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Exit-Voice Dynamics: How do Hong Kong People Respond to Democratic Backsliding?


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
 Contents

 PDF/EPUB

 Cite article

 Share options

 Information, rights and permissions

 Metrics and citations

 Figures and tables

Abstract

Does people's greater intention to migrate deter them from participating in protests? How does protest participation shape intention to migrate? How does the relationship between migration intention and protest change amidst Hong Kong's transition to authoritarianism? Drawing upon Hirschman's exit-voice theory, this study examines the relationship between protest and migration intentions against the changing context across time. We use a time-series dataset on Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement of late 2019 for our analysis. The results show that people who have greater intention to migrate are more likely to participate in protest, but this association wanes as state repression intensifies. We find that migration intention indicates the psychological preparedness to leave, and that the fallback plan emboldens people to speak out. Yet, as the state becomes more repressive, people who intend to migrate are also sensitive to the signals about the repression, which thus attenuates protest participation. This also explains the phenomenon that more active protestors intend to leave to escape repression. People with radical political affiliations are more inclined to emigrate but this relationship attenuates over time, indicating the importance of group effects in curbing migration intentions.

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Abstract

Does people's greater intention to migrate deter them from participating in protests? How does protest participation shape intention to migrate? How does the relationship between migration intention and protest change amidst Hong Kong's transition to authoritarianism? Drawing upon Hirschman's exit-voice theory, this study examines the relationship between protest and migration intentions against the changing context across time. We use a time-series dataset on Hong Kong's anti-extradition movement of late 2019 for our analysis. The results show that people who have greater intention to migrate are more likely to participate in protest, but this association wanes as state repression intensifies. We find that migration intention indicates the psychological preparedness to leave, and that the fallback plan emboldens people to speak out. Yet, as the state becomes more repressive, people who intend to migrate are also sensitive to the signals about the repression, which thus attenuates protest participation. This also explains the phenomenon that more active protestors intend to leave to escape repression. People with radical political affiliations are more inclined to emigrate but this relationship attenuates over time, indicating the importance of group effects in curbing migration intentions.

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migration intentions, protests, political repression, Hong Kong

Introduction

Political contestations have been rampant in face of democratic backsliding from the Arab world in North Africa and the Middle East, post-socialist European countries like Hungary and Poland, to Asian regions like Hong Kong and Thailand. Studies have examined the political processes, resource mobilization, and tactics of social movements; but few have discussed people's responses to changing political situations, such as leaving the country, continuing to protest, or acquiescing. Using the Hong Kong protests of 2019–2020 as a case, this study asks: Does emigration intention dampen political protests? Do political protests escalate or suppress emigration intention? How does the exit-voice relationship change, especially as state repression intensifies over time?¹ These questions have important sociopolitical implications, but there has been no systematic investigation of the time- and context-contingent nature of exit-voice dynamics. Studying these questions prior to potential migration and from the point of origin also reflects real struggles of people's decision-making, thus illuminating the micro-dynamics of exit-voice decisions (Marrow and von Koppenfels 2020).

Informed by Hirschman's (1970) *Exit, voice, and loyalty: responses to decline in firms, organizations, and states*, we explore how people respond to sociopolitical conditions that threaten their livelihood and their future. Hirschman argues that people who are dissatisfied with "the quality" of their government can use their "voice" to demand changes in policies and/or "exit." While "voice" can be expressed in different ways, our study focuses on social protests. Social protests involve "campaigns challenging governing structures and the elites who run them," characterized by their extra-institutional character and transgressive tactics (Moss and Snow 2016, 547). Highlighting this form of voice reflects more accurately the stakes involved and the changing stakes in Hong Kong.

We conceptualize "exit" as intention to migrate, instead of actual migration since we focus on residents of the sending region. While actual migration could more accurately measure sequential consequences of protests, it is not as accurate in understanding exit and voice relationships that simultaneously affect one another (Opp 2016). Intentions of migration involve sharing of hopes, plans, and ambitions or goals with others who are choosing to protest or not; they also emerge from interactions among individual characteristics, the protest behaviors, and the sociopolitical context (Marrow and von Koppenfels 2020). Although not all people who express

¹ In our study, we have excluded "moving from Hong Kong to the People's Republic of China" from our definition of migration.

their willingness to emigrate will do so, past studies show that it is a moderate to strong predictor of actual migration (Docquier, Peri, and Ruysen 2014; Van Dalen and Henkens 2013).

In Hirschman's original model, "loyalty," defined as "attachment to the organization," moderates the exit-voice relations (1970, 77). He posits that "loyalty" deters exit while amplifying voice, when people believe that their country is going in the wrong direction.² However, this study focuses on the examination of the exit-voice relationship because Hong Kong was in the situation where the government is "not only uninterested in stimulating voice at the expense of exit," but also "it is meant to repress voice alongside exit" (Hirschman 1970, 92). As Hirschman argued, this situation precludes recuperating from within through loyalty-driven protests.³ In addition, the literature of transnationalism informs us that migrants tend to have multiple belongings and identifications beyond national borders (Levitt and Jaworsky 2007). In other words, when both staying and leaving could be attributable to "attachment," there might be little, if any, variability to explain. Therefore, while we acknowledge the potential role of attachment to the city and to the nation (i.e., local and national identification respectively),⁴ our theoretical and analytical model centers on the examination of the exit-voice relationship.

This study uses Hong Kong's conflict over a bill of extradition to China as a case to examine exit-voice relationships in face of the increasing political repression. We draw on online survey data ($n = 979$) that contains detailed time varying measures of protest frequencies, political discontent, migration intentions, political affiliations, and network characteristics between June and mid-November 2019, and a rich set of identification, protest, and migration-related variables. Our study factors the time-varying complexities into our understanding of protests, migration intentions, changes in political affiliation, and network changes at the critical time when government's repressive strategies become stronger. The transitional political setting provides theoretical inputs beyond slightly more static conditions that have been examined in past research, be it in democratic settings or authoritarian settings. In addition, while most studies pay attention to how emigration shapes protests, fewer discuss the ways in which protests and their incentives affect emigration

² According to Hirschman, loyalty is functional in keeping exit at bay: (a) when exit barriers are high, (b) when there is a perceived chance to recuperate from within, or (c) when the exit option has no close substitute.

³ Hirschman also posits that loyalty increases the exit cost and thus could deter migration. But in Hong Kong, where society has become increasingly repressive, stronger attachment to Hong Kong could result in higher emotional cost for staying, thus offsetting the emotional cost of leaving (cf. note 2a).

⁴ We conceptualize "loyalty" as a nested concept: attachment to the city as "local identification" and attachment to country as "national identification" (cf. Opp 2016). We understand that identification with Hong Kong and identification with China could be competitive, compatible, or supplementary.

(see Opp 2016; Okamoto and Wilkes 2008 for exceptions). Unpacking voice-exit link, however, is not only theoretically important but also provides insights for sending countries into their governance and dealing with dissidents and for receiving countries into formulating immigration policies.

Hong Kong's Anti-Extradition Movement and Deterioration of Democracy

Once an “authoritarian crown colony” under Britain, Hong Kong underwent a process of democratization between the late 1970s and 1990s, accelerated by the Sino-British Joint Declaration of 1984. This declaration outlined Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy following the handover of sovereignty to China in 1997 (Chen 2006; Fong 2022, 1188). The constitution, known as the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, was enacted by China in 1990 and serves as the foundation for the “One Country Two Systems” framework, ensuring the preservation of Hong Kong’s existing economic, social, and legal systems after the Handover. It also provides a blueprint for democratization in Hong Kong (Chen 2006). Thus, when Hong Kong was handed over to China in 1997, its political landscape was characterized by semi-democracy, featuring a partially elected legislature and district council, an independent judicial system, quasi-autonomous administrative bodies, a vibrant civil society, and a critical media (Fong 2022; Lee 2013; Ma 2008).⁵

After the Handover, the civil society continued to grow but the government made only small concessions to enlarge the number of popularly elected seats in the legislature despite the promise of universal suffrage of both the legislature and the Chief Executive stipulated in the Basic Law. Democratic backsliding like disqualification of opposition candidates and legislators-elect, unequal resource competition, and gerrymandering did occur (Fong 2022). Thus, politics has been characterized by a prolonged contestation for democracy since the Handover. Despite much effort devoted to fighting for democracy by institutional means, the push for universal suffrage has been disappointing. Demonstrations, petitions, and sit-ins were rampant and the turnout was sometimes massive. Alongside the political pursuits, greater social integration with China have antagonized some Hong Kong people. The pro-democrats split between moderate democrats and more radical localists (those who also defend local autonomy, interests, and culture against the trend of “mainlandisation”) (Yuen and Chung 2018).

The government was generally tolerant of street politics. Freedoms of speech and assembly were largely respected. Despite the colonial legacy of Public Order

⁵ While some scholars called Hong Kong a “semi-democracy,” there are also variations. For example, Freedom House called Hong Kong “hybrid democracy”. Others used the wording “partial democracy” to describe the post-handover period (See Ku 2000, for example).

Ordinance that required groups to obtain permits to protest, protests were rarely prohibited and the police generally exercised restraint (Independent Police Complaints Council 2020). In February 2019, the Hong Kong government revealed its intention to amend the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance and the Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Ordinance. The government argued that the proposal was owed to a murder in Taipei and the escape of the suspect to Hong Kong. The public, however, suspected that such amendments extended to fugitives outside the bilateral extradition agreement like Mainland China. Pan-democrats in the Legislative Council lobbied against it, but the government did not back down. On 9 June 2019, before the second reading of the bill, a million citizens demonstrated against it. This sparked off the Anti-Extradition Bill Movement till mid-2020. Police repression became more intense and brutal (Figure 1). Although the government eventually withdrew the bill, the public extended their demands to investigation to police abuses of power and for universal suffrage.

Protests, however, became more dangerous with the alleged witnessing of police brutality (Ting 2020). On 4 October, the government used the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to enact an emergency law against the wearing of masks in protests. The police began to refuse permits for peaceful assemblies, and participation in protests could be punished with 5 to 10 years of imprisonment (Independent Police Complaints Council 2020). The number of arrests owing to anti-extradition campaign skyrocketed from 73 in June 2019 to 2,899 in November 2019 (a total of 5,900) (Independent Police Complaints Council 2020). According to Cheng et al. (2022), the government's responses posed a systemic threat—the erosion of fundamental rights and the spirit of law—to democracy. The unregulated policing of protests




Figure 1. Police's use of weapons related to anti-extradition movement (June–November 2019).

was another specific threat of repression that made people believe that political institutions could no longer protect their freedom of assembly and regulate the power of the state. Fong (2021, 206) even called Hong Kong a “paramilitary police-state.”

Since 4 October, protests became more radicalized. Some peaceful protestors joined the radicals (Ting 2020). “Valiant fighters” stormed government offices, defaced symbols of Beijing’s authority, and sought to “dole out vigilante justice to those who attack demonstrators or confront them during protests” (Ting 2020). Thus, political affiliations changed over time, showing increasing support for pro-independence, self-determination, and localism (Centre for Communication and Public Opinion Survey 2020). Alongside the increased political confrontations, more Hong Kong people plan to emigrate (Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies 2019).

Exit-Voice Relationship in the Literature

In the following subsections, we detail the literature on exit-voice dynamics and setting hypotheses about the exit-to-voice link and the voice-to-exit link. First, the protest model, that is the exit-to-voice link, explains how migration intention and migration costs and incentives potentially affect protests, while controlling for protest incentives that result in protests. Second, the migration intention model describes the voice-to-exit link, which explains how protests and protest incentives potentially affect migration, while controlling for emigration costs and incentives that affect migration.

Protest Model: The Exit-to-Voice Link

How does migration intention affect protest? How do emigration costs and incentives affect protest? Hirschman (1970, 1993) asserted that exit depresses voice. Using the fall of German Democratic Republic (GDR) as a case study, he argued that mass emigration in the early postwar years and the continuing hope for exit after the construction of the Berlin Wall silenced East German citizens. Yet, Hirschman refined his original argument about the negative relationship between exit and voice, and asserted that it is not universal. For example, in the last year before the collapse of the GDR, voice and exit aspirations/exit reinforced each other (Hirschman 1993). Increased opportunities to exit signaled the weakening of government authority, and that made citizens feel empowered and emboldened to voice. Pfaff and Kim (2003) added that the signaling effect of exit among networks creates a common knowledge about the magnitude of public grievances (what they called “generalized discontent”) which will likely raise expectations that others will speak out before a certain exit threshold is reached. They argued that signaling does not require mass exodus, but could be a symbolic “potential of exit” that spreads “the perception of emigration crisis” (p. 409). In other words, migration intentions that are shared within their network through day-to-day conversations and exchanges on social media spread grievances and create a sense of crisis. This provides opportunities to amplify voice, especially before migration

reaches a certain exit threshold; this applies to our case as actual migration has not materialized so quickly. Based on these past studies, we thus propose:

H1: Migration intention has a positive relationship with protest.

Emigration cost and incentives potentially affect protests. Sellars' research (2019) on Japan and Mexico explain that exit incentives and the knowledge that some other individuals have profitable exit option lowers confidence in collective action. If exit is not an option or if the exit cost is high, voice will be louder. For example, Barry et al. (2014) showed that high unemployment rates in destination countries make people perceive a higher economic cost of exit and that perception increases protests. We thus propose the following hypotheses:

H1-1: Higher emigration costs increase protests and higher emigration incentives reduce protests.

Furthermore, protest incentive might attenuate the effect of migration intention on protest. Hirschman posits that social and political discontentment raises voice, a finding in various empirical studies (Costello, Jenkins, and Aly 2015; Etling, Backeberg, and Tholen 2020). He also argues that one of the principal determinants of individuals' resorting to voice rather than the more predictable exit is the estimate of their abilities to shape government policy (Dowding et al. 2000; Etling, Backeberg, and Tholen 2020). Having a sense of efficacy, individuals tend to believe that the situation can be remedied through protest.

Opp (2016) borrows from Olson's (1965) concept of selective incentives for members of large groups to contribute to collective action. While Olson focuses on material incentive, Opp modified it by arguing that non-material incentives are important determinant of protests. Moral incentives like the acceptance of a protest norm encourage participation; social incentives like protest promoting networks and affiliations with political groups facilitate the emergence of and members' participation in social movement (Diani and McAdam 2003; McAdam and Paulsen 1993; Moss and Snow 2016; Opp 2016). Such networks are important because individuals' exit and voice decisions are seldom made independently; rather their decisions depend on the anticipated actions of others in their networks who facilitate or hinder coordination (Sellars 2019).

We thus hypothesize:

H1-2: The effect of migration intention on protest would diminish despite its significance after controlling for emigration costs and incentives and protest incentives.

Migration Intention Model: The Voice-to-Exit Link

Most studies on exit-voice dynamics have focused on explanations regarding how emigration affects protest, but rarely the reverse. The theoretical base of this direction—

how heightened protest depresses emigration—is not fully developed. As for the ways in which protest incentives might affect migration intentions, social and political discontentment is found to push people out (Etling, Backeberg, and Tholen 2020; Opp 2016). In addition, when people perceive that they cannot influence government policies and that political activism is futile, they feel hopeless and emigrate (Ådnanes 2004; Bygnes and Flipo 2017; Etling, Backeberg, and Tholen 2020; Salamońska and Czeranowska 2019).

Moral and social incentives for protests based on political affiliation and networks could be important for understanding emigration. There are distinct norms in protest strategies and political ideologies in each affiliation. Their group solidarity is built upon the practices of these areas, rather than formal membership in political parties and trade unions (Chan and Lee 2007). For radical groups, contributions to those strategies by street protests are likely to be rewarded, and showing intention to emigrate might cause sanctioning within the groups. Thus, the linkage between protest and migration intention is a two-way relationship, as *H1* hypothesized.

Based on the literature on migration intention, we further hypothesize regarding incentives:

H2-1: Political and social discontentment increases migration intention; while perceived political influence and moral and social incentive for protest reduce migration intention.

In addition, we recognize that the incentives and costs of emigration may also affect migration intention. The costs of emigration are the perceived difficulties in integration that involve acquisition of rights and status within the core institutions of destination country, such as employment, housing, and citizenship rights. Although our study focuses on people in residence in the country of origin, people who have left or re-enter their home country share their good and bad experiences abroad with people who have never migrated (Ley and Kobayashi 2005). Transnational experiences from self and others form a perception of the potential exit costs. High exit costs reduce people's intention to emigrate.

However, economic, social, and cultural capital could facilitate emigration. Economic capital which is directly convertible into money enables easier incorporation, for instance in terms of gaining institutionalized property rights. Social capital like transnational ties help provide more information about the destination country, which is much needed because migration is a knowledge-intensive and risky process (Erel and Ryan 2019; Etling, Backeberg, and Tholen 2020). We also believe that anticipated emigration of friends increases intention to migrate as it allows for collective search and exchanges of information prior to moving and future emotional and social support in the host country, which new immigrants need (Wissink and Mazzucato 2018). Better cultural capital, defined as cultural knowledge in embodied state like language skills and exposure to cultures in the host country, increases migration intention because this smooths social interaction with locals (Erel and Ryan 2019). Thus, we hypothesize:




Figure 2. Conceptual models of protest-migration intention and the hypotheses.

H2-2: The effect of protest on migration intention would diminish despite its significance after controlling for emigration costs and incentives and protest incentives.

Corresponding to hypotheses H1 to H2-2, Figure 2 summarizes linkages of protest participation, protest (dis)incentives, migration intention and migration costs and incentives.

Taking Time into Account: Exit-Voice Dynamics Amidst Changing State Repression

There are calls to reveal the pathways of exit-voice dynamics across time (Dowding et al. 2000; Opp 2016). Our study contributes by examining the ways in which changes in migration intention affect protest participation, and vice versa, amidst the rapid change from a free to a repressive society. The political situation, characterized by intensified movements and counter-movements, complicates the opportunity structures of the exit-voice dynamics through time.

How do changes in migration intention affect protest participation? Pfaff and Kim (2003) suggest that exit could have a protest-facilitating signaling effect as it spreads knowledge of people’s shared grievances and creates a sense of crisis. However, such signaling effect, they also argued, is neither uniform nor constant. When emigration reaches a threshold, the effect fails to instigate resistance. This is likely in our case, but we are using migration intention to reflect “exit.” The diffusion of migration intention is not just through people who know one another, but through mass and social media. We also speculate that as the state becomes more repressive, involving

crackdown against dissidents, imprisonment, and torture, cumulative migration intention does not only signal discontentment and grievances, but also fear and hopelessness (Ådnanes 2004; Barry et al. 2014; Salamońska and Czeranowska 2019). Thus, growing migration intention might potentially dampen the effect on protest participation over time, although we do not have enough support to draw a hypothesis here. We also control for protest incentive variables so as to tease out the effect of migration intention on protest participation.

How do changes in protest participation and protest incentives affect migration intention? In Hong Kong, when more repressive policing and growing discontentment go hand in hand, emigration could be the only collective action available to citizens (Mueller 1999). Therefore, positive effect of political discontentment on migration intention could be more important across time. But migration intentions could be different too in terms of different people's political affiliations. When protestors' interactions with the government intensify, their ideas, beliefs, and tactics will be sharpened (Klandermans 2014). Group polarization around "us" and "them" is the result. Moderates might also be urged to be sympathetic or unsympathetic to more radical beliefs and tactics (Haines 1984). People who originally opposed the movement will be further antagonized. When the ingroup symbols are increasingly celebrated (protest incentives increased) and those of the outgroup denigrated, they exert different effects on migration intention. Our study captures this evolution of movement-counter-movement dynamics. In our case, it is plausible that more radical participants who encourage protests might reduce their intention to migrate across time when compared to moderates and non-supporters of the protests.

Methods

Data Collection

We used an anonymous self-administered web survey for our data ($n = 979$).⁶ Our survey was administered from 28 March to 30 May 2020. We used a web survey rather than a representative face-to-face or phone survey due to risks involved in disclosing information regarding their protest participation. Given the sensitivity of the issue, we did not use any sampling frame provided by the government. We also avoided phone conversations which would create unnecessary suspicion among respondents. To capture a politically diverse audience, we posted the questionnaire on Facebook pages of 16 districts, a parent forum in Baby Kingdom, and the "chit-chat" forum in LIHKG. The respondents are Hong Kong citizens aged 18 to 65.

Despite concerns with the validity of non-representative surveys, Salganik (2019) has extensively discussed their merits. Although the use of digital data can make it

⁶Please note that we have used the same dataset in our another paper (see Lui, Sun, and Hsiao 2022).

difficult to estimate the proportion of Hong Kong residents who wanted to emigrate, digital data can help tease out relationships (Salganik 2019). The goal of this study is to understand mechanisms, to break down the big explanation-seeking-why question (the “black box” of exit-to-voice and vice versa) into smaller questions about how the participating entities relate to the outcome (Hedström and Ylikoski 2010).⁷ Thus, we believe our data has the advantages without too many pitfalls, although researchers should be careful when applying the mechanisms to other cases.⁸

As Hong Kong changed in the months under examination, so have people’s participation in the protest, their migration intentions, friendship networks, and political affiliations. To capture temporal dynamics, we adopted life-history techniques (Freedman et al. 1988) and asked respondents to recall their experiences at different times. Life-history techniques have been used to examine how unique events, such as political uprising, wars, or migration, affect behaviors.

Although the study has a retrospective design, studies have shown that landmark events prevent telescoping and improve accuracy of recall (Lavrakas 2008). As landmark events leave strong imprints on memory, they aid recall accuracy of behaviors and attitudes at the time of the events. Following this logic, we identified five well-known events, and asked respondents about their experiences at those times. We have used the same time categorization in our previous paper (see Lui, Sun, and Hsiao 2022):

Time 1: Before June 2019. Government tested the waters on the plan to amend the bill.

Time 2: Around June 12, 2019. Government ignored opposition and pushed for the second reading of bill amendment even after a large demonstration against it on June 9. Protestors gathered at the Legislative Council to demand the withdrawal of the amendment. The police fired 150 rounds of tear gas to disperse the crowd.

Time 3: Around July 21, 2019. People accused the police of colluding with the triads. Footage broadcast live and viral videos showed Yuen Long thugs assaulting protesters,

⁷According to Hedström and Ylikoski (2010), the focus on mechanisms opens up the black box that only sees factors and effect by asking a series of small “how questions,” such as what are the participating entities, and what are their relevant properties? How are the interactions of these entities organized, for instance in our case, temporally? What variables could prevent or modify the outcome?

⁸We still do not know how closely our data approximates the population. For example, we cannot evaluate the discrepancy between actual and intended migration because the data on actual migration is incomplete. The actual migration rates reported by the United Nations, World Bank, or Hong Kong Census Data could not capture people “on the move” who are going through the special streams opened up by the British, Canadian, and Australian governments. For Taiwan, the figures are also unknown because many Hong Kong people are making the transition to permanent residence. Comparing these open sources with data from each local government also shows conflicting messages about the actual migration rates.

bystanders, and journalists indiscriminately, while police stations were closed and the police did not arrive at the scene until 39 min after the assault (Marcolini et al. 2019).

Time 4: Around October 4, 2019. People demand for the dismissal of police force after police shot an 18-year-old student protestor (Tang 2019). The government invoked the Emergency Regulations Ordinance to ban the wearing of masks in protests (Information Services Department 2019).

Time 5: Around November 11, 2019. Two universities were besieged by the police when protestors started three boycotts: boycotting class, work and visiting pro-government shops and restaurants. The fight between the police and the protestors was fierce.

Our pretesting cognitive interviews support our design (Groves et al. 2011).⁹ We had five respondents from various education backgrounds and political affiliations. Each interview lasted around 50–70 min. We asked participants to verbalize their thoughts. They asked rhetorical questions like “when did I decide to migrate?” and then linked that time to a significant political event. Other participants recounted preparing for migration. They could locate a behavior, like finding a migration consultant, to anchor the time point. Thus, the intention to migrate was linked to a specific behavior and not just an intention in a vague sense.

Measures

Protest variables. To measure people’s participation in the protest, we asked the question: How many times have you participated in the anti-extradition movement in person (including protests, sit-in, or other action-oriented campaigns) from Time 1 to Time 5? We noticed that the lengths of different periods are not equal, so we recoded this to a binary variable 0 (have not participated) or 1 (have participated). This variable is the outcome variable in the protest model and a covariate in the migration intention model.

For protest incentives, we include political and social discontentment, perceived efficacy to influence the government, political affiliation, and pro-democracy network.

Political discontent is measured by two separate questions about people’s perception of the police and the government in dealing with the anti-extradition protest: How reasonable were the police from Time 1 to Time 5? It is measured from 1 (completely reasonable) to 7 (completely unreasonable).

⁹Cognitive interviews were used to increase the validity of surveys. We administered draft survey questions, and asked respondents to think aloud as they work on the problems. We also probed respondents about how they understood the questions, and attempted to learn how they formulated their answers.

Social discontent is measured by people's satisfaction with housing, job opportunities, youth policies, social welfare policies, health care policies, and education system, ranging from 1 (completely satisfied) to 7 (completely dissatisfied).

Perceived political influence is measured by people's level of agreement on four statements: (a) Politicians do not care much about what people like me think; (b) There is no way except voting to influence what the government does; (c) People like me do not have any influence on what the government does; and (d) All politics is so complicated that somebody like me does not understand what is happening. The answer categories ranged from 1 (completely disagree) to 7 (completely agree).

Political affiliation is measured by the question: Which of the following political faction can best represent you from Time 1 to Time 5? The choices include moderate democrats, localists/self-determinists, pro-independence, neutral, and pro-government. The first three groups are supportive of protests, while the latter groups are indifferent to or opposed to the protest.

For the pro-democracy network, we measured the respondents' network by the question: How often do you contact friends who are pan-democratic, neutral, and pro-government from Time 1 to 5? The frequency of contact ranges from 1 (very infrequently) to 5 (very frequently). From these we construct three variables for pan democratic networks, neutral networks, and pro-government networks. Note that these variables are not mutually exclusive, as we do not wish to impose pre-defined network categories on people.

Emigration Variables. We measured migration intention by this question: Do you plan to migrate (outside Hong Kong and China) from Time 1 to Time 5? We use the scale of 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much so/have already planned). This variable is the outcome variable for the migration intention model and a covariate for the protest model.

Emigration costs are measured by the structural difficulties in integration in terms of citizenship (whether the person has a foreign passport or not) and the predicted salary. Emigration incentives are measured by (a) cultural capital, including percentage of time residing in Hong Kong *versus* abroad and self-rated language ability of the official language used by the host country; (b) social capital that includes whether the respondent has existing ties abroad (close family ties, other relatives, and friends), and the anticipated friend's ties abroad and the anticipated mobility of the spouse and parents if the respondent is emigrating; and (c) economic capital, including the current average income per person and whether they own overseas properties or not.

Note that protest participation, emigration intention, political affiliations, and pro-democratic network variables are time-varying, and the rest of them are not. We purposefully minimize the number of time series questions in the survey because respondents in pilot study show fatigue when all emigration and political variables are in the form of time series.

Control Variables. We control for gender, age, marital status, and household income. In addition, we control for identification variables which involve both cognitive and

emotional aspects of “attachment” (Mathews, Ma, and Lui 2007). We ask “to what extent do you identify with China?” “To what extent do you identify with Hong Kong?” on a scale of 1 (do not identify) to 7 (completely identify) to reflect the cognitive aspect of attachment. While the identification question could be understood in cultural, historical, and national terms, we only use one question in our survey. To assess the emotional aspects of attachment, we asked: “To what extent are you proud of being Chinese (*Zhong guo ren*)?” “To what extent you are proud of being a Hong Konger (*Heung gong yan*)?”¹⁰

Analytical Strategies

For the protest models, since the outcome is binary (participate in a protest/not participate in a protest) and we have multiple observations per individual across time, we employ a logistic mixed effects model that includes time-specific fixed effects and random intercepts for each individual. For the migration intention models, as the outcome ranges from 1 to 7, we employ linear mixed-effect models. We also ran additional models of panel regressions, presented in the supplementary materials in which lagged protest/migration is used as a covariate to explain migration/protest (e.g., using protest in Time 1 to predict migration in Time 2). However, since the lagged panel models force us to drop the outcome variables at Time 1 from the models, and we believe Time 1 is an important baseline to test time-variant effects, we opted to use the original models. That said, we will supplement our result with additional insights from the lagged models.

Our model assumes that the effects of covariates are similar across time while accounting for the temporal correlation. However, in the last section of the results, we also include time interaction effects to explore temporal heterogeneity in effects. Note that due to the multi-level modeling with random intercepts per individual, the coefficients should be interpreted as conditional at the individual level. In other words, for each individual, the coefficients represented how the outcome changes if the covariates change.

Results

Descriptive Statistics

We first examine descriptive statistics of the variables used in the analyses in Table 1, which also shows which variables are time-varying and which are time-invariant. The mean for protest is .63, indicating that on average across time people tend to

¹⁰For the emotional aspect, we only measure “pride.” But in Mathews, Ma, and Lui (2007), while pride is one important indicator for emotional aspect of identification, “affection” and “uneasiness” could be others.

Table I. Descriptive Statistics of Core Variables.

Variable Group	Variables	Range	Mean	SD	Time Variant
Outcome	1. Protest	(0,1)	.63	.48	Yes
	2. Migration intention	(1,7)	3.77	1.87	Yes
Protest incentive variables	1. Political discontent	(1,6)	4.78	1.68	No
	2. Social discontent	(6,42)	30.49	6.24	No
	3. Perceived political influence	(4,28)	15.99	4.91	No
	4. Political affiliation: Moderate democrats (N = 1397) Pro-independence (N = 797) Pro-localism (N = 1600) Neutral (N = 600) Pro-government (N = 373)				Yes
Emigration incentives variables	5. Pro-democracy networks	(1,5)	3.66	1.32	Yes
	1. Years of residence in Hong Kong (in proportion)	(0,1)	.90	.15	No
	2. Close family ties abroad	(0,1)	.13	.33	No
	3. Other relative ties abroad	(0,1)	.56	.50	No
	4. Friends ties abroad	(1,7)	2.56	1.49	No
	5. Anticipated friends ties abroad	(1,7)	3.27	1.40	No
	6. Anticipation of parents' mobility	(1,7)	3.52	1.97	No
	7. Anticipation of spouse's mobility	(1,7)	5.79	1.82	No
	8. Experience of living abroad	(0,1)	.30	.46	No
	9. Has overseas property	(0,1)	.06	.23	No
	10. Has a foreign passport	(0,1)	.37	.48	No
	11. Foreign language ability	(1,6)	4.01	1.03	No
12. Predicted salary in host country	(1,7)	2.56	1.76	No	
Control variables	1. Gender	(0,1)	.58	.49	No
	2. Age	(18,65)	34.38	12.51	No
	3. Marital status	(0,1)	.37	.48	No
	4. Household income per person	(0,16)	4.82	4.32	No
	5. Identification with Hong Kong	(2,12)	10.87	1.65	No
	6. Identification with China	(2,12)	5.57	3.03	No

participate in the protests. The mean for migration intention is 3.77, slightly below 4, indicating that on average across time people are generally slightly uninclined to emigrate.¹¹

¹¹Based on our survey which was administered in May 2020, before any special policies for Hong Kong people were announced (e.g., British National Overseas Visa from the UK, Hong Kong Stream from Canada and Australia), the highest counts for the intended




Figure 3. Average proportion of respondents who participated in protests across time.

However, such aggregate statistics do not allow us to capture trends across time. In Figure 3 we plot the average proportion which participated in the protests across time. As seen, Time 1 has the lowest participation proportion, while the proportions were steadily high across Time 2 to Time 5, with perhaps a slight decrease in the latter times.

Regarding migration intention, we plot the average level of migration intention across time in Figure 4 (cf. Lui, Sun, and Hsiao, 2022). As seen, there is a steady increase in migration intention over time, indicating that people generally increased their intention to emigrate.

We conducted further examinations of how such changes differ by time in Tables 2 and 3. Table 2 shows how changes occurred across time for each respondent. The largest increase in protest participation seemed to take place from Time 1 to Time 2, as 27% of the respondents did not participate in Time 1 but participated in Time 2. In contrast, for other time points the percentages are stable.

In contrast, Table 3 shows the change in migration intention over time. For each time interval, there is a steady group of people whose intention to migrate increased (35% from Time 1 to Time 2, 37% from Time 2 to Time 3, 22% from Time 3 to

migration destination are Taiwan (334), followed by Australia (188), Canada (174), and the UK (156). (Respondents were allowed to choose more than one destination.).




Figure 4. Average level of migration intention across time.

Time 4, 17% from Time 4 to Time 5). Thus, unlike a one-time spike in the number of people who increased their participation in protests, increasing migration intention remains constant.

Logistic Mixed Regression Results on Exit-to-Voice Link

We start the examinations of the hypotheses in the protest models regarding the exit-to-voice link in Table 4. Each column is a different model, corresponding to the order of the hypotheses. Because there are many covariates, we only present coefficients of the core covariates; other controls are indicated in the last few rows of the table. As noted in the methods section, in all models we included time-fixed effects to address confounding by time.

In Model 1, we test the relationship between migration intention and protest participation. Supporting H1, the positive coefficient indicates a positive relationship between migration intention and protest participation. People who have higher migration intentions are also more likely to participate in the protests.

In Model 2, we add emigration costs and incentives. Emigration incentives such as having close family ties abroad, anticipating friendship ties abroad, anticipated spousal mobility, and holding a foreign passport are positively associated with protest participation. Having an overseas property is negatively associated

Table 2. Increase-Decrease of Protest by Time.

Time Periods	Protest (%)
T1 → T2	
0 → 0	30
0 → 1	27
1 → 0	2
1 → 1	41
T2 → T3	
0 → 0	26
0 → 1	6
1 → 0	4
1 → 1	65
T3 → T4	
0 → 0	27
0 → 1	2
1 → 0	5
1 → 1	66
T4 → T5	
0 → 0	31
0 → 1	1
1 → 0	4
1 → 1	65

Notes. "0" means no participation in protests and "1" means participation in protests.

Table 3. Increase-Decrease of Migration Intention by Time.

Time Periods	Migration Intention (%)
T1 → T2	
Increased	35
No change	59
Decreased	5
T2 → T3	
Increased	37
No change	60
Decreased	3
T3 → T4	
Increased	22
No change	74
Decreased	3
T4 → T5	
Increased	17
No change	80
Decreased	3

Table 4. Logistic Mixed Effect Models with Protest Participation as Outcome.

Covariate	Model 1 Estimate (s.e.)	Model 2 Estimate (s.e.)	Model 3 Estimate (s.e.)
Migration intention	0.40*** (0.06)	0.23*** (0.06)	0.02 (0.06)
Emigration incentives			
Years of residence in Hong Kong		3.25** (1.08)	0.55 (0.93)
Close family ties abroad		0.48 (0.51)	0.88* (0.44)
Other relative ties abroad		0.23 (0.31)	0.15 (0.27)
Friends ties abroad		0.11 (0.12)	0.30** (0.11)
Anticipated friends ties abroad		0.60*** (0.13)	0.29** (0.11)
Anticipation of parents' mobility		0.04 (0.08)	-0.00 (0.07)
Anticipation of spouse's mobility		0.18** (0.07)	0.18 (0.06)
Experience of living abroad		-0.19 (0.36)	0.14 (0.31)
Has overseas property		-1.85* (0.72)	-0.31 (0.64)
Has a foreign passport		1.37*** (0.35)	0.17 (0.30)
Foreign language ability		0.08 (0.16)	0.04 (0.14)
Predicted salary if in host country		0.14 (0.10)	0.02 (0.08)
Protest incentives			
Political discontent			0.33*** (0.08)
Social discontent			0.01 (0.02)
Perceived political influence			0.06* (0.03)
Political affiliation: pro-independence			2.31*** (0.35)
Political affiliation: pro-localism			1.33*** (0.22)
Political affiliation: neutral			-0.82** (0.30)
Political affiliation: pro-government			-2.29*** (0.59)
Pro-democracy networks			0.50*** (0.10)
Control variable: Identification			
Identification with Hong Kong			0.18 (0.10)
Identification with China			-0.24*** (0.06)
Time fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Demographic controls	NO	NO	YES
Number of observations	4895	3960	3601
Number of individuals	979	792	721

Notes. Reference category for political affiliation is "moderate democrats." Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

with protest participation. Perceived salary abroad does not significantly affect protest participation. The result partially contradicts H1-1 as emigration incentives are predicted to reduce protest participation, whereas emigration cost increases protest participation. However, having foreign passport and overseas property become insignificant after controlling for protest incentives and costs in Model 3.

Regarding H1-2, the relationship between migration intention and protest participation decreases and becomes insignificant once protest incentives are added in the

model. However, as we will see in Table 6, changes in the exit-to-voice relation in different time points have canceled out the significant effects.¹²

Linear Mixed Regression Results on Voice-to-Exit Link

Table 5 shows results for the voice-to-exit link. In Model 4, in line with H1, results show that protest has a positive association with migration intention.

Model 5 includes protest incentives in the model. Regarding H2-1, political discontent, social discontent, pro-democracy networks, and political affiliations of independence and localism are positively associated with migration intention. Political influence and political affiliations of neutral and pro-government are negatively associated with migration intention.

Emigration incentives like anticipated friendship ties if emigrated, anticipated spousal mobility, having overseas property, having a foreign passport, and foreign language ability were factors positively associated with migration intention. After taking these costs and incentives into account, partially supporting H2-2, the relationship of protest on migration intention was so substantially reduced that it became insignificant. However, the lagged migration model, which drops the migration intention outcome in Time 1, shows protest in at an earlier time point is a consistent predictor of migration intention at the subsequent time point (see supplemental Table S2).

Interaction Effects with Time in Exit-Voice Dynamics

Table 4 shows that the relationship between migration intention and protest participation was insignificant. However, we could have covered up the underlying exit-voice dynamics, if we had not considered time. Table 6 presents the time-varying relationship of migration intention and protest. There is a positive main relationship of migration intention and protest *before the anti-extradition movement* (Time 1). From Time 2 to Time 5, when political tensions and repression became increasingly intense, their relationship became nonsignificant after accounting for the negative interaction effects. This result shows that compared to the start of the protest, the positive relationship between exit and voice is attenuated in later times.

Finally, we found no significant interaction effects between protest and time on migration intention, indicating that the positive relationship of voice-to-exit is robust and stable over time. However, as shown in Table 7, we found that people with political affiliations that encourage protests reduced their intention to emigration across time when compared to moderates. As seen in the positive main effects and the negative time interaction effects for the political affiliations of independence and

¹²The lagged protest model shows that effect of migration intention on protest is insignificant. See Supplemental Table S1.

Table 5. Linear Mixed Effect Models with Migration Intention as Outcome.

Covariate	Model 4 Estimate (s.e.)	Model 5 Estimate (s.e.)	Model 6 Estimate (s.e.)
Protest	0.30*** (0.05)	0.12* (0.05)	0.04 (0.05)
Protest incentives			
Political discontent		0.15*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
Social discontent		0.03*** (0.01)	0.01 (0.01)
Perceived political influence		-0.04*** (0.01)	-0.04*** (0.01)
Political affiliation: pro-independence		0.20** (0.08)	0.34*** (0.08)
Political affiliation: pro-localism		0.19*** (0.05)	0.30*** (0.06)
Political affiliation: neutral		-0.23** (0.07)	-0.15 (0.08)
Political affiliation: pro-government		0.13 (0.12)	0.28* (0.13)
Pro-democracy networks		0.06** (0.02)	0.04 (0.03)
Emigration Incentives			
Years of residence in Hong Kong (in proportion)			-0.38 (0.37)
Close family ties abroad			0.12 (0.17)
Other relative ties abroad			-0.09 (0.11)
Friends ties abroad			-0.04 (0.04)
Anticipated friends ties abroad			0.34*** (0.04)
Anticipation of parents' mobility			0.01 (0.03)
Anticipation of spouse's mobility			0.08*** (0.02)
Experience of living abroad			0.14 (0.12)
Has overseas property			0.56* (0.24)
Has a foreign passport			0.31** (0.12)
Foreign language ability			0.20*** (0.06)
Predicted salary in host country			-0.04 (0.03)
Control variable: Identification			
Identification with Hong Kong			-0.05 (0.04)
Identification with China			-0.05 (0.02)
Time fixed effects	YES	YES	YES
Demographic controls	NO	NO	YES
Number of observations	4895	4358	3601
Number of individuals	979	871	721

Notes. Reference category for political affiliation is "moderate democrats." Standard errors in parenthesis. * $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

local, the willingness to emigrate diminished in later times. Specifically, consistent significant results were found in relation to pro-independence and pro-government affiliations, while for other political affiliations, the results were more scattered. Political discontent did not have interaction effects with time on migration intention.

Together, we suggest two complementary speculations as to why higher migration intention increases protest participation, and why this positive relationship diminishes when a relatively free society becomes more authoritarian. The first speculation is that migration intention reflects an individual's psychological preparedness for

Table 6. Logistic Mixed Effect Models with Protest Participation as Outcome (with Time Interactions).

Covariate	Model 7 Estimate (s.e.)
Migration Intention	.24* (.09)
Migration Intention * Time 2	-.31** (.12)
Migration Intention * Time 3	-.22 (.13)
Migration Intention * Time 4	-.31 (.23)
Migration Intention * Time 5	-.36** (.12)
Other covariates	YES
Time fixed effects	YES
Demographic controls	YES
Number of observations	3601
Number of individuals	721

Notes. Reference category for Time is Time 1. Standard errors in parenthesis.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

leaving Hong Kong. When people are more prepared with a backup plan, they would be emboldened to protest. This also explains why contradictory to our hypothesis, emigration incentives—having close family, friends, and anticipated friends abroad—increases the likelihood of protest participation.

The second speculation, as argued by Pfaff and Kim (2003), is that emigration has a signaling effect of increasing grievances, which amplifies protests. The signaling effect is imperative, especially when their research is set in an authoritarian regime that punishes expressions of discontentment. Hong Kong, in contrast, was a semi-democracy becoming authoritarian. Thus, alongside signaling growing grievances, we argue that people's intention to flee Hong Kong and its eroding democratic infrastructure signifies fear about the repression and engenders a sense of fatalism about Hong Kong's future. Prospective migrants are sensitive to the signals about the repression, and their fears could have discounted voice and the effort to voice (the average proportion who participated in protests declined after Time 3). This explains why the growing intensity in political repression has attenuated the positive relationship of exit-voice.

Furthermore, while our original model shows a significant exit-to-voice link, the lagged model dropping Time 1 protest as the outcome is insignificant. The strongest association between protest and migration is shown to be at Time 1, and this relationship attenuates over time, consistent with our interpretation. However, the robust voice-to-exit link may lend further support to our speculation on the increasingly widespread fatalism about the future of Hong Kong. People may protest at first, but then as time goes by a bleak future seems inevitable, some who are active in protests and moderates (also shown in Table 7) may choose to migrate. In other words, the lagged models show that while at Time 1 the exit-voice links may be more balanced in both directions, as time goes by the balance tilts toward the voice-to-exit link and away from the exit-to-voice link.

Table 7. Linear Mixed Effect Models with Migration Intention as Outcome (with Time Interactions).

Covariate	Model 8 Estimate (s.e.)
Political affiliation: pro-independence	1.10*** (0.18)
Political affiliation: pro-localism	0.44*** (0.11)
Political affiliation: neutral	-0.01 (0.10)
Political affiliation: pro-government	1.06*** (0.21)
Political discontent	0.15*** (0.03)
Political affiliation: pro-independence * Time 2	-0.62*** (0.20)
Political affiliation: pro-independence * Time 3	-0.92*** (0.20)
Political affiliation: pro-independence * Time 4	-0.97*** (0.20)
Political affiliation: pro-independence * Time 5	-1.06*** (0.21)
Political affiliation: pro-localism * Time 2	-0.24 (0.13)
Political affiliation: pro-localism * Time 3	-0.41** (0.14)
Political affiliation: pro-localism * Time 4	-0.32* (0.15)
Political affiliation: pro-localism * Time 5	-0.35 (0.15)
Political affiliation: neutral * Time 2	-0.10 (0.16)
Political affiliation: neutral * Time 3	-0.55** (0.20)
Political affiliation: neutral * Time 4	-0.32 (0.22)
Political affiliation: neutral * Time 5	-0.41 (0.21)
Political affiliation: pro-government * Time 2	-0.57* (0.24)
Political affiliation: pro-government * Time 3	-1.28*** (0.30)
Political affiliation: pro-government * Time 4	-1.14*** (0.31)
Political affiliation: pro-government * Time 5	-1.23*** (0.31)
Political Discontent * Time 2	0.01 (0.04)
Political Discontent * Time 3	-0.07 (0.06)
Political Discontent * Time 4	-0.03 (0.06)
Political Discontent * Time 5	0.01 (0.06)
Other covariates	YES
Time fixed effects	YES
Demographic controls	YES
Number of observations	3601
Number of individuals	720

Notes. Reference category for Time is Time 1; Reference category for political affiliation is "moderate democrats." Standard errors in parenthesis.

* $p < .05$. ** $p < .01$. *** $p < .001$.

Table 8 presents the summary of the results, and whether they correspond with the hypotheses.

Conclusions

The latter half of 2019 for Hong Kong is characterized by intensifying protests, increasing migration intention, and stricter political repression. This study shows

Table 8. Summary of the Results.

Hypotheses	Result
H1: Exit-to-voice link	
<i>H1: Migration intention has a positive relationship with protest.</i>	Supported
<i>H1-1: Higher emigration costs increase protests and higher emigration incentives reduce protests.</i>	Mostly unsupported. Quite the reverse, having overseas networks increase protests.
<i>H1-2: The effect of migration intention on protest would diminish despite its significance after controlling for emigration costs and incentives and protest incentives.</i>	Partially supported. The effect of migration intention on protest diminishes and becomes insignificant. However, there are some complexities: the significance of exit-to-voice relationship varies by time.
H2: Voice-to-exit link	
<i>H2-1: Political and social discontentment increases migration intention; while perceived political influence and moral and social incentive for protest reduce migration intention.</i>	Supported.
<i>H2-2: The effect of protest on migration intention would diminish despite its significance after controlling for emigration costs and incentives and protest incentives.</i>	Supported. The effect of protest on migration intention diminishes. It remains significant after controlling for protest incentives. Its robustness is shown in the lagged model, which also controls for emigration incentives.
Exit-to-voice through time	
Positive effect of migration intention on protest is dampened across time. The relationship is strongest in Time 1.	
Voice-to-exit through time	
Positive relationship of protest participation on migration intention is robust across time. Although people with radical political affiliations are more intended to emigrate, this relationship reduces across time when compared to moderates and those who are neutral about the political protest.	

that migration intention enhances protest participation, and that their relationships are time- and context-contingent. Notably, as political repression increases over time, the positive effect of migration intention on protest is dampened, while the positive effect of protest participation on migration intention is robust. Our results illuminate the importance of considering the changing political situation that complicates the opportunity structures of exit and voice. This study contributes to a deeper understanding of the micropolitics of exit-voice dynamics in Algeria in the Arab world, post-socialist European countries like Hungary and Poland, and Asian countries like the Philippines, which are lapsing into authoritarianism. We highlight the theoretical importance of combining migration and social movement studies in both fields of literature.

Our results also contribute to the understanding of how protests and protest incentives affect migration intention, a neglected topic in the literature. Political discontent, as reflected in people's perception of police arbitrariness at the street level, increases migration intention and protest participation. Perceived efficacy to influence the policies has a negative association with migration intention. The radicals have a stronger intention to migrate than do moderates and the apolitical. This reflects that while radical groups encourage each other to protest, they also plan to leave the country should conditions turn against them. Also, exit is not viewed as a dead-end to protest, resonating with the transnational literature that describes political participation "from the outside" (cf. Kapur 2014). However, radicals' intention to migrate diminishes when protest intensifies. Corroborating Haines' (1984) analysis, when protests are radicalized, group affiliations become more polarized. The conviction of the radical protestors and the unity within their group could be strengthened (Klandermans 2014). This heightens the radicals' morale to protest within Hong Kong, while putting less thought into migrating. While their hope for "recuperating" the government within the institutions is frail, they are hopeful about people's power to overthrow the administration. These speculations based on the findings show the complexity of radicals' psychology, where fear, hope, morale, and loyalty to their radical group co-exist, while translating them into intention to migrate and protest participation at different time of the social movement. Further research needs to be done regarding the psychology of the radicals during similar contestations.

This study factors the contextual difference across time into the understanding of exit-voice dynamics; however, the time period we focus on, despite capturing the transition, is short. Around a year after the protest (autumn 2020), Hong Kong passed the National Security Law that curbs protests in the name of national security. In the meantime, the British government is allowing British National Overseas passport holders (people born in Hong Kong during the colonial era) and their family members to move to the UK. What does the exit-voice dynamic look like with policy changes in migrant receiving countries that are likely to have an impact on the cost and opportunities of protest and emigration? Our results show that migration incentives, such as having ties with family, friends, and anticipated friends are positively related to protest participation. Thus, *during* the Anti-Extradition Movement, a likely scenario is that *if* receiving countries opened up to Hong Kong immigrants, migration incentives would increase, resulting in greater protest participation. But this, of course, remains speculative because it was not the scenario during the movement, and our data could not provide this information.

Due to the survey design, we can only test associations and at most temporal associations between exit and voice, and cannot make causal inferences. While we controlled for political discontent, social discontent, political affiliation, identification and demographics, we cannot completely rule out the possibility of spuriousness. Future research could augment this study with methods that have more causal ability, such as natural experiments or regression discontinuity designs. Furthermore, future studies could look into the role of identifications in exit and voice. Although

we do not find that stronger identification with Hong Kong increases protest participation, leaving Hong Kong could be the only way for people with high identification with Hong Kong to voice their dissatisfaction under the authoritarian rule (cf. Johansson and Vinthagen 2020). We are yet to look into whether loyalists who intend to migrate would protest more. Our paper also found that the nesting of local and national identification having opposite effects on protest participation; while for emigration, only national identification has an effect. More in-depth analysis of the nested nature of identification might shed light on protests of minority groups in other countries (cf. Okamoto and Wilkes 2008) or contested regions like Catalonia, Spain (cf. Boylan 2015) and Quebec, Canada (cf. Blanchet and Medeiros 2019).

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Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

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