MEPs of the EU-Taiwan Friendship group, and some of the most pro-Taiwanese member states, to initiate the debate. Then, Taiwanese delegations persuaded key officers in the Commission, and China desk officers of member states, to draft the proposal. Simultaneously, all of Taiwan's representative offices in European capitals and the Department of European

⁴ This statistics does not include those Chinese coming from Hong Kong and Macau, which amount to 1,016,356 in 2012.

Affairs of the MOFA were mobilized to contact their counterparts in Europe. At the same time, ROC Ministry of Foreign Affairs was improving the anti-fake technology in producing and digitalizing its passports in order to lower their disappearance rate, which was a pre-condition to obtain visa-waiver from the EU. During the final stage of decision-making in the Council of the EU, Cyprus was reported to oppose extending the visa-waiver to Taiwan. Owing to its own division, it followed Beijing's one-China policy and refused to develop even semi-official relations with Taiwan. Even France was reported to be once hesitating, frustrated and angered by Ma's refusal to compromise on reimbursement of \$591 million of illegal commissions from the Lafayette procurement. Some MEPs likely based their agreement upon hopes of having Taiwan promise to abolish the death penalty. It was under the Czech presidency that this visa-waiver issue was put into agenda of the EU Council.⁵ Inter-parliamentary relations also played an important role in overcoming these obstacles. Some British MEPs with Mr. Charles Tannock ahead helped persuade their Cypriot colleagues and the Cypriot government to abandon their opposition. Taiwan's parliamentary delegation engaged in intensive communications with their colleagues in the EP on the abolition of death penalty. French delegates finally did not challenge the consensus in the Council.⁶ On 22 December 2010, the EU agreed to grant visa-waivers to all Taiwanese. Without issuing any protest, Beijing seemingly intended to reinterpret this visa-waiver issue granted by the EU as evidence of Beijing's goodwill to Taiwanese. "We are pleased to learn," said an ex-Ambassador of the PRC, "that our Taiwanese compatriots are now better treated in the world if it is not threatening to one-China policy."⁷

The achievements realized under Ma's presidency have reconfirmed the fruitfulness of détente across the Strait and the unhooking of the EU-Taiwan relationship from the EU-PRC relationship. Improving the EU-Taiwan relationship in a way that does not necessarily threaten the EU-PRC relationship may constitute the most fruitful achievement of Ma's détente. More importantly, the EU's decision to grant Taiwanese visa-free status had a domino effect, such that more than eighty countries and territories followed the EU's policy and granted ROC nationals visa-free entry.

Ma's proposal that Taiwan and the EU launch negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) encountered more difficulties in the EU. Though the EP has

⁵ Interview with Mr. Jong-Jen Chiu, former Director General of Department of European Affairs of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the ROC, on May 24, 2013.

⁶ Interview with Mr. Yong-Chuen Tzen, former secretary general of the President of the Republic of China in December 2012. Mr. Tzen was the party whip of KMT in the parliament between 2008 and 2012.

⁷ Interview with Mr. Wen-Zhon Zhou, former ambassador of PRC to the US, in Beijing on 11 January 2013.

adopted several resolutions in support of such negotiations, and some think tanks in Brussels have echoed Taiwan's proposal, no member states in the EU have ever given Taiwan explicit support on this issue (The Legislative Yuan of Republic of China, 2011: 323-324). Taiwan was therefore not included in the list of Asian countries with which the EU will negotiate FTAs after the EU-Korea FTA entered into effect in July 2011. The EU then began negotiating FTAs with selected members of ASEAN: Singapore, Vietnam and Thailand. It was even proposed that the EU start negotiating FTAs with India, the US, and Japan. In a speech on EU-Taiwan relations in 2011, the Directorate-General for Trade (DG Trade) made it clear that the EU would not risk antagonizing the PRC to start negotiations on an FTA with Taiwan, though the latter was an important trade partner of the EU in Asia (Taipei Times, 2011). Just one day after Taipei and Singapore announced that they would restart negotiations on an FTA in August 2010, the PRC ambassador to the EU met with the Deputy Directorate-General for the External Relations (DG Relex) and informed him of China's position that negotiations on FTA between Taipei and Singapore should not be 'generalized' as a principle. Asked by his European counterpart if this meant that Beijing opposed FTA negotiations between Brussels and Taipei, the PRC ambassador replied that "he would not deny it".⁸ Beijing evidently feared that the EU-Taiwan FTA, once successful, would result in a domino effect, as in the case of visa-free entry, which would strengthen Taiwan's independent identity in the international community.

Ma's EU policy also failed to attract more European investment and to obtain more active support from the EU for Taiwan's quest for membership in international organizations. With ratification of the GPA (Governmental Procurement Agreement) and ECFA, Taiwan intended to attract more interest in FTAs and reposition itself as a smart gate to the whole Chinese market. Unfortunately, official statistics show the disappointing results of Ma's policy in attracting European capital.⁹ According to the reports of the European Commercial Chamber in Taiwan (ECCT), Taiwan has failed to attract European capital owing to its inefficient bureaucracy, complicated legal system, and reluctance of the government to open the door to international investors. Last but not least, the uncertain future of détente with the PRC was always casting shadows over European investment in Taiwan. Consequently, though Taiwan's ranking in world competitiveness rankings has risen continuously since Ma's

⁸ Interview of Karel Kovanda, then Deputy Director General of DG Relex of European Commission by the author in January 2010.

⁹ In 2008, the inward FDI to Taiwan was \$45,458 million flowed, which slightly increased to \$64,203 million in 2010 and \$56,514 million in 2011. UNTAD-STAT, *Inward and Outward FDI Annual Stock 1980-2011*. in <http://unctadstat.unctad.org/TableViewer/tableView.aspx>. Latest update 20 March 2013.

inauguration in 2008, European investment in Taiwan has not risen proportionately.

Concerning Taiwan's participation in international organizations, the WHO finally invited Taiwan's Minister of Health, according to the new Regulation on International Health, to the annual World Health Assembly in 2009. In 2010, Kaohsiung and Taipei, respectively, held the World Games and the Deaflympics, without protest from mainland China. In 2012, the ICAO invited Taiwan's director general of civil aviation to its annual assembly as a 'special guest'. But the EU has not yet modified its position on Taiwan's quest for membership in international organizations. The 'WHA formula' and 'ICAO formula' even encouraged some European diplomats to suppose that Taipei and Beijing could come to an understanding between themselves on such issues. This trend has seemingly deprived Taiwanese diplomats of their most persuasive arguments with their European counterparts.

At the same time, during Ma's presidency, Taiwan put an end to the moratorium on the death penalty and restarted executing criminals, which was condemned publicly by the European External Action Service (EEAS), European Parliament, and French government. The abolition of the death penalty has been one of the most contentious points in the bilateral relationship between the EU and Taiwan. "European Parliament is a good friend of Taiwan," said a heavily-weighted former MEP, "and we all are very sensible to the execution of criminals in Taiwan."¹⁰

CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTS OF EU-TAIWAN RELATIONS

Taiwan's EU policy is a success story. After the ROC was expelled from the UN in 1971, its diplomatic situation in Europe collapsed. Taiwan has since succeeded, to an extent, in reestablishing its relations with the EU and its member states when it replaced the Hallstein Doctrine with a 'flexible diplomacy'. Then, in response to domestic and international events in the late 1980s, Taiwan adopted a 'pragmatic diplomacy' with the aim of exploiting certain dual recognition in its bilateral diplomacy and dual representation within international organizations. Though rising tensions in the Strait and the rapid economic development of the PRC prevented bilateralism from being more thoroughly promoted in diplomatic and economic fields between the late 1990s and 2008, bilateralism did lead to progress in deepening common values of EU and Taiwan, such as human rights protections and democracy. Since Ma's inauguration as the president in May 2008, Taiwan's EU policy has resulted in the speculative grant of visa-free entry in the EU and elsewhere thanks to the domino effect. Most importantly, Ma's EU policy successfully broke the vicious

¹⁰ Georg Jarzembowski, Speech on EU-Taiwan Relationship at National Taiwan University on 2nd May 2013. Mr. Jarzembowski was member of EP and chairman of EP-Taiwan Friendship between 1999 and 2009.

circle of the EU-Taiwan-PRC relations and distanced the EU-Taiwan relationship from the EU-PRC relationship. (Appendix)

Taiwan's EU policy surely has not been consistently victorious. In its quest for membership of international organizations, Taiwan failed to obtain as much support from the EU as it had from the US. While the US restarted the negotiations with Taiwan on the TIFA (Trade and Investment Framework Agreement) and reiterated that, as a member of the WTO, Taiwan had every right to negotiate a FTA with any other members, the EU still declined to Taiwan's initiative on the Economic Cooperation Agreement (ECA). Throughout the debate over whether or not to lift the PRC arms embargo, Taiwan's interests were entirely neglected in the EU and European media. Détente with the PRC did not help Taiwan attract more investment from the EU.

This frustration could be well explained by the constraints imposed by Beijing's one-China principle, which prevented Taiwan from developing any formal and diplomatic relationship with the EU. However, Taiwan's EU policy might also be handicapped by the rising tension in Taiwan Strait and decreasing trade volume between EU and Taiwan. As shown in the years between late 1990s and 2008, rising tension and hostility between the PRC and Taiwan could narrow the maneuvering room that Taiwan needed in conduction of its diplomacy in Europe. EU agreed to grant Taiwanese visa waiver treatment only after Ma had launched détente in the Strait in 2008.

Another threat to Taiwan's EU policy might be the decreasing bilateral trade volume. In the past decade between 2003 and 2012, the volume of EU-Taiwan trade in goods increased from €33,651 million to €38312 million. (European Commission, 2013a) During the same period, the volume of EU-Korean Trade rose from €42,451 to €75,608 while that of the EU-PRC increased from €147,693 to €433,735. (European Commission, 2013b and 2013c) Accordingly, ranking as the EU's fourth Asian trade partner in 2003 when EU established its delegation in Taipei, Taiwan was downgraded to the seventh in 2012. (European Commission, 2013a) The continuous decline of bilateral trade could be emptying the very common interest that Taiwan could exploit for its diplomacy in Europe.

Last but not least, quarrels over the abolition of death penalty in Taiwan never ceased to disturb Taiwan's EU policy. Though the ROC unilaterally 'ratified' and implemented the UN Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in December 2009, no Taiwanese leaders or political parties advocated publicly the abolition of death penalty, and all polls showed strong opposition against this abolition. In the near future, the Taiwanese government will continue to be criticized by the EU each time when it executes criminals.

The concept of national interest proved to be able to explain Taiwan's diplomatic

strategy and tactics vis-à-vis the EU. As Taiwan has never regarded the EU as a guarantor of its national security, its EU policy aimed to exploit politico-economic interests, serve ideological goals, and consolidate its own identity in the international community. In the period of flexible diplomacy, the EU was principally an alternative market to the US for Taiwan's export-driven economy. Under Lee's pragmatic diplomacy, Taiwan's EU policy became more ambitious, aiming to upgrade the EU-Taiwan relationship to a semi-official level and obtain European support in its quest for membership of WTO and, to a lesser degree, the UN. Chen and the DPP's confrontational diplomacy was challenged and constrained by the rapidly rising economy of the PRC and ceaseless tensions across the Strait. However, Chen's diplomacy also helped promote those EU-cherished values in Taiwan and gain conditional support from Brussels in Taiwan's quest for membership in the specialized institutions of the UN. EU was for the first time clarifying its stance on the Taiwan Strait in January 2007. Ma's workable diplomacy has, to a great degree, unhooked the EU-Taiwan relationship from the EU-PRC relationship. Increasing détente in the Strait even prevented Beijing from actively opposing EU's granting of visa-waiver to nationals of the ROC, thereby enlarging the space available for Taiwan's diplomatic maneuverings vis-à-vis the EU.

Comparing the abovementioned four periods of Taiwan's EU policy, I found that the KMT-led governments preferred to promote functional relations and economic interests in the EU-Taiwan relationship, while the DPP was inclined to 'politicize' this bilateral relationship. This difference might be well illustrated in light of different definitions of Taiwan's national interest. As the KMT adheres to the present ROC constitutional order and refrains from provoking anti-Taiwan nationalism on the mainland China, its governments prefer to avoid political debate over the future of Taiwan in its EU policies while focusing on economic interests and functional relations. As regards the DPP, it continues to pursue for Taiwan's *de jure* independence. Therefore, its EU policy cannot but aim to reinforce identity and sovereign independence from China, in both its PRC and ROC constitutional garbs. While in power, DPP leaders and governments could not but strengthen Taiwan's independence and sovereignty in its external actions and EU policies. The definition of national interest has prevailed over other factors to shape most EU policies in Taiwan.

Appendix: Success and frustration of Taiwan (ROC)'s EU Policies since 1949

Period	Strategy	Success	Frustration
1949-1980	Hallstein Doctrine		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - French recognition of the PRC in 1964 - European general support of PRC accession to the UN in 1971 - European de-recognition of ROC in the 1970s
1980-1988	flexible diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Re-establishment of Taiwanese offices in European capitals - Re-establishment of European delegations in Taipei - Establishment of bilateral annual conference to be held outside of Taiwan 	
1988-2000	pragmatic diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Upgrading of Taiwan's offices in European capitals - Upgrading of European delegations in Taipei - Upgrading of bilateral conferences to be held in Europe and Taipei alternatively - Visits of high ranking officials from the EU and its member states to Taiwan - First pro-Taiwan resolution of the EP - EU's support of Taiwan's accession to GATT - French arms sale to Taiwan - Mutual recognition of Taiwan and Macedonia 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - French adherence to on-China explicitly

2000-2008	confrontational diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Establishment of Taipei representative Office in the EU in Brussels - Establishment of the EU delegation in Taipei - The EU's conditional support of Taiwan's participation in WHA - Liberty Prize granted to Chen by the Liberal Group of EP - Chen's formal visit to Vatican via Italy - The EU's admiration of progress towards the abolition of death penalty in Taiwan - Adoption of several pro-Taiwan resolutions by the EP 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reportedly, no visa to be issued to top political leaders of Taiwan to Europe - Macedonian recognition of the PRC in 2001 - The EU's tentative lifting of arms embargo upon PRC - The EU's condemnation of Taiwan's veto of the PRC nominee as a judge on appellate body in WTO - The EU's criticism on Taiwan's planned referenda
2008-present	Workable diplomacy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Visa-waiver granted by the EU - The EU's admiration of increasing détente in the Taiwan Strait 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Failure to start negotiations on FTA with the EU - Failure to attract more investment from the EU - Failure to increase trade with the EU - Failure to acquire more support from the EU in Taiwan's quest for membership of international organizations - The EU's condemnation of death penalty in Taiwan

Source: the author

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