

## REGIME PERFORMANCE AND DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

*Chong-Min Park and Yu-tzung Chang*

*Chong-Min Park is dean of the College of Political Science and Economics and professor of public administration at Korea University. He directs the Asian Barometer Survey in South Korea. Yu-tzung Chang is associate professor of political science at National Taiwan University. He is co-principal investigator and program manager of the Asian Barometer.*

Compared to other regions, the track record of “third-wave” democratization in East Asia has been largely mixed.<sup>1</sup> East Asia’s first third-wave democracy emerged in the Philippines in 1986 when the People Power Revolution overthrew the country’s longstanding dictatorship. South Korea’s transition immediately followed with the adoption of a democratic constitution and founding election in 1987. Taiwan, whose transition began that same year with the lifting of martial law, held its first presidential election almost a decade later, in 1996. Mongolia made a rapid transition to democracy in 1990, abolishing one-party communist rule and holding its first multiparty parliamentary elections in more than sixty years.

Cambodia’s transition from one-party communist rule began in 1991, but democratization was halted by the 1997 coup. Thailand’s transition to democracy began in 1992, but democratic consolidation was interrupted by a 2006 military coup. Indonesia embarked on the transition to democracy in 1998 with the forced resignation of longtime autocrat Suharto and the holding of open, multiparty parliamentary elections in 1999. Most recently, beginning in 2011 Burma, a longtime military dictatorship, began taking steps toward political liberalization.

Yet many countries in the region have remained immune to the global wave of democratization. Singapore and Malaysia, puzzling anomalies, have preserved pseudodemocracies characterized by controlled or uneven multiparty competition. China, Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam have maintained one-party communist rule, and Brunei is a “sultanistic” regime. The transformation of autocracies into democracies in the region has stalled for over a decade.

With this background in mind, this chapter examines public support for democracy as an idea and public evaluations of the regime-in-practice across the democratic and pseudodemocratic countries of East Asia. How do East Asians orient themselves toward democracy as an idea? Do they believe in the legitimacy of democracy? How strong is their adherence to the norms and institutions associated with liberal democracy? Apart from support for democracy as an idea, how do they orient themselves to their regime-in-practice? How supportive are they of the prevailing system of government? To what extent do they believe that the regime-in-practice reflects the institutions and mechanisms of democracy? How much trust do they have in representative institutions of the regime-in-practice? And, most important, what shapes orientations toward democracy as an idea and evaluations of the regime-in-practice? By addressing these and other related questions, we seek to understand the patterns of citizen orientations to political regimes, both ideal and real, across East Asia.

In order to do so, we have used public-opinion data drawn from the third wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (hereafter, ABS III) conducted in nine countries between 2010 and 2012. The sample countries are divided into three groups according to regime type: liberal democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), electoral democracies (Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Thailand), and pseudodemocracies or competitive authoritarian regimes (Malaysia and Singapore).<sup>2</sup>

## Conceptual Framework

David Easton's theory of political support serves as our starting point for analyzing citizen orientations to democracy and evaluations of the regime-in-practice.<sup>3</sup> Easton described political support as something that flows from an individual's evaluation (whether favorable or unfavorable) of a given political system. He distinguished among three levels of such systems: the political community ("a group of persons bound together by a political division of labor"), the regime (the system of government and its principles or justifications), and the authorities (incumbents in authority roles). He further differentiated three components within the regime: values, norms, and the structure of authority. The regime values "serve as broad limits with regard to what can be taken for granted in the guidance of day-to-day policy." The regime norms are the "procedures that are expected and acceptable in the processing and implementation of demands." The structure of authority refers to the "formal and informal patterns in which power is distributed and organized with regard to the authoritative making and implementing of decisions."<sup>4</sup> Hence, political support at the regime level includes attitudes toward the values, operating norms and procedures, and institutional arrangements of a political regime.

Much of the empirical research on support for democracy builds on this conceptual distinction between different aspects of the regime. For instance, Russell J. Dalton distinguishes between three objects of regime support: principles, norms and procedures, and institutions. He further differentiates between two modes of orientation: affective and evaluative. The former represents “adherence to a set of values,” and the latter reflects “judgments about political phenomena.”<sup>5</sup> Pippa Norris classifies three objects of regime support: principles (the core values of a political system), performance (the functioning of a political system), and institutions (actual state institutions such as parliament, courts, the police, political parties, and the military).<sup>6</sup> Similarly, John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson differentiate between three dimensions of regime legitimacy: core regime principles, regime performance, and regime institutions.<sup>7</sup>

Despite conceptual clarification and theoretical distinction, researchers have had difficulties distinguishing empirically between different types or modes of political support. Nonetheless, a multidimensional or multilevel conceptualization of political support is useful for disentangling citizen orientations toward a political system. By specifying the targets of support, we should be able to better understand the nature of political discontent, its sources, and its consequences.

Following prior theory and research, we distinguish between three aspects of the regime: values, norms and rules, and institutions. Moreover, we distinguish between support for democracy as an idea (democratic support) and support for the regime-in-practice (regime support), which varies depending on the political setting. In democracies, support for the regime-in-practice may reflect practical support for democracy. In autocratic settings, however, support for the regime-in-practice indicates practical support for autocracy.

In breaking down the various kinds of support for democracy, we focus on three specific notions reflecting commitment to democracy. The first aspect of democratic support refers to general orientations toward democracy as a whole. In public-opinion surveys, this aspect of democratic support is often measured by agreement that democracy is the best (or most preferred) form of government. Likewise, in this study it is measured by both preference for democracy over its alternatives (especially authoritarian regimes) and acceptance of democracy as the best form of government. The second aspect of democratic support encompasses orientations toward specific norms and procedures of democracy. In this study, it is measured by adherence to certain liberal norms, such as checks and balances, the rule of law, and social pluralism. The last aspect concerns orientations toward specific institutions of democracy, such as popular elections and a multiparty system.

Similarly, in analyzing regime support we look at three factors reflecting the endorsement of the regime-in-practice. The first aspect of

**TABLE 1—DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY**

	Preference for Democracy over Its Alternatives	Acceptance of Democracy as Best Form of Government	Both	(N)
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>				
Japan	63	90	61	(1,880)
South Korea	66	83	58	(1,207)
Taiwan	51	87	48	(1,592)
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>				
Indonesia	58	77	52	(1,550)
Mongolia	49	86	47	(1,210)
Philippines	55	76	46	(1,200)
Thailand	68	89	66	(1,512)
<i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i>				
Malaysia	74	87	69	(1,214)
Singapore	47	79	44	(1,000)

Note: Entries are percentages. Missing data not reported.

Source: ABS III

regime support pertains to citizens' overall evaluation of the regime-in-practice. In public-opinion surveys, satisfaction with the workings of democracy is often used to measure this aspect of regime support, although its meaning is contested.<sup>8</sup> Here, we measure regime support using both pride in and "loyalty" to the prevailing system of government. The second aspect of regime support evaluates the performance of political institutions. We measure this by the extent to which the regime-in-practice embodies the values and institutions of democracy. The last aspect involves evaluation of specific institutions of the regime-in-practice. Our indicators are trust in representative institutions—parliament and political parties.

### Orientations Toward Democracy

**Diffuse democratic support.** To ascertain support for democracy in general we selected two questions. One asked respondents to choose from the following three statements the one that best described their feelings: 1) "Democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government"; 2) "under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one"; and 3) "for people like me, it does not matter whether we have a democratic or a non-democratic regime." The other question asked respondents whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement "Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government." We consider affirmative responses to both questions to indicate diffuse support for democracy.

As Table 1 shows, among the region's democracies Thailand displayed the highest level of preference for democracy over its alternatives. It was closely followed by South Korea and Japan. In these countries, roughly two-thirds of respondents considered democracy always to be preferable. In contrast, Mongolia displayed the lowest level of preference for democracy, with Taiwan placing slightly ahead of it. In these two countries, only half of respondents (49–51 percent) expressed unconditional preference for democracy. The two competitive authoritarian regimes exhibited sharply contrasting patterns: Malaysia (74 percent) had a higher level of preference than all its democratic neighbors, whereas Singapore (47 percent) had a lower level than all the democracies.

Acceptance of democracy as the best form of government turned out to be far more widespread. An overwhelming majority (83–90 percent) in most democratic countries agreed that “Democracy may have its problems, but it is still the best form of government.” Surprisingly, in the two competitive authoritarian regimes agreement was even higher (79–87 percent) than in some democratic countries. In every sample country, acceptance of democracy as the best form of government was higher than the preference for democracy over its alternatives. The difference was striking especially in Mongolia, Taiwan, and Singapore.

By looking at the percentage of respondents who answered in the affirmative to both questions, we ascertained the level of diffuse democratic support. Among the region's democracies, Thailand displayed the highest level of diffuse democratic support (positive answers to both questions). Japan and South Korea were close behind, followed by Indonesia. Only in these countries (and Malaysia) did a majority express unconditional adherence to democracy.

The East Asian model of economic success under authoritarian rule seems to sustain a skeptical view of democracy as a universal value. No matter which conception of democracy ordinary people may have, democracy has yet to be seen as “the only game in town” in much of the region.

*Support for liberal democratic norms.* Freedom and equality are often considered the foundational values of liberal democracy. These values are to be achieved through the institutions and mechanisms of limited government, which include the separation and balance of government powers, the rule of law, and a pluralist civil society. How supportive are East Asians of these liberal democratic norms?

To measure acceptance of the norm of checks and balances, we have used two agree-disagree statements: “When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch” and “If the government is constantly checked by the legislature, it cannot possibly accomplish great things.” Surprisingly, none of the East Asian countries surveyed enjoyed majority support for the norm of checks and

TABLE 2—SUPPORT FOR LIBERAL DEMOCRATIC NORMS

	Support for Checks and Balances	Support for the Rule of Law	Support for Social Pluralism
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>			
Japan	47	42	31
South Korea	48	31	42
Taiwan	27	55	24
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>			
Indonesia	30	35	23
Mongolia	28	17	15
Philippines	13	31	15
Thailand	39	11	14
<i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i>			
Malaysia	25	35	13
Singapore	25	25	25

*Note:* Entries are the percent of those giving prodemocratic responses to a pair of questions. Missing data not reported.

*Source:* ABS III

balances as indicated by disagreeing with both statements (see Table 2). In South Korea and Japan, ranking first and second, respectively, slightly less than half subscribed to the norm. The Philippines displayed the lowest level of support, lower even than Singapore and Malaysia. In Taiwan, Mongolia, Indonesia, and Thailand, only a minority (27–39 percent) was supportive of the norm. Support for executive power unconstrained by the legislature or the judiciary—a hallmark of autocratic rule—retains broad support in the region, even among its newer democracies.

Second, we measured support for the rule of law, which is considered essential for protecting liberty and equality from the arbitrary exercise of state power. To measure acceptance of this norm, we selected two agree-disagree statements: “When the country is facing a difficult situation, it is okay for the government to disregard the law in order to deal with the situation” and “If we have political leaders who are morally upright, we can let them decide everything.” Table 2 shows the percentages disagreeing with both statements.

According to these two measures, only Taiwan enjoyed majority support for law-based governance. The second highest level of support was in Japan, where only two in five were supportive of this norm. In South Korea, the Philippines, and Indonesia, only about one in three (31–35 percent) favored law-based governance, and the proportion was much lower in Thailand and Mongolia (11–17 percent). In competitive authoritarian regimes, only a minority subscribed to the norm. In South Korea, Mongolia, and the Philippines, rejection of rule by “good leaders” was far weaker than rejection of arbitrary rule, indi-

cating mixed attitudes toward the liberal conception of rule of law. Overall, the prevailing conception of good governance in the region still seems to reflect the traditional value of rule by leaders who are virtuous and benevolent.

Finally, we examined support for the liberal value of social pluralism and its related implicit value of societal freedom with two agree-disagree statements: “Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups” and “If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic.” There was no country surveyed where a simple majority of citizens supported this norm (by disagreeing with both items). The country with the highest level of support was South Korea, where 42 percent endorsed the norm. In other countries examined, only a small minority (14–31 percent) was supportive of the norm. In particular, Thailand, Mongolia, and the Philippines displayed very low levels of support.

Overall, public adherence to liberal norms associated with the idea of limited government proved to be shallow across the region, suggesting that the cultural foundation of liberal democracy remains superficial. Diffuse support for democracy is not accompanied by commitment to specific liberal democratic norms, suggesting either a radically different view of what democracy is or that much of the avowed support for democracy may be mere “lip service.”<sup>9</sup>

***Support for democratic institutions.*** Trust in existing political institutions is often used to ascertain support for democratic institutions. It makes little sense, however, to use this trust as an indicator of idealistic support for democratic institutions. In autocratic settings, high trust in political institutions clearly cannot be taken to indicate high support for democracy. Even in democratic settings, people may be supportive of democracy and, at the same time, critical of their actual regime’s institutions.

To measure support for democratic institutions, we chose two forced-choice questions asking respondents to indicate the kind of government that they would prefer. The first asked them to choose between two statements: “Political leaders are chosen by the people through open and competitive elections” and “Political leaders are chosen on the basis of their virtue and capability even without election.” The second also asked them to choose between two statements: “Multiple parties compete to represent political interests” and “One party represents the interests of all the people.” The first set of questions captures a preference for popular elections and the second, a preference for a multiparty system. Both are essential institutions for minimalist democracy.

Support for popular elections was high regardless of regime type (see Table 3). In every sample country, at least two-thirds of respondents wanted their political leaders to be popularly elected through

**TABLE 3—SUPPORT FOR INSTITUTIONS OF MINIMALIST DEMOCRACY**

	Popular Elections	Multiparty System	Both
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>			
Japan	80	78	67
South Korea	81	73	64
Taiwan	79	81	67
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>			
Indonesia	77	53	47
Mongolia	75	79	63
Philippines	68	57	41
Thailand	72	68	56
<i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i>			
Malaysia	69	28	22
Singapore	80	70	59

*Note:* Entries are percentages. Missing data not reported.

*Source:* ABS III

open and competitive elections. Even in the competitive authoritarian regimes, democratic elections were widely favored. By contrast, support for a multiparty system differed across the regime types. In all three liberal democracies and two of four electoral democracies (Mongolia and Thailand), at least two-thirds supported it. In the other electoral democracies (Indonesia and the Philippines), only a simple majority supported a multiparty system. Overall, support for the institutions of minimalist democracy varied. In Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Mongolia, nearly two in three (67–63 percent) favored both popular elections and a multiparty system. Indonesia and the Philippines, unlike their democratic neighbors, showed low support—fewer than half of respondents (47–41 percent) favored both democratic institutions. Interestingly, in Thailand the political turmoil that has surrounded elections did not translate into widespread rejection of popular elections and a multiparty system. Finally, a majority in Singapore favored both democratic institutions, whereas in Malaysia less than a quarter did.

Despite low levels of public adherence to liberal norms, public preference for democratic institutions turned out to be high across much of the region. It should be noted, however, that there existed cross-national differences in the gap between diffuse support for democracy and preference for democratic institutions. In all three liberal democracies (Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan), one electoral democracy (Mongolia), and one competitive authoritarian regime (Singapore), support for democratic institutions was higher than diffuse support for democracy. In particular, the gap was greater in Taiwan, Mongolia, and Singapore, suggesting that ambivalence toward democracy as a whole in these countries does not indicate disapproval of minimalist



democratic institutions. By contrast, in Indonesia, the Philippines, and especially Thailand and Malaysia, the preference for democratic institutions was lower than diffuse support for democracy, casting doubt on the authenticity of citizen beliefs in democratic legitimacy.

Overall, popular elections and a multiparty system—the hallmarks of minimalist democracy—remained widely accepted in much of the region, although certain liberal norms associated with limited government were not widely embraced. This finding suggests that diffuse support for democracy, while not yet based on liberal democratic norms, is nonetheless generally accompanied by support for minimalist democratic institutions.

### Evaluations of the Regime-in-Practice

Having analyzed East Asian views on democracy, we now turn to citizen evaluations of the regime-in-practice, examining three components: support for the regime-in-practice as a whole, evaluation of the performance of political institutions, and trust in existing representative institutions.

***Diffuse regime support.*** To ascertain general support for the regime-in-practice, we selected two agree-disagree statements: “Thinking in general, I am proud of our system of government” and “I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.” The first reflects pride in the current system of government, whereas the second reflects loyalty to it. We consider affirmative responses to both questions to reflect diffuse regime support (see Table 4).

Among the region’s democracies, there was a sharp divergence. Thailand displayed the highest level of pride: More than four in five were proud of their system. This was followed by Indonesia, where two-thirds of respondents took pride in their system. In South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan, only a minority (29–40 percent) expressed pride in their system. Despite living in one of the most successful democracies in the region, South Koreans displayed the lowest level of pride in their system (less than a third). Nine in ten Singaporeans and eight in ten Malaysians were proud of their system, suggesting low popular disaffection with the ongoing political order of competitive authoritarianism.

A similar pattern was found in response to the question about loyalty to the system, which was greater than pride in the system in every sample country except for Singapore. Japan and Taiwan displayed a larger gap (26 and 21 percent, respectively) while Mongolia, the Philippines, and South Korea exhibited a smaller gap (11–14 percent), indicating that in the former countries the prevailing system of government was viewed more as “a lesser evil” than in the latter countries. This finding suggests that low pride in the system may not necessarily indicate preference for “exit” from the system, perhaps because of no viable alternatives.

**TABLE 4—DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME-IN-PRACTICE**

	Pride in the System	Loyalty to the System	Both
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>			
Japan	36	62	30
South Korea	29	43	23
Taiwan	40	61	34
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>			
Indonesia	69	75	61
Mongolia	45	56	36
Philippines	46	60	34
Thailand	83	87	77
<i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i>			
Malaysia	80	83	74
Singapore	92	89	85

Notes: Entries are percentages. Missing data not reported.

Source: ABS III

By combining responses to both questions, we ascertained the level of diffuse regime support. Among the region's democracies Thailand, again displayed the highest level of regime support (about three-quarters), followed by Indonesia (three-fifths). South Korea exhibited the lowest level of diffuse regime support, followed by Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and Mongolia. In these countries, only minorities (23–36 percent) expressed diffuse support for the regime-in-practice. It is noteworthy that Singapore and Malaysia maintained a huge reservoir of diffuse regime support, suggesting that the ongoing political order may weather short-term public dissatisfaction with policy outputs.

Overall, most East Asian democracies seemed to fall short of citizen aspirations, illustrating higher levels of public discontent with the democracy-in-practice. More notably, in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, the regimes-in-practice failed to engender even simple majority support, indicating widespread public disaffection with the actual functioning of liberal democracy.

***Evaluation of institutional performance.*** Since institutional performance is a multidimensional phenomenon, it is necessary to distinguish between its different aspects and to ascertain public evaluation of each dimension. In this study, we focus on five dimensions associated with a high-quality democracy: freedom, equality, the rule of law, electoral competition, and accountability.<sup>10</sup> The initial two pertain to substantive aspects, whereas the last three are procedural. The public's evaluation of institutional performance indicates the extent to which the prevailing system of government is seen to embody the values and institutions of liberal democracy.

Freedom is one of the foundational values of liberal democracy. To measure the public's evaluation of regime performance on this dimension, we selected two agree-disagree statements: "People are free to speak what they think without fear" and "People can join any organization they like without fear." Table 5 shows the percentage of those who agreed with both statements. Among the region's democracies, Thailand registered the highest level of public approval, followed by Indonesia and Taiwan. In these three countries, more than two-thirds (68–77 percent) of respondents felt that they enjoyed both freedoms. South Koreans, Japanese, and Mongolians were more critical—only about half (47–53 percent) affirmed both statements. Surprisingly, Malaysia returned higher scores: Three in four believed they enjoyed both freedoms. As expected, Singapore displayed the lowest level of affirmation (44 percent).

To measure citizens' evaluation of regime performance on equality, we again selected two agree-disagree statements: "All citizens from different ethnic communities are treated equally by the government" and "Rich and poor people are treated equally by the government." Once more, as Table 5 shows, Thailand displayed the highest level of affirmation (84 percent) among the region's democracies, followed by Indonesia (62 percent).

Public assessments of equality were more severe in the other democracies, ranging from 12 percent in Korea to 34 percent in Mongolia. Competitive authoritarian regimes fared better. A majority in Malaysia and Singapore considered both types of equality provided. In most sample countries, perceptions of unequal treatment of the economically disadvantaged were more conspicuous than perceptions of unequal treatment of ethnic minorities, suggesting that economic disparities constitute a major source of political disaffection across much of the region.

Another foundational value, the rule of law, is essential for securing not only liberal democracy but also good governance. To measure evaluation of regime performance on this dimension, we selected two questions. One asked, "How often do government leaders break the law or abuse their power?" and the other, "How widespread do you think corruption and bribe-taking are in the national government?" The two most favorable replies in each case were taken as signs of positive regard for the rule of law. Public evaluation of regime performance regarding this value was largely unfavorable except in Singapore (75 percent). Even in Japan, which displayed the highest level of approval among the region's democracies, only half of respondents had a favorable judgment. In Thailand, one in three considered public officials to be law-abiding. In Mongolia, less than a tenth of respondents felt that their society was governed by the rule of law. In the other democracies, only a small minority (15–22 percent) gave a favorable evaluation. Yet in competitive authoritarian Malaysia, a third did.

**TABLE 5—EVALUATION OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE**

	Freedom	Equality	Rule of Law	Electoral Competition	Accountability
<i>Liberal Democracy</i>					
Japan	50	19	49	46	22
South Korea	47	12	19	52	21
Taiwan	68	20	22	58	30
<i>Electoral Democracy</i>					
Indonesia	74	62	17	47	33
Mongolia	53	34	6	54	6
Philippines	63	20	15	39	29
Thailand	77	84	34	54	28
<i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i>					
Malaysia	74	59	35	56	39
Singapore	44	62	75	47	37

*Notes:* Entries are the percent of those having favorable responses to a pair of questions. Missing data not reported.

*Source:* ABS III

Electoral competition, another plank of liberal democracy, pertains to the degree to which the electoral process is free, fair, and competitive. One question here asked respondents to evaluate the freeness and fairness of the most recent national election. The other asked them whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement “Political parties or candidates have equal access to the mass media during the election period.” In four of the seven democracies (South Korea, Mongolia, Thailand, and Taiwan), a majority (52–58 percent) considered the electoral process to be free, fair, and competitive (see Table 5). The Philippines displayed the least favorable evaluation, followed by Japan and Indonesia. In these countries, only a minority (39–47 percent) considered the electoral process to be free, fair, and competitive. Surprisingly, the competitive authoritarian regimes fared well: Evaluations in Malaysia were more favorable than those in every democracy except for Taiwan, and Singaporeans evaluated elections more favorably than did Japanese and Filipinos.

Lastly, we measured accountability, which pertains not only to the relationship between citizens and government leaders (vertical accountability) but also the relationship between branches of government (horizontal accountability). Our measures were again the responses to two agree-disagree statements: “Between elections the people have no way of holding the government responsible for its actions” and “When the government breaks the laws, there is nothing the legal system can do.” Public evaluations of accountability in the democracies were largely negative; only in Indonesia did even a third evaluate accountability favorably. The two competitive authoritarian regimes fared

much better. The findings illustrate the strengths and weaknesses of regimes across East Asia in the eyes of their publics. If we consider a favorable evaluation of a third or less as a failing mark of institutional performance, then South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines failed on three dimensions (equality, rule of law, and accountability); Japan and Mongolia failed on two (equality and accountability for Japan, and rule of law and accountability for Mongolia); and Thailand and Indonesia each failed on one (accountability for Thailand and the rule of law for Indonesia). Thus in every democracy examined—liberal or electoral—citizens perceived common problems in the rule of law and accountability and, somewhat less pervasively, a lack of equality. By contrast, the two competitive authoritarian regimes had no below-the-failing-mark evaluations.

If we consider majority public-approval level a minimum threshold for good performance, Thailand had a passing grade on three such dimensions (freedom, equality, and electoral competition), and Taiwan, Mongolia, and Indonesia had two passing marks. In Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, however, respondents perceived good governance on only one such dimension (electoral competition in South Korea, and freedom in Japan and the Philippines). In six of the seven democracies surveyed, freedom received an approval level above the minimum threshold, whereas in four of the seven democracies electoral competition surpassed such a level. Both of these are hallmarks of “thin” democracy. Surprisingly, competitive authoritarian regimes fared better in the eyes of their publics, with the Malaysian system being evaluated well on three performance dimensions (freedom, equality, and electoral competition) and the Singaporean system on two (equality and the rule of law).

Overall, the prevailing systems of government surveyed in the region were viewed as deficient in controlling government corruption and official abuses of power. Moreover, they were also viewed as weak in non-electoral popular control of government. Although electoral autocracies with a façade of controlled multiparty elections fared better on many dimensions, they too were viewed as deficient in nonelectoral accountability. In contrast to expert-based assessments, citizens of the three liberal democracies in East Asia do not view their prevailing systems of government as high-quality democracies.

***Trust in representative institutions.*** In democratic settings, trust in political institutions may be used to indicate support for democratic institutions.<sup>11</sup> Since our study includes not only democracies but also competitive authoritarian regimes, we consider this measure to reflect support for the institutions of the regime-in-practice. In public-opinion surveys, the targets of trust include various public institutions such as parliament, courts, political parties, the armed forces, the police, and the civil service. In order to focus on representative political institutions,

**TABLE 6—TRUST IN INSTITUTIONS**

	Parliament	Political Parties	Both
<b><i>Liberal Democracy</i></b>			
Japan	11	9	5
South Korea	11	12	8
Taiwan	19	14	9
<b><i>Electoral Democracy</i></b>			
Indonesia	50	42	34
Mongolia	28	17	11
Philippines	43	35	25
Thailand	49	35	27
<b><i>Competitive Authoritarianism</i></b>			
Malaysia	70	54	49
Singapore	83	69	67

*Notes:* Entries are percentages. Missing data not reported.

*Source:* ABS III

here we have selected the parliament and political parties as the objects of trust (see Table 6).

Among the region's democracies, Indonesia displayed the highest level of trust in parliament, followed closely by Thailand. In these countries, about half the electorate expressed trust in parliament. In the Philippines, a large minority (43 percent) expressed some degree of trust in Congress. By contrast, only small minorities (11–28 percent) in Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, and Mongolia expressed some degree of trust in their legislatures. The Japanese and South Koreans were most cynical; only about one in ten trusted parliament. Competitive authoritarian regimes fared far better, with large majorities in Malaysia and Singapore expressing trust in parliament.

In most democracies, trust in political parties was even lower. There was no democracy surveyed in which a majority had trust in political parties. Indonesia displayed the highest level of trust (42 percent), followed by Thailand and the Philippines (35 percent in both). In these three countries, only a large minority trusted political parties. In the more advanced democracies of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, as well as in Mongolia, only small minorities (9–17 percent) had trust in political parties. In sharp contrast, more than two-thirds of respondents in Singapore and more than half in Malaysia trusted political parties.

By combining responses to both questions, we ascertained the level of trust in current representative institutions. In Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, less than a tenth (5–9 percent) had trust in both institutions. Mongolia fared only a little better (11 percent). Other electoral democracies registered somewhat higher levels of trust in parliament and par-

ties: In the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia, more than one in four (25–34 percent) trusted both institutions. By far the highest levels of political trust, however, were in Singapore (67 percent) and Malaysia (49 percent), suggesting that these regimes are resilient. Overall, ordinary citizens in East Asian liberal democracies appear highly cynical about parties and politicians. This finding should not be taken as a rejection of democratic institutions, however. As noted earlier, large majorities (73–81 percent) in the same countries support a multiparty system. Moreover, large majorities (80–83 percent) disagreed with the statement “We should get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide things.” Similarly, a larger majority (87–91 percent) disagreed with the statement “Only one political party should be allowed to stand for election and hold office.” These findings show a wide discrepancy between trust in current regime institutions and support for democratic institutions, suggesting the prevalence of “critical citizens” in East Asian liberal democracies. These critical citizens are supportive in general of democratic values and institutions but cynical about their actual political institutions.<sup>12</sup>

### Sources of Political Support

Citizen support for a political regime is considered one of the critical conditions for regime stability. This is especially so for a democracy, which cannot be sustained without popular consent to its values, norms, and institutions. Hence, prior research has sought to understand what shapes citizen support for a political regime. Two competing explanations have emerged. The instrumental account emphasizes performance-driven political support. Within this account, some theorists emphasize economic performance<sup>13</sup> while others consider political performance to be more influential.<sup>14</sup> Unlike the instrumental account, the intrinsic view asserts that values and norms acquired through political socialization matter more than short-term performance.

Considering both views, we may divide sources of political support into three broad clusters: 1) normative commitment to the norms and institutions of democracy; 2) evaluation of political institutional performance; and 3) evaluation of policy performance. The first cluster includes four variables: checks and balances, the rule of law, social pluralism, and minimalist institutions.<sup>15</sup> The second cluster includes five variables: freedom, equality, the rule of law, electoral competition, and accountability.<sup>16</sup> The third cluster includes four variables: national economy, personal economy, basic welfare, and public safety.<sup>17</sup> In addition to these clusters, we have added one set of variables to represent demographic controls: age, educational attainment, and income.<sup>18</sup> We employed pooled cross-sectional data from the countries of each regime type for multivariate analysis.

**TABLE 7—SOURCES OF DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY**

	<b>Liberal Democracy</b>	<b>Electoral Democracy</b>	<b>Competitive Authoritarianism</b>
<i>Norms and Institutions</i>			
Checks and balances	.045(.009)***	.035(.008)***	Ns
Rule of law	.018(.009)*	Ns	Ns
Social pluralism	.033(.008)***	Ns	-.065(.013)***
Minimalist democratic institutions	.210(.017)***	.086(.017)***	Ns
<i>Institutional Performance</i>			
Freedom	.109(.008)*	.019(.008)*	.024(.012)*
Equality	Ns	.017(.007)*	Ns
Rule of law	.043(.009)***	.039(.009)***	Ns
Electoral competition	.025(.009)**	.041(.009)***	.031(.015)*
Accountability	Ns	Ns	Ns
<i>Policy Performance</i>			
National economy	-.039(.012)***	Ns	Ns
Household economy	Ns	Ns	Ns
Basic welfare	Ns	Ns	Ns
Public safety	Ns	.048(.016)**	Ns
<i>Demographic Controls</i>			
Age	.026(.008)***	.041(.008)***	.045(.013)***
Education	.083(.016)***	.055(.014)***	.060(.023)**
Income	Ns	.060(.013)***	Ns
<i>Summary Statistics</i>			
R-square	.127	.077	.059
(N)	(3,340)	(3,426)	(1,350)

Note: \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

Source: ABS III

***Diffuse democratic support.*** Table 7 shows the results of the multivariate analysis for diffuse support for democracy. For this dependent variable, we found that two institutional-performance variables—freedom and electoral competition—had the most frequent significant effects regardless of regime types. The effects of other key variables, however, do differ depending on regime type.

In liberal democracies, all four commitment variables—checks and balances, rule of law, social pluralism, and minimalist democratic institutions—had significant effects. The more that people are committed to liberal norms and minimalist institutions of democracy, the more likely they are to be supportive of democracy. Three of five institutional-performance variables had significant effects. Favorable evaluation of freedom, the rule of law, and electoral competition encouraged support for democracy. Notably, equality and accountability had no effects. Only one of the four policy-performance variables—national economy—had



significant, albeit negative, effects. Neither basic welfare nor public safety had effects. Of the demographic variables, age and education had significant effects: Older people and the more educated were more supportive of democracy than younger people and the less educated, a common finding in this type of research.

In electoral democracies, two of four commitment variables had significant effects. The more that people are committed to checks and balances and minimalist institutions of democracy, the more likely they are to be supportive of democracy. In contrast, four of five institutional performance variables—freedom, equality, the rule of law, and electoral competition—had significant effects. The only exception was accountability. Only one policy-performance variable—public safety—contributed to diffuse support for democracy. All demographic variables had significant effects: older people, the more educated, and the affluent were more favorably disposed to democracy than younger people, the less educated, and the poor.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, only one of four commitment variables—social pluralism—had significant (albeit negative) effects. Oddly, the more that people are committed to social pluralism, the less likely they are to be supportive of democracy. Even adherence to minimalist institutions of democracy had no effects. Two of five institutional-performance variables—freedom and electoral competition—had significant effects. Yet none of the policy-performance variables had effects. Of the demographic variables, age and education had significant effects: Older people and the more educated were more supportive of democracy than younger people and the less educated.

As the coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) indicated, our model was not successful at accounting for diffuse support for democracy at the individual level. Yet it should be noted that the model worked better in liberal democracies than in other types of regimes. The effects of commitment variables were more frequently found in liberal democracies than in electoral democracies. In contrast, the effects of institutional-performance variables were found more often in electoral democracies than in liberal democracies. This finding suggests that in electoral democracies diffuse support for democracy is more performance-based than in liberal democracies. Notably, neither norms nor performance mattered much in competitive authoritarian regimes.

In democratic settings, we would expect people to be more supportive of democracy when they consider regime performance to be satisfactory. In nondemocratic settings, however, better regime performance would not necessarily encourage support for democracy because there would be no reason for people to entertain democracy as an alternative if they found their regime's performance satisfactory. Perhaps this is why regime performance played little role in engendering diffuse support for democracy in competitive authoritarian regimes. Another notable find-

**TABLE 8—SOURCES OF DIFFUSE SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME-IN-PRACTICE**

	Liberal Democracy	Electoral Democracy	Competitive Authoritarianism
<i>Norms and Institutions</i>			
Checks and balances	-.045(.018)*	Ns	-.062(.024)**
Rule of law	Ns	Ns	Ns
Social pluralism	Ns	Ns	-.068(.023)**
Minimalist democratic institutions	Ns	.076(.036)*	Ns
<i>Institutional Performance</i>			
Freedom	.061(.016)***	.054(.017)**	.061(.020)**
Equality	.121(.018)***	.213(.015)***	.152(.020)***
Rule of law	.145(.018)***	.139(.018)***	.081(.019)***
Electoral competition	.134(.018)***	.112(.019)***	.178(.026)***
Accountability	.043(.015)**	Ns	Ns
<i>Policy Performance</i>			
National economy	.134(.024)***	.209(.028)***	.292(.038)***
Household economy	.100(.029)***	Ns	Ns
Basic welfare	.122(.029)***	.141(.026)***	.275(.046)***
Public safety	.138(.031)***	.156(.033)***	Ns
<i>Demographic Controls</i>			
Age	.093(.016)***	.061(.018)***	.048(.023)*
Education	Ns	-.151(.029)***	Ns
Income	Ns	Ns	-.161(.035)***
<hr/>			
R-square	.206	.253	.331
(N)	(3,291)	(3,431)	(1,362)

Note: \*p<0.05 \*\*p<0.01 \*\*\*p<0.001

Source: ABS III

ing is that policy performance mattered little, regardless of regime type.

**Diffuse regime support.** Having analyzed the sources of diffuse democratic support, we now turn to the sources of diffuse support for the regime-in-practice—democratic or autocratic (see Table 8). In liberal democracies, only one of the four commitment variables had significant, albeit negative, effects. The more that people are committed to checks and balances, the less likely they are to be supportive of the prevailing system of government, suggesting that their democracy-in-practice was viewed as short of this element of limited government. By contrast, all five institutional-performance variables had significant effects. Moreover, all four policy-performance variables had significant effects. Of the demographic controls, only age had a significant effect, indicating that older people were more supportive of the regime-in-practice than younger people.

In electoral democracies, only one of the four commitment variables

had significant effects: The more that people are committed to institutions of minimalist democracy, the more likely they are to be supportive of the regime-in-practice. Yet, four of the five institutional-performance variables (the exception being accountability) had significant effects. Of the four, equality was the strongest predictor. Similarly, three of the four policy-performance variables had significant effects. Among them, the national economy was the strongest predictor. Of the demographic controls, age had positive effects while education produced negative effects. Younger people and the more educated were more critical of the regime-in-practice than older people and the less educated.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, two of the four commitment variables had significant but negative effects: The more that people are committed to checks and balances and social pluralism, the less likely they are to be supportive of the regime-in-practice. At the same time, four of the five institutional-performance variables had significant effects. In particular, the impact of electoral competition was most notable. Two of the four policy-performance variables—the national economy and basic welfare—had significant effects. The more that people are inclined toward favorable evaluations of the national economy and the provision of basic welfare, the more likely they are to be supportive of the regime-in-practice. Of the demographic controls, age had a positive (albeit weak) effect, while income had a negative effect. The better off were far more critical of the ongoing political order than the worse off.

As the coefficient of determination ( $R^2$ ) indicated, our model was relatively successful in accounting for diffuse support for the regime-in-practice at the individual level, especially in competitive authoritarian regimes, where the entire set of variables accounted for a third (33 percent) of the variance in diffuse regime support.

Unlike diffuse support for democracy, diffuse support for the regime-in-practice was largely shaped by political and socioeconomic performance. Significant performance variables differed among regime types. In liberal democracies, there was no single dominant performance variable, although the rule of law seemed slightly more important. By contrast, in electoral democracies equality and the national economy emerged as the most important predictors. In competitive authoritarian regimes, the national economy and basic welfare emerged as stronger predictors. Equality, electoral competition, the national economy, and basic welfare turned out to be consistent predictors of diffuse support for the regime-in-practice, regardless of regime type. Accountability, one of the key procedural dimensions of democracy, played little or no role. One of the most notable findings is that adherence to liberal norms had negative, if any, effects, suggesting that the ongoing political orders—democratic or autocratic—fall short on some standards of limited government in the eyes of their citizens.

In liberal democracies, institutional performance played a limited role in engendering support for democracy but a notable role in fostering support for the regime-in-practice. Adherence to liberal norms contributed to diffuse support for democracy but undermined diffuse support for the regime-in-practice, suggesting that the spread of liberal democratic norms may have something to do with the phenomenon of democratic deficit.<sup>19</sup>

In electoral democracies, institutional performance contributed to both support for democracy and support for the regime-in-practice. Policy performance, however, contributed little to support for democracy, but it did encourage support for the regime-in-practice. This finding suggests that satisfactory institutional performance would help to further democratic consolidation, but satisfactory policy performance may not contribute to democratic deepening.

In competitive authoritarian regimes, neither institutional performance nor policy performance contributed much to support for democracy. They did, however, increase support for the regime-in-practice, suggesting that satisfactory regime performance may help to strengthen regime stability. Poor performance may weaken support for the prevailing system of government, but may not strengthen support for democracy. What would undermine support for the autocracy-in-practice would be the spread of liberal norms such as checks and balances and social pluralism.

Overall, what emerged from the analysis is that institutional performance made a negligible contribution to diffuse support for democracy but a notable contribution to diffuse support for the regime-in-practice. Policy performance hardly encouraged support for democracy, but it did facilitate support for the regime-in-practice. Adherence to liberal norms encouraged support for democracy but contributed little to support for the regime-in-practice. Diffuse support for democracy is hardly performance-based, while diffuse support for the regime-in-practice is largely performance-based. Hence, good performance may strengthen support for the ongoing political order but may not necessarily encourage support for democracy. It is commitment to liberal norms and basic institutions of democracy that fosters support for democracy.

### Seven Key Points

Using cross-national survey data drawn from ABS III, we have described here how East Asians orient themselves toward political regimes. Building on David Easton's theory of political support, we have distinguished between three levels of citizen orientations toward regimes—values, norms and rules, and institutions. Furthermore, we differentiated between orientations to democracy and evaluations of the regime-in-practice. In order to ascertain possible discrepancies be-

tween idealistic orientations and realistic evaluations, we contrasted support for democracy as an idea with evaluation of the regime-in-practice.

Seven key points emerge from our study. First, the analysis shows that diffuse support for democracy—as measured by both the preference for democracy over its alternatives and the acceptance of democracy as the best form of government—has yet to be firmly entrenched across much of East Asia. Even in the three liberal democracies surveyed, those both preferring democracy to any alternatives (especially authoritarian regimes) and considering democracy to be the best form of government have yet to reach a two-thirds majority.

Second, support for liberal norms associated with limited government was fairly weak—far weaker than diffuse support for democracy, indicating that avowed support for democracy is not rooted in specific liberal norms and procedures. This finding suggests that a considerable number of East Asians could be indifferent to illiberal or delegative democracy.

Third, support for minimalist institutions of democracy such as popular elections and a multiparty system remains firm in much of East Asia. In fact, preference for these institutions was more robust than adherence to liberal norms. In this regard, it is no wonder that rejection of strongman or single-party rule was overwhelming in much of the region. Yet support for minimalist democratic institutions was lower than diffuse support for democracy in some sample countries, suggesting that varying conceptions of democracy are held by ordinary citizens.

Fourth, diffuse support for the regime-in-practice remained low in most democracies examined. Pride in the system was generally much lower than loyalty to (rather than exit from) the system, indicating the prevalence of a realist view of democracy-in-practice as “a lesser evil.” It is notable that diffuse regime support was much higher in competitive authoritarian regimes than in most democracies, suggesting that the former faced weaker pressure for regime change from ordinary people.

Fifth, evaluation of institutional performance varied depending on its dimension. Evaluation of freedom was largely favorable across most of the region, and evaluation of electoral competition was fairly favorable in much of the region. In contrast, East Asian democracies, liberal or electoral, all suffered from a public perception of weakness in rule of law and poor accountability. Equality was another perceived failing in the eyes of citizens of many East Asian democracies. Despite lacking the institutions and mechanisms of democracy, the two competitive authoritarian regimes fared better on almost every dimension in the view of their citizens, especially in the area of law-based governance.

Sixth, public trust in parliament and political parties, the hallmarks of representative democracy, remained low across most of the region

except for the competitive authoritarian regimes. In particular, political cynicism ran deeper in liberal democracies than in electoral democracies, reflecting a global phenomenon of critical citizens who have little trust in parliament and political parties but still favor democratic institutions and processes.

Lastly, citizen support for democracy was based more frequently on adherence to minimalist institutions and some liberal norms. Citizen support for the regime-in-practice, however, was based largely on evaluation of regime performance. In liberal and electoral democracies, institutional performance proved to be more relevant than policy performance. In competitive authoritarian regimes, by contrast, policy performance mattered more than institutional performance. The growth of popular support for democracy seems to require adherence to liberal norms and minimalist democratic institutions, whereas the growth of popular support for the regime-in-practice appears to depend on the institutions and practices of good governance as well as satisfactory policy outcomes.

Each regime type in East Asia appears to face its own political challenges. Liberal democracies face publics whose orientations toward democracy tend to be more favorable than their evaluations of the regime-in-practice, and these democracies are thus likely to be under public pressure to reform the prevailing system of government to achieve “thick” democracy. Meanwhile, electoral democracies face publics whose evaluations of their regime-in-practice tend to be as favorable as their orientations toward democracy, and these regimes are thus likely to experience slow or faltering democratic consolidation or progress. Finally, the two competitive authoritarian regimes face publics whose evaluations of the regime-in-practice tend to be far more favorable than their orientations toward democracy, and these regimes (especially Singapore) are thus likely to remain resilient in the midst of global democratization.

## NOTES

1. Yun-han Chu et al., eds., *How East Asians View Democracy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008); Doh Chull Shin, “The Third Wave in East Asia: Comparative and Dynamic Perspectives,” *Taiwan Journal of Democracy* 4 (December 2008): 91–131; Larry Diamond, “China and East Asian Democracy: The Coming Wave,” *Journal of Democracy* 23 (January 2012): 5–13.

2. For the concept of competitive authoritarianism, see Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes After the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).

3. David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: Wiley, 1965); David Easton, “A Re-Assessment of the Concept of Political Support,” *British Journal of Political Science* 5 (October 1975): 435–457.

4. Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, 177 and 193.
5. Russell J. Dalton, *Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5–9 and 22–25.
6. Pippa Norris, “Introduction: The Growth of Critical Citizens?” in Pippa Norris, ed., *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 9–13.
7. John A. Booth and Mitchell A. Seligson, *The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Political Support and Democracy in Eight Nations* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 49–55.
8. Damarys Canache, Jeffery Mondak, and Mitchell Seligson, “Meaning and Measurement in Cross-National Research on Satisfaction with Democracy,” *Public Opinion Quarterly* 65 (Winter 2001): 506–28.
9. Christian Welzel and Ronald Inglehart, “The Role of Ordinary People in Democratization,” *Journal of Democracy* 19 (January 2008): 126–40.
10. See, for example, Joe Foweraker and Roman Krznaric, “Measuring Liberal Democratic Performance: An Empirical and Conceptual Critique,” *Political Studies* 48 (September 2000): 759–87; Larry Diamond and Leonardo Morlino, “The Quality of Democracy: An Overview,” *Journal of Democracy* 15 (October 2004): 20–31.
11. See, for example, Ola Listhaug and Matti Wiberg, “Confidence in Political and Private Institutions,” in Hans-Dieter Klingemann and Dieter Fuchs, eds., *Citizens and the State* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 298–322.
12. See, for example, Norris, *Critical Citizens*.
13. See, for example, Seymour Martin Lipset, “Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy,” *American Political Science Review* 53 (March 1959): 69–105; Peter Kotzian, “Public Support for Liberal Democracy,” *International Political Science Review* 32 (January 2011): 23–41.
14. See, for example, Geoffrey Evans and Stephen Whitefield, “The Politics and Economics of Democratic Commitment: Support for Democracy in Transition Societies,” *British Journal of Political Science* 25 (October 1995): 485–514; Richard Rose, William Mishler, and Christian Haerpfer, *Democracy and Its Alternatives: Understanding Post-Communist Societies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Support for Democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or Instrumental,” *British Journal of Political Science* 31 (July 2001): 447–74.
15. Each variable was constructed by simply adding the scores of its two constituent indicators. The resulting scores of the first three variables ranged from 1 to 7, while those of the last variable ranged from 1 to 3.
16. Each variable was constructed by simply adding the scores of its two constituent indicators. The resulting scores of each variable ranged from 1 to 7.
17. To measure evaluation of the national economy, we asked, “How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?” We also asked, “How would you rate your economic situation today?” Responses to each question were coded as follows: very good=5, good=4, not good or bad=3, bad=2, and very bad=1. To measure evaluation of basic welfare, we selected one agree-disagree question: “People have basic necessities like food, clothes, and shelter.” Responses were coded as follows: strongly agree=4, somewhat agree=3, somewhat disagree=2, and strongly disagree=1. To measure evaluation of

public safety, we asked “How safe is living in this city/town/village?” Responses were coded as follows: very safe=4, safe=3, unsafe=2, and very unsafe=1.

18. Age was coded as 17–29=1, 30–39=2, 40–49=3, 50–59=4, and 60+=5. Educational attainment was coded as less than high school=1, high school=2, and some college+=3. Income was substituted with subjective income adequacy, which was measured by asking the following question: “Does the total income of your household allow you to satisfactorily cover your needs?” Responses were coded as follows: “our income covers the needs well, we can save”=4; “our income covers the needs all right, without much difficulty”=3; “our income does not cover the needs, there are difficulties”=2; and “our income does not cover the needs, there are great difficulties”=1.

19. For a systematic attempt to account for the democratic deficit, see Pippa Norris, *Democratic Deficit: Critical Citizens Revisited* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).