

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫成果報告

全國化下的人群跨國流動、國家主權與公民身份： 護照與簽證的社會學考察

計畫類別：☒個別型計畫 ☐整合型計畫

計畫編號：NSC 90－2412－H－002－014－

執行期間：90 年 8 月 1 日至 92 年 1 月 31 日

計畫主持人：汪宏倫

共同主持人：

本成果報告包括以下應繳交之附件：

- ☐赴國外出差或研習心得報告一份
- ☐赴大陸地區出差或研習心得報告一份
- ☐出席國際學術會議心得報告及發表之論文各一份
- ☐國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告書一份

執行單位：國立台灣大學社會學系/中央研究院社會學研究所

中 華 民 國 92 年 4 月 30 日

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫成果報告

計畫編號：NSC 90—2412—H—002—014—

執行期限：90 年 8 月 1 日至 92 年 1 月 31 日

主持人：汪宏倫 國立台灣大學社會學系/中研院社會所

一、中英文摘要

全球化令許多論者宣稱：國家主權正遭到侵蝕，而「公民身份」也從「國族」過渡到「去國族化」模型。本研究嘗試對護照與簽證作一社會學考察，以檢證上述命題。本研究依據政治學者 Krasner (1999) 的主張，將國家主權區分為國際法、威斯特發利亞、國內與相依主權四種。至於公民身份，則依據其制度叢結分為三種：法律地位、權利與義務、以及集體認同的成員身份。若欲理解全球化對國家主權與公民身份究竟造成什麼影響，我們需要將上述「主權」與「公民身份」的各個面向一一解開，分別檢視。本研究從護照與簽證的制度，來考察國家如何管制跨國人口流動，以及個人如何透過此種制度設計，而有不同的公民身份體驗。本文以台灣以及「911」之後的美國，作為研究案例。研究發現，全球化對國內與相依主權，或有負面影響，但是在某些意義上，卻也加強了對於國際法與威斯特發利亞主權的顯著性。相同地，公民身份作為「法律地位」與「成員資格」，也透過護照與簽證的制度，而被加強。此一研究發現，有兩個理論意涵。第一，認為國家主權與公民身份因為全球化而有全面性的根本轉變，這樣的說法，其實是站不住腳的。要透徹理解全球化對此二者造成的影響，我們必先將「主權」與「公民身份」的制度叢結解開，一一探討。第二，欲理解上述過程如何發生，脈絡化的制度分析，可以幫助我們得到更深入的洞察與省思。

關鍵詞：全球化、民族國家、主權、公民身份、護照與簽證

Abstract

Globalization has led many to argue that

state sovereignty has been undermined, while citizenship is being transformed from a national to a post-national or de-nationalized model. This study examines the above argument by unpacking the concepts of “sovereignty” and “citizenship” on both theoretical and empirical levels. On the one hand, state sovereignty is dissected into four aspects: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty (Krasner 1999). On the other hand, citizenship is understood as composed of three types of institutional clusters that tie individuals to the state: legal status, rights and obligations, and a form of membership and collective identity. To understand how globalization has challenged state sovereignty and transformed citizenship, we need to probe into all these aspects and institutional clusters before any conclusion can be drawn. In so doing, this study chooses the passport, along with the visa system, as a strategic site to examine how the state regulates transnational flows of people through institutional measures, and how individuals experience their citizenship through the passport and visa practice. The cases under investigation are Taiwan and the post-911 US. It is found that, while globalization may have eroded domestic and interdependence sovereignty, it has, to a certain extent, underscored the significance of international-legal and Westphalian sovereignty. Similarly, citizenship as legal status and as a form of membership has been reinforced through the passport practice, thereby strengthening rather than weakening institutional ties between individuals and the (national) state. Two theoretical implications follow. First, the argument of overall transformations of state sovereignty and/or citizenship appears untenable. To fully grasp how globalization has challenged

both, we need to unpack the concepts and examine what have been challenged and what have not. Second, to understand how the above process takes place, a relational, contextualized institutional analysis is considered more fruitful to generate insights.

Keywords: globalization, nation-state, sovereignty, citizenship, passport and visa

二、緣由與目的

It hardly bears repetition to restate today that one of the central debates concerning globalization is its impact on the national state. Along with the view that state sovereignty is being undermined, it is now widely held that citizenship is undergoing fundamental transformations as well. Conventionally, citizenship is considered inextricably connected to the national state. In this traditional model, citizens obtain their rights and legal status from the national state they belong to, whereas they perform their duties and loyalty to the very same state in return. However, since the sovereignty of the national state is said being jeopardized, it is also posited that the old model of citizenship, which has been hinged almost exclusively on the state, is being changed. With the supra-national restructuring of the entire globe, many scholars posit that citizenship nowadays gradually emerges from locations outside the confines of the national state. As a result, it is said that we are moving from a national to a post-national or de-nationalized model of citizenship (Appadurai 1996; Guehenno 1995; Jacobson 1996; Sassen 1996, 2001; Soysal 1995).

This study examines the above thesis – which is succinctly referred to as the “post-national model” for the purpose of convenience – on both theoretical and empirical grounds. I contend that the above argument is theoretically dubious and empirically ungrounded. It is certainly true that there have been new forms and formations of rights and memberships that go beyond national boundaries, but does it necessarily imply the emergence of “post-national” or “denationalized”

citizenship? Since globalization is an uneven process, one might well ask: to what extent is such an argument valid, and to which part of the world is it applicable? More fundamentally, since the national state has been notorious for being an elusive concept, how about its derivatives such as “sovereignty” and “citizenship”? Are they clearer concepts better grasped and analyzed? All in all, what do sovereignty and citizenship means exactly?

My counter-argument consists of a series of propositions, one followed by another. First, both sovereignty and citizenship are two conglomerate terms that need to be unbundled before any precise analysis can proceed. Second, the impacts of globalization on these different bundles of sovereignty and citizenship have been uneven and sometimes mutually contradictory, to such an extent that no conclusive remarks concerning the decline of sovereignty per se or the transformation of citizenship in general can ever be reached. Instead, to better analyze the impact of globalization, we need to specify which bundles of sovereignty and citizenship have been changed, and which have not. And finally, empirically speaking, through the examination of the passport and the visa system, which is considered a manifestation of state sovereignty and individual citizenship, we found that sovereignty and citizenship may have been enhanced and entrenched due to the impact of globalization.

In this study, I deal with the theoretical issues by unbundling the concepts and practices surrounding sovereignty and citizenship. I draw on analytical frameworks of Stephen Krasner and Pierre Bourdieu, respectively, to unbundle these two concepts. On the one hand, state sovereignty is dissected into four aspects: international legal sovereignty, Westphalian sovereignty, domestic sovereignty and interdependence sovereignty. On the other hand, citizenship is understood as composed of three types of institutional clusters that tie individuals to the state: legal status, rights and obligations, and a form of membership and collective identity. To understand how

globalization has challenged state sovereignty and transformed citizenship, therefore, we need to probe into how these aspects and institutional clusters have been influenced differently by various forces of globalization.

On the empirical side, this study chooses the passport, along with the visa system, as a strategic site to examine how the state regulates transnational flows of people through institutional measures, and how individuals experience their citizenship through the passport and visa practice. I shall explore the sociological bearings of the passport and visa system. It is argued that institutions have provided with us bases for cognitive schemes and ontological security in our daily life. In the contemporary globalized world, institutional devices such as the passport and the visa system provide with us the foundation of institutional trust during international or transnational encounters.

三、研究發現與討論

The research question we may pursue is: how do we study “trust” that is institutionally sustained but implicitly assumed in our daily life? In his celebrated study on trust, Harold Garfinkel, the founder of ethnomethodology, introduced the method of “experimental breaching:”

In accounting for the persistence and continuity of the features of concerted actions, sociologists commonly select some set of stable features of an organization of activities and ask for the variables that contribute to their stability. An alternative procedure would appear to be more economical: to start with a system with stable features and ask *what can be done to make for trouble*. The operations that one would have to perform in order to produce and sustain anomic features of perceived environments and disorganized interaction should tell us something about how social structures are ordinarily and routinely being maintained. (Garfinkel 1963: 187, italics added)

Regarding sovereignty and citizenship that we are concerned here, what can be done to “make for trouble”? In other words, what kind of breaching experiment can be done to

unveil the institutional trust provided by the passport and the visa system?

To this regard, I suggest that we look into two illustrative cases in which the breaching of institutional trust can be lucidly observed without making extra efforts of “experimenting.” These two breaching cases, so to speak, are Taiwan and the US respectively. In the former case, there is no need for experiments, since the breaching of trusts has been taking place on daily basis due to its dubious passport. In the latter case, the breaching of institutional trusts took its most tragic and most conspicuous form in the horrifying 9-11 attack in 2001. What the state and the public in the US reacted to the event help us understand how institutional trust works, fails and is mended in the practice of the passport and the visa system.

Breached Case #1: The Embarrassments and Humiliations Caused by Dubious Passports

The passport has long been a significant site of contestation in Taiwan’s nationalist politics. This comes as no surprise for several reasons. To begin with, since the ROC on Taiwan is virtually unrecognized in international society, its passport is not officially recognized as a formal document most of times. Worse yet, since the national title on the passport, namely, the Republic of China (ROC hereafter),¹ is quite misleading to most outsiders, it often causes misrecognition of the passport bearers by others.

Under such circumstances, disputes and controversies surrounding the ROC passport have been numerous; some of them were publicly exposed, some of them individually experienced. It has to be noted, however, that all materials presented below are for the heuristic purpose only. In other words, by illustrating these cases and stories, I do not imply that all or most Taiwanese people

¹ Depending on the context, I shall then use the “ROC” and “Taiwan” interchangeably in the following discussions.

holding the ROC passport have undergone similar difficulties. Instead, what is implied here is simply that, in a scenario in which a dubious passport or visa is concerned, we can clearly see how institutional trust is breached, and how people react to mend the breaching.

The major difficulties and troubles one may experience in using the ROC passport can be grouped into two kinds: one is misrecognition, the other is the difficulty of getting visas from other countries.

(1) Misrecognition

I think there are very few people who can distinguish between “the Republic of China” and “the People’s Republic of China. To most foreigners, this distinction is incomprehensible.

The above words are directly quoted from one of my interviewees during my study, who has been a frequent international traveler for years. Indeed, to most people in Taiwan, such a statement reveals nothing new. It is widely acknowledged that the national title indicated on the Taiwan passport has been rather confusing and misleading to outsiders, and there has been fervent public debate concerning whether the term “Taiwan” ought to be indicated on the passport in order to avoid misrecognition. More often than not, bearers of the ROC passport have been mistaken for the citizens of the PRC, and such mistakes have caused troubles of different kinds and of varying scales from time to time.² However, few incidents are comparable to the recent one in the World Health Assembly (WHA), in which the misrecognition took a really ironic twist.

As noted above, the ROC passport is not recognized, while the international status of Taiwan has been pending for a long time. As a result, it has become a common practice among many capable ROC citizens to obtain a second passport from a foreign country for practical or political reasons. We find discriminatory treatments of these second passport holders in an ironic situation in the WHA.

In an attempt to bar Taiwan’s participation in the meeting of the WHA, the

authority demanded that anybody who is from Taiwan were not allowed to enter the meeting site. The true irony is: those who held passports from other countries such as the US, Canada, and the like were barred from entering the meeting, because on their passports it was indicated that their birth places were either “Taipei” or “Taiwan.” The instruction given by the WHA authority was that anybody from Taiwan was not allowed to enter the meeting. On the contrary, those who held Taiwanese passports, on which only “the Republic of China” was indicated, were allowed to enter the meeting, since the security personnel, who apparently mistook the ROC passport bearers for the Chinese citizens (that is, citizens of the People’s Republic of China), could not “detect” any official sign showing that these people were actually from Taiwan.

In this case, we see clearly that the passport was held as the only valid and reliable source to identify where a person is from, even though it was apparently misrecognition. Although the ROC passport holders were able to “sneak in” the conference this time, in most other occasions, misrecognition of such kinds cause repugnant feelings, leading to a rising demand that the state ought to take proper measures to rectify the official record – namely, the misleading national title on the passport – in order to reassure its truth value.

(2) Difficulties in Getting Visas

Since the ROC passport is not officially recognized, many countries do not issue their visas by directly stamping on the passport. Instead, they issue a separate piece of paper to be attached to the passport. When the ROC passport holders enter these countries, immigration officials of these countries stamp on that particular piece of paper in lieu of “real visas.” In some cases, the officials will retain the piece of paper when the traveler leaves the country, so that no official record will be traced on the passport, as if the traveler has never been to the country. This is an illuminating instantiation of organized hypocrisy shown in Figure 1. Since State A does not recognize State B, such non-recognition has affected its visa policy

² For a vivid illustration, see Long (1997).

towards citizens of State B. The visa ought not to be shown in the passport, along with other official documents, issued by State B, otherwise it will violate the principle of non-recognition. Thus, even though a visa is issued nonetheless, it has to be issued on a separate piece of paper, so that no official records will be shown on the passport issued by State B. Such a pretentious – or one is tempted to call it “hypocritical” – practice has caused repugnant feelings from time to time. An interviewee complained about this practice:

For us travel lovers, we'd like to collect visa stamps as many as possible. It is not only a record of where you have been, but also like a habit of collecting things. But when you travel to these countries, you don't have any record left and you can collect nothing. It's really a nuisance!

But the problem is not merely this. More troubles are yet to come during their itineraries when such kinds of visas are actually used. In my interview, a frequent FIT (Foreign Individual Traveler) recalled:

Because Taiwan is not recognized as a country, the visas we get are different from others' from time to time. For instance, the Turkish visa looks just like a piece of Xerox paper. It makes me feel quite humiliated. ... [When I was traveling,] I took the bus from Greece to Turkey, and you know what? The bus was delayed for over twenty minutes simply because of [the visas issued to] the two of us, my company and me. The visas on our passports looked so different. [The immigration officer] simply stared at the piece of the paper and asked: “Is this a real visa?” Because we applied for the visa in Taiwan, and because [the officials at the checkpoint] had never seen things like this, they thought it was a forgery. Finally they got someone more experienced to check the document, and he said he'd seen such a kind of thing before, so they let us in after all. But the passengers on the bus were all delayed for almost half an hour, and then they'd keep asking you: “Which country are you from?” “What's wrong with your visas?” “Why did it take so long?” It's very humiliating.

The immigration officials at the Greek checkpoint did not mean to humiliate my interviewee, I believe. It turned out to be a humiliating experience, mostly because the officials had never seen such a thing before;

in other words, they could not put in their trust on a dubious travel document, which, in turn, was considered a forgery. In this case, we see the breaching situation of an abnormal visa has caused repugnant feelings to both the passport bearers and to the inspectors. And not only them, even the passengers on the same bus were affected, and it was deemed desirable to return to a more “normal” visa situation.

Again, the trust bestowed on the truth value behind such an official document was breached due to the organized hypocrisy among the states regarding Taiwan's international status. The inspectors did not mean to “make trouble” for those particular individuals, but they simply could not bestow their trust in a seemingly forged paper that they had never seen before. This distrust, in turn, caused existential anxieties, to put it in Giddens's term again, to those passport bearers.

The scenario also reminds us of one basic, but mostly overlooked, feature: the passports and the visas people have are of very different values. A US or a British passport can be more useful (and hence more “valuable”) in passing certain borders than many other passports. Bacharach and Gambetta (2001) have pointed out that the central problem of trust lies not in the act of trust itself, but the “secondary problem of trust” – namely, whether we can trust the *signs of trustworthiness* we are confronted with prior to our decision to trust. In this light, the passport and the visa are indeed “signs of trustworthiness” that constitute the basis for trust. This explains why there have been forged passports in black market at a remarkable price, and why passports – along with citizenship or residence rights they implies – have been commodified in the migration market.³

Breached Case #2: From Ontological Security to Personal and National Security

The conspicuous tragedy of the 9-11

³ On the commodification of residence rights, see Tseng (1997).

attack has received tremendous attention from journalists, commentators and scholars. Most of the discussions have been surrounding issues such as the violence of the state, terrorism, nationalism and patriotism, the clash of civilizations, international security and world peace, and so on, and so forth. However, few look into the event from a micro, phenomenological perspective. It is from such a perspective that I shall focus my discussions below.

The 9-11 attack breached our trust in the utmost way. Among the suspects of hijackers were foreign students who studied in various institutions across the US and learned how to pilot a plane in the very same country that they aimed to attack. They got formal visas, entered the US through legal channels with the trust from the immigration office in them; they passed the security check in the airports, got on the plane with the trust – the minimum of trust, at least – of the crew and other passengers in security measures as well as in their fellow passengers; and they took the incredible shots at the twin towers of the World Trade Center and the Pentagon that few people would ever imagine to happen. All in all, to make it short: they abused every bit of good faith that one would ever put onto others and to surrounding institutions.

The attack was devastating, while its impact profound. Since the ruthless attack has seriously deteriorated the very basis of trust in everyday life, people lost their good faith in each other, particularly to outsiders. There were outright nationalist and patriotic sentiments that explicitly showed distrusts in foreigners. In addition to tightening measures in security check, the US government has tightened its regulations on visa issuance and surveillance on foreigners, including international students. Some of these measures went so far to such an extent that it could be said that human rights were violated. It is a true irony that a “free” country like the US, which has been boasting so much about its protection of individual freedom and human rights, has to take these anti-liberal measures. Despite occasional criticisms and complaints, various polls

showed that the majority of the American public considered them reasonable and necessary measures to prevent similar tragedies from taking place again.⁴

In appearance, it can be asserted that the state is enhancing its evil surveillance on most innocent ordinary people. However, there is a “popular” basis underlying these surveillance measures that should not be easily overlooked. To most US citizens, it is certainly hoped that similar tragedies of massive attacks will never take place again, and the simplest thing they can expect is that their government can take as many precautions against such happenings as possible.

In an aggressive article entitled “Tighten America’s Borders,” for instance, two analysts of immigration studies blame the US government for not doing their jobs by letting the hijacker in to enter the US, a territory considered exclusively entitled to US citizens only. As they assert from the beginning: “Entry to the United States is not a right but a privilege, granted exclusively at our discretion” (Camarota and Emerson 2001: 42). Taking this as their point of departure, the authors move on to argue:

For the most part that discretion is exercised by members of the State Department's Bureau of Consular Affairs, often referred to as the Consular Corps. Among their other duties, these men and women make the all-important decisions about who gets a visa to enter the United States, making them the forward guard of homeland defense-America's other Border Patrol. Unfortunately, the Consular Corps badly needs more manpower and improved tools in order to fulfill these responsibilities properly. (p.42)

By pointing out that government officials are not doing their jobs, the authors reason, in a somewhat blaming tone:

If only one of the people involved in the September 11 plot had been identified by a

⁴ For reports on such issues as public supports of the anti-terrorist measures taken by the US government, see, for instance, “Inside Job,” *Government Executive* vol.33 (15), December 2001; “Border Wars,” *National Review* vol.54 (45), 8 April 2002.

consular officer, or when he entered the United States, or when his visa expired, the entire conspiracy might have been uncovered.

The logic is simple and straightforward indeed: “if the terrorists can’t enter the country, they won’t be able to commit a terror attack on American soil” (p.42). Thus, following this logic, the authors urge the US authority to improve its border control by tightening visa screening process, tracking entries and exits of foreigners, etc. As to possible oppositions, the authors respond quite frankly and bluntly:

Civil libertarians may howl. But remember, these are not American citizens entitled to full American freedoms; they are guests from overseas whose presence here is a privilege. (p.44)

I quote the above passages at some length, because the two authors cited here vividly reflect a very typical example of the public reasoning in their supporting state’s control over entries and exits of foreigners. The state is held responsible to protect the borders in order to make these people feel safe to live in their homeland. However, in making such a point, it has to be noted that I am not preaching for the necessity of the state, far less do I intend to defend any “evil acts” done by the state. What I am arguing here, rather, is that there is a more fundamental, popular basis for state’s “evil acts,” and they cannot be easily explained away simply by state’s administrative rationality or governmentality.

There are moral and political dimensions in this issue, of course: why were there terrorist attacks in the first place? Why should civilians, some of them foreigners, pay the price of their lives for the crimes they did not commit, crimes committed by a state that they could hardly be held accountable for? On the normative ground, we may hold the state of the US responsible for the tragedy of the 9-11 attack. On the positive ground, however, we are struck to find that the majority of the people tolerate the tightening control of the passport and the visa system, and that there have been strong supports, whether domestically or internationally, to US’s “anti-terrorism” war, which have been fought in a nonetheless

terrorist fashion. It is true that we ought to point out that the US government took a wrong step to solve the problem by tightening the visa control and waging yet another war, but would it not be pretentious as well to claim that we are moving from a national to a post-national era in which national states are losing their significance, that state sovereignty is undermined and citizenship “de-nationalized”?

Indeed, one may argue that the US government is to be blamed in the first place, since it is the biggest terrorist regime in the world (Chomsky 2001). However, no one can afford another terrorist attack of the 9-11 kind. Many anti-terrorist measures the US government took after the event – from tightening visa issuance, increasing surveillance over foreigners, to the aggressive war waged against much weaker, poorer countries – have won public supports, whether explicit or implicit. I’m not making a point for or against the measures taken by the US government. Rather, I’m trying to point out the fact that the American public seemed to have consents to such acts, reflected in President Bush’s record-breaking approval ratings. This is the reality we have to live with and reckon with. Here comes the true irony: the passport regime was implemented internationally after the First World War. To some extent it was meant to enhance national security by increasing state’s capacity of controlling its porous borders. But even until today when it is said that we are living in a globalized world, the motif of national security remains to be the strongest in the regime of the passport and the visa system.

四、結論

In the above analysis, I have argued that sovereignty and citizenship need to be unbundled before we proceed to analyze the impact of globalization on them. In addition, I choose the passport and the visa system as the strategic site to investigate how sovereignty manifests itself through state’s regulation on transnational flows of people, and how individuals experience their

citizenship through the passport and visa practice. Through examining the two “breached cases” of Taiwan and the US, we have found that globalization has, to a certain extent, underscored the significance of sovereignty and citizenship by reinforcing institutional ties between individuals and the (national) state.

Some may contend that the two cases I deal with are too idiosyncratic or too “untypical” to be of any heuristic value. While Taiwan is an “outlier,” so to speak, in international society, the US is the most powerful state unmatched by any other counterparts in many ways. Both are “exceptions” on the two extremes of the “periphery” and the “core” respectively. However, from the point of view of ethnomethodology, the value of these two cases lies precisely in their being “abnormal” and violating our commonsensical knowledge. I would like to point out again that I am not making another two cases of “exceptionalism;” rather, what I have argued is that through these “ethnomethodological” cases we can better see how the passport and the visa system have played a significant role without ourselves being aware of it.

Finally, let me return to my analogy of the tuition waiver that I mentioned in the midst of the report. It would be foolish, if not obviously wrong, to predict that going to the college will be free in the future simply because we have observed that some students are not paying tuitions for their courses. Tuition waivers are granted only to those “good,” sometimes privileged, students. Most students, however, are “mediocre” or simply not so lucky to have the privilege, and they all have to pay a price for going to the college. Even in cases where going to the college is made completely free, there are youngsters who are deprived of the chances of going to the college at all! It is almost banal to repeat again that, through the educational system, the inequalities between the privileged and under-privileged may be reproduced and hence persist. Similarly, the view that national states matter to a lesser extent, that we are moving from a national towards a post-national model, may hold true

only for those of privileged class or from privileged countries. For most people around the world, they are still paying the price for being subjects – citizens, that is – of a particular national state. The passport and the visa system has demonstrated this to us with great lucidity.

As Kumar (2000:20) puts it, “For those who live in affluent countries, the passport is of use for international travel in connection with business or vacations. In poorer nations of the world, its necessity is tied to the need for finding employment, mainly in the West.” Kumar’s argument may not hold true everywhere, but he reminds us one very important thing: the passport and the visa we hold in our hands when traveling across borders are of significantly different values. They mean different things to people from different parts of the world. The post-national argument posits that the old model of citizenship is changing or diminishing, but our cases have shown to us that the old model not only works well but is entrenched perhaps more deeply than ever before.

五、參考文獻(Selected Bibliography)

- Anderson, Benedict. 1998. *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia, and the World*. New York: Verso.
- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Bacharach, Michael, and Diego Gambetta. 2001. “Trust in Signs.” in *Trust In Society*, edited by Karen S. Cook. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Berger, Peter L., and Thomas Luckmann. 1967. *The Social Construction of Reality*. New York: Doubleday.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 1991. *Language and Symbolic Power*. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Camarota, Steven A., and Steven Emerson. 2001. “Tighten America's Borders.” *The American Enterprise* 12:42-4.

- Caplan, Jane, and John Torpey. 2001. "Introduction." Pp. 1-12 in *Documenting Individual Identity: the development of state practices in the modern world*, edited by Jane Caplan and John Torpey. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Chomsky, Noam. 2001. 9-11. New York: Seven Stories Press.
- DiMaggio, Paul J., and Walter W. Powell. 1991. "The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields." Pp. 63-82 in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Falk, Richard A. 1994. On Humane Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Foucault, Michel. 1991. "Governmentality." Pp. 87-104 in *The Foucault Effect: Studies in Governmentality*, edited by Graham Burchell, Colin Gordon, and Peter Miller. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Garfinkel, Harold. 1963. "A Conception of, and Experiments with, "Trust" as a Condition of Stable Concerted Actions." Pp. 187-238 in *Motivation and Social Interaction*, edited by O.J. Harvey.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1985. *The Nation-State and Violence: Volume Two of a Contemporary Critique of Historical Materialism*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1990. *The Consequences of Modernity*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Giddens, Anthony. 1991. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. California: Stanford University Press.
- Guehenno. 1995. *The End of the Nation-State*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Jepperson, Ronald L. 1991. 'Institutions, Institutional Effects, and Institutionalism.' in *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis*, edited by Walter W. Powell and Paul J. DiMaggio. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kumar, Amitava. 2000. *Passport Photos*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Long, Ying-Tai 1996[1988]. *When in Europe*. Taipei: China Times Publishing Company.
- Mann, Michael. 1996a. "Nation-States in Europe and Other Continents: Diversifying, Developing, not Dying." Pp. 295-316 in *Mapping the Nation*, edited by Gopal Balakrishnan. London: Verso.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, and George M. Thomas. 1987. 'Ontology and Rationalization in the Western Cultural Account.' in *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, society, and the Individual*, edited by George M. Thomas, John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
- Meyer, John W., John Boli, George M. Thomas, and Francisco O. Ramirez. 1997. "World Society and the Nation-State." *American Journal of Sociology* 103:144-81.
- Nussbaum, Martha Craven, and Joshua Cohen. 1996. *For Love of Country : Debating the Limits of Patriotism*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Salter, Mark B. 2002. "International Institutions and their Capacity to Solve Global Migration Problems: The Search for Durable solutions." Paper presented at International Studies Association Annual Convention, March 24-27.
- Sassen, Saskia. 1996. *Losing Control?* New York: Columbia University Press.
- Sassen, Saskia. 2001. "Towards Post-National And Denationalized Citizenship." Paper presented at New Cultural Formations in an Era of Transnational Globalization, October 6-7, Taiwan, Academia Sinica.
- Scott, W. Richard. 1994. 'Institutions and Organizations: Towards a Theoretical Synthesis.' in *Institutional Environments and Organizations*, edited by W. Richard Scott and John W. Meyer. Thousand Oaks: SAGE.
- Shaw, Martin. 1994. *Global Society and International Relations*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Soguk, Nevzat. 1999. *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Thomas, George M., and John W. Meyer. 1984. "The Expansion of the State." *Annual Review of Sociology* 10:461-82.
- Thomas, George M., John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, and John Boli. 1987. *Institutional Structure: Constituting state, society, and the individual*. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
- Tseng, Yen-fen. 1998. "Commodification of Residency: an analysis of Taiwan's business immigration market in *Taiwan: A Radical Quarterly in Social Studies*, 27:37-67.

Turack, Daniel C. 1972. *The Passport in International Law*. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath and Company.

Walzer, Michael. 1996. "Spheres of Affection." Pp. 125-7 in *For Love of Country : Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, edited by Martha Craven Nussbaum and Joshua Cohen. Boston: Beacon Press.

Weis, P. 1979. *Nationality and Statelessness In International Law*. London: Stevens & Sons Ltd.

Wendt, Alexander. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.