Confucianism and Democratic Values in Three Chinese Societies*

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Since the third wave of democratization reached East Asia in the 1990s, whether the new democracies of East Asia could consolidate their democracies has been an issue of interest. While proponents of Asian values pointed to the cultural specificity of Confucian political culture and argued that democratic values may not truly take root in East Asia, proponents of modernization theory saw democratic values as the natural outcome of economic development. This study aims to ground this debate in an empirical study of Confucian and democratic value orientations in three Chinese societies: mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. We develop indices based on survey research measuring Confucian and democratic values, and use these to analyze their distribution across the three Chinese societies. We also use them in conjunction with a multivariate analysis to uncover the causal structural relationship between Confucian values and democratic values. Our results show that Confucian values have a negative influence on democratic values and vice versa, but also show that

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modernization is a strong contributor to democratic consciousness. There are grounds for optimism for the future of democracy in Chinese societies, as education has an important role in the development of democratic consciousness, and these will continue to dampen Confucian values in line with modernization.

KEYWORDS: democratic values; Confucian values; modernization; survey research; political culture.

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Over the last half-century in the West, democracy and liberty have merged. But today the two strands of liberal democracy, interwoven in the Western political fabric, are coming apart across the globe. Democracy is flourishing; liberty is not.

—**Fareed Zakaria**[1]

The 1974 overthrow of the Caetano dictatorship in Portugal triggered the third wave of global democratization. Originating in Southern Europe, the wave spread to Latin America and Asia in the 1980s, reaching Eastern Europe and most of Africa by the 1990s.[2] Observing that formerly communist Eastern Europe and authoritarian Third World regimes chose liberal democracy instead of nondemocratic alternatives to fill the ideological vacuum of regime collapse, liberals optimistically assumed that liberal democracy was universally recognized as the only viable form of government.[3] Francis Fukuyama even went so far as to predict the "end of history," that with the passing of ideological division, future alternatives to liberal democracy as the dominant form of social organization could not even be envisaged.[4]

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[1]Fareed Zakaria, *The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad* (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 17.

[2]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 15.

[3]Marc F. Plattner, "The Democratic Moment," in *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), 30.

[4]Francis Fukuyama, *The End History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992), 45.

However, it is an open question whether the third wave of democratization can continue to be extended and consolidated in Asia. In the wake of economic development and increased national pride, some scholars and politicians in Asia have questioned whether further democratization is necessary. Arguing that democracy as understood in the West is not suitable to their circumstances, they have advocated "Asian values," or a kind of soft authoritarianism, in opposition to Western liberal democracy. While some in the public debate (such as Kim Dae Jung) have remained faithful to Western democratic ideals,[5] others (most notably Lee Kwan Yew) have argued that it is not necessary for Asia to follow the Western model of political and economic development, and that there exists a specifically Asian model of development.[6] When viewed in light of Samuel Huntington's thesis that conflict in the post-Cold War era will increasingly result from cultural rather than ideological or economic differences,[7] this debate over development and democratization could have implications for the future peace and security of the international community.

Will Asian values obstruct the spread of the third wave of democratization in East Asia? This question can be answered from a number of angles.

The Debate on Asian Values and the Development of Democracy

Amartya Sen argues that democracy is a universal value, so it is misguided for East Asian leaders to advocate Asian values or an Asian development model which would forestall democratic development. Although in doing so they might re-label their undemocratic regimes "democratic," their true purposes lie in counteracting domestic pressures

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[5]Kim Dae Jung, "Is Culture Destiny? The Myth of Asia's Anti-Democratic Values," *Foreign Affairs* 73, no. 6 (November/December 1994): 189-94.

[6]Alan Dupont, "Is There an 'Asian Way'?" *Survival* 38, no. 2 (1996): 13-33.

[7]Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996).

for democratic reform.[8] The empirical evidence shows that the new democracies in Asia have experienced democratic progress since their transitions. Greater social mobility, improved educational standards, and less hierarchical power structures resulting from rapid economic growth in Taiwan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand signal the initial success of democratic transition in Asia.[9] On the other hand, what L.H.M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih (   ) call "Confucianism with a liberal face" may be a more accurate description of Asian-style democracy. Just as the Taiwanese electorate supports democracy not for the sake of limited government but as a means to install virtuous rulers,[10] so South Korean leaders continue to cloak themselves in the mantle of Confucian moral legitimacy to remain in office.[11] This may indicate that the outcome of democratization in these societies is still open-ended, and may go in either a liberal or Confucian direction.[12] At the same time, however, many scholars now argue that liberalism and Confucianism are not as incompatible as has been thought. While Irene Bloom claims that Confucianism contains a strong element of individual moral autonomy,[13] Joseph Chan argues that freedom of expression can be justified in terms of the Confucian concern for healthy politics,[14] and Daniel A. Bell argues that democracy can be

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[8]Amartya Sen, "Democracy as a Universal Value," *Journal of Democracy* 10, no. 3 (1999): 15.

[9]According to O'Donnell, the third wave of democratization consists of two transitions: toward democratic government (democratic transition) and democratic regime (democratic consolidation). See Guillermo O'Donnell, "Transitions, Continuities, and Paradoxes," in *Issues in Democratic Consolidation: The New South American Democracies in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Scott Mainwaring, Guillermo O'Donnell, and J. Samuel Valenzuela (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 18.

[10]L.H.M. Ling and Chih-yu Shih, "Confucianism with a Liberal Face: The Meaning of Democratic Politics in Postcolonial Taiwan," *Review of Politics* 60, no. 1 (1998): 55-82.

[11]Chaibong Hahm, "The Confucian Political Discourse and the Politics of Reform in Korea," *The Korea Journal* 37, no. 4 (Winter 1997): 66.

[12]See note 10 above.

[13]Irene Bloom, "The Moral Autonomy of the Individual in Confucian Tradition," in *Realms of Freedom in Modern China*, ed. William C. Kirby (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), 19-43.

[14]Joseph Chan, "A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights for Contemporary China," in *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights*, ed. Daniel A. Bell and Joanne Bauer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 228.

justified on the basis of its protection of the family and the community.[15] Indeed, some scholars see Confucianism as conducive to a communitarian form of East Asian democracy. Communitarianism is a reaction to the excessive individualism of modern liberal democracy, emphasizing community and national interests over those of the individual, and a high degree of community-oriented political participation over interest-group politics and checks and balances.[16] While Weiming Tu (　　　) sees Confucianism as providing a basis for the irreducibly social nature of the individual,[17] Wm. Theodore de Bary argues that Confucianism contains a genuine communitarian tradition with potential for a vibrant civil society.[18] According to these observers, elements of Confucian culture such as deference, harmony, and cooperation can combine with elements of the Western tradition to reinterpret and transcend the liberal democracy of the West.

Given this variety of possibilities, it is important to know what effects Confucianism, the core of Asian values, really has on the consolidation of democracy in East Asia. To properly address the Asian values debate, empirical research is needed to test and ground abstract theoretical speculations.

The purpose of this paper is to understand how the processes of modernization and democratization transform traditional Confucianism, through an analysis of survey data gathered in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. How does traditional Confucianism interact with Western liberal democratic concepts among the people of these countries? Even more important, are Asian values or Confucianism obstacles to further

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[15]Daniel A. Bell, "Democracy in Confucian Societies: The Challenge of Justification," in *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*, ed. Daniel A. Bell, David Brown, Kanishka Jayasuriya, and David Martin Jones (New York: St. Martin's, 1995), 36.

[16]Henry Tam, *Communitarianism: A New Agenda for Politics and Citizenship* (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 12-18.

[17]Weiming Tu, "Human Rights as a Confucian Moral Discourse," in *Confucianism and Human Rights*, ed. Wm. Theodore de Bary and Weiming Tu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 303.

[18]Wm. Theodore de Bary, *Asian Values and Human Rights: A Confucian Communitarian Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), 88.

democratic development? In the next section of this paper, we briefly review two theories that attempt to explain how Confucian values might complicate democratic development in East Asia. In the third section, we develop indices for measuring Confucian values and democratic values, and report their empirical distribution across the three Chinese societies. In the fourth section we employ multivariate analysis to uncover the causal structural relationship between Confucian values and democratic understanding. We find that Confucian values are negatively related to democratic values, and that modernization variables are strong contributors to democratic understanding, giving some grounds for optimism about the consolidation of democracy in East Asia.

Two Theoretical Perspectives

We present two main explanatory perspectives on how Confucianism interacts with modernization and democratization. These are discussed separately under the headings of modernization and cultural relativism.

Modernization

According to this perspective, differences between Eastern and Western cultures will eventually disappear through the global processes of modernization and democratization. Liberal democracy will replace all other regime types and become the best and only option in East Asia. In this vein, Fukuyama divides the consolidation of democracy into four separate empirical levels: ideology, institutions, civil society, and culture. Fukuyama then argues that any changes in political ideology and institutions (the top levels) will not in any way damage the integrated Confucian social order (the lower levels). Confucian culture can, for example, combine with authoritarianism or semi-authoritarianism, as in mainland China, Hong Kong, and Singapore, but it can also easily combine with democratic regimes, as in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea.[19] Fukuyama also observes

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[19]Francis Fukuyama, "The Primacy of Culture," *Journal of Democracy* 6, no. 1 (1995): 12.

that although Confucianism does not value individualism, it does value meritocracy, education, and tolerance, all of which are compatible with, and even conducive to, modern liberal democracy.[20] Excluding Confucianism as an important factor, Fukuyama points to the degree of modernization as the most important determinant of why some East Asian countries will become democratic and others will remain authoritarian.

Research on East Asian democratization increasingly demonstrates that modernization and industrialization assist the development of democracy.[21] Robert Scalapino argues that economic development in East Asia has led to a loosening of hierarchical social structures and high social mobility, both of which are conducive to democracy.[22] In other words, the process of modernization in East Asia affects the outcome of democratization. In another approach, Marc Plattner notes that democratic regimes will result in stronger liberal consciousness. This means that while the essentials of liberal thinking are still weak in the newly democratized countries of East Asia, liberalism will continue to strengthen as the third wave expands, and the anti-liberal cultural tradition will wane. As Gerald Curtis notes, although the civic culture in traditional East Asian societies is not solid, the process of democratization will cultivate a civic culture promoting democratic stability.[23] In this vein, Flanagan and Lee have argued that modernization is strongly related to libertarian values in Japan and Korea.[24] Drawing upon the latest wave of the World Values Survey, Dalton and Ong also contradict the core tenets of the Asian values argument, and offer a more positive view of the prospects for

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[20]Francis Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy," ibid., no. 2 (1995): 25-26.

[21]Francis Fukuyama, "The Illusion of Asian Exceptionalism," in *Democracy in East Asia*, ed. Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 224-25.

[22]Robert A. Scalapino, "A Tale of Three Systems," in Diamond and Plattner, *Democracy in East Asia*, 230.

[23]Gerald L. Curtis, "A 'Recipe' for Democratic Development," in Diamond and Plattner, *Democracy in East Asia*, 222.

[24]Scott Flanagan and Aie-Rie Lee, "Value Change and Democratic Reform in Japan and Korea," *Comparative Political Studies* 33 (2000): 626-59.

political development in East Asia.[25]

Cultural Relativism

From this perspective, East Asian political culture and liberal democracy are not compatible, since each is specific to its own respective culture. Lucian Pye has argued that in East Asian cultures traditional authoritarian and paternalistic relations between superiors and inferiors will remain even after modernization.[26] The pattern of dependency established in the family will interact with an individual sense of insecurity brought about by rapid socioeconomic change to create new forms of power-dependency.[27] This psychocultural analysis is consistent with how Samuel Huntington draws a sharp line between Chinese and Western civilizations, the former valuing group interests over individual interests, political authority over individual freedom, and social responsibility over individual rights.[28]

According to this analysis, the root of the problem would be that the Confucian tradition never developed a political philosophy supportive of liberal democracy as the West did. Advocacy of government by virtuous men, rather than law, is not conducive to individual rights, and modeling the state after the family leads to a paternalism that slides easily into authoritarianism. Essentially, Confucianism sees the ideal state as leading by moral suasion,[29] so as not to require coercion to fulfill its chief function of cultivating virtue and social harmony.[30] However, in the absence of institutional checks against rule by men who are not virtuous, harmony and

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[25]Russell J. Dalton and Nhu-Ngoc T. Ong, "Authority Orientation and Democratic Attitude: A Test of the 'Asian Values' Hypothesis," *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 6 (2005): 1-21.

[26]Lucian W. Pye, "Civility, Social Capital, and Civil Society in Asia," in *Patterns of Social Capital: Stability and Change in Historical Perspective*, ed. Robert I. Rothberg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 381.

[27]Lucian W. Pye, *Asian Power and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Belknap, 1985), 325.

[28]Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations*, 108.

[29]Frederick W. Mote, *Intellectual Foundations of China* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989), 41.

[30]Leonard Hsu, *The Political Philosophy of Confucianism* (London: Rutledge, 2005), 102.

cooperation must be built on a foundation of hierarchical structures that cannot guarantee basic freedoms,[31] and have the effect of hiding latent societal conflicts.[32] Furthermore, a social order based on an equivalence of societal and state interests is not conducive to the emergence of an independent civil society. Although China was not totalitarian in a modern sense throughout its history, "the supreme jurisdiction of the political order in all domains of social and cultural life"[33] did nothing to assist the development of democracy.

Given the continuing influence of Confucian political culture, the result may be what Fareed Zakaria calls "illiberal democracy." East Asian democratic transitions may bring about not constitutional liberalism, but rather an essentially authoritarian, illiberal political culture more consistent with Confucianism than with Western liberal democracy.[34] This illiberal political culture, according to Bell, would consist in a state with a non-neutral understanding of the societal good, a techno-paternalistic government running the country like a firm, and a public space managed by the state, with a dependent civil society subject to government control.[35]

This paper aims to examine the two theoretical perspectives above. If the perspective of modernization is correct, then traditional Confucian values will decline in importance along with modernization, and liberal democratic values will be reinforced through improved educational standards and generational replacement. However, if the perspective of cultural relativism is correct, then modernization and the experience of democratization will not help create a democratic political culture. In the text below, we examine the contribution of indicators of modernization and Confucian political culture to various measures of democratic consciousness.

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[31]Wm. Theodore de Bary, *The Trouble with Confucianism* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 49.

[32]Pye, *Asian Power and Politics*, 186.

[33]Benjamin I. Schwartz, *China and Other Matters* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 115.

[34]Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 6 (November/December 1997): 28.

[35]Bell, Brown, Jayasuriya, and Jones, *Towards Illiberal Democracy in Pacific Asia*, 163-67.

Research Design and Measurement

Our research involves political systems with significantly different regime characteristics and evolutionary trajectories. The regime in mainland China is characterized by single-party rule, a transitional economy, and glaring regional disparities in socioeconomic development. Taiwan has a relatively open, increasingly competitive polity, a sizable middle class, and an export-oriented market economy. Hong Kong has a system dominated by the administrative and business elite, whose democratization was truncated during its transition from being a British colony to an autonomous administrative region of the PRC. It has the most open economy in the world and is the most modernized among the three Chinese societies, but also has a growing income gap between rich and poor.

This great diversity in macro-level sociopolitical characteristics allows us to explore the effects of system-level attributes, especially the level of modernization and the nature of the political regime, upon citizens' democratic values, before going on to compare the structural relationship among democratic values, Confucian values, and socioeconomic background variables at individual level.

Furthermore, our sampling design for mainland China enables us to divide the nationwide survey into two sub-samples: one for urban residents (with urban household registration) and another for rural residents. The advantage of doing this lies in being able to more clearly decipher the influence of modernization while holding political system and cultural legacy constant.

The empirical data employed in this paper were collected under the auspices of a region-wide comparative survey project known as the East Asia Barometer. Comparable surveys were administered across eight East Asian political systems during 2001-02. The three-way comparison among mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong was designed both as a sub-project of the larger regional survey and as the sequel to our earlier three-way survey that fielded a comparable questionnaire in these three culturally Chinese societies during 1993-94. Please see the Appendix for an explanatory note on the survey methodology.

Measuring Confucian Values

What are the specific components of Confucian values? How can they be defined? Values widely cited as Confucian include the importance of family, a concern for ethics and virtue, the primacy of group over individuals, an emphasis on unity or harmony, hard work, thrift, and the importance of education.[36] Park and Shin see the core of Confucian values as having four main attributes: (1) social hierarchy (deference to authority), (2) social harmony (aversion to conflict), (3) group primacy (pursuit of collective welfare), and (4) anti-pluralism (preference for social unity).[37] Our analysis relies on Weiming Tu's classification of Confucian thought into two categories: political Confucianism and Confucian personal ethics.[38] While political Confucianism emphasizes imperial and gentry power, which together define the structure of the ruling social hierarchy, Confucian personal ethics stresses family values and a system of personal ethics, which Tu sees as the true essence of Confucian culture. According to Confucian personal ethics, it is imperative to obey family elders, and the ultimate objective of one's personal behavior is to honor one's ancestors. In order to bring honor to the family, it is also imperative to take on the responsibility of bearing children and continuing the family line. Finally, in one's social relations, tone must respect the opinions of non-family elders and the educated, so that a harmonious and well-ordered society can be preserved. There is a clear connection between Confucian personal ethics and political Confucianism, such that the former serves as the sociocultural base of the latter. Whereas the essence of the argument of the cultural relativists, as outlined above, is that political Confucianism is incompatible with democratic institutions, we examine Confucian personal ethics as potentially at odds with democratic values.

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[36]Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell, eds., *The East Asian Challenge for Human Rights* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); and Weiming Tu, ed., *Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996).

[37]Chong-Min Park and Doh Chull Shin, "Do Asian Values Deter Popular Support for Democracy? The Case of South Korea" (Paper presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, March 4-7, 2004).

[38]Cited in Fukuyama, "Confucianism and Democracy," 26.

In our survey, there are six questions corresponding to most, if not all, of the aspects of the personal ethics outlined above. Each question was designed around a four-point scale, consisting of "highly disagree," "disagree," "agree," and "strongly agree." For the sake of statistical analysis, the four response categories are given numerical values: "highly disagree" is given -2 points, "disagree" -1 point, "don't know" 0 points, "agree" 1 point, and "highly agree" 2 points. This conversion allows us to construct a composite index approximating an interval variable tapping into the lingering influence of traditional Confucian ethics observed at the individual level. The higher the average score, the more tradition-oriented, while the lower the average score, the less tradition-oriented.

In table 1, we show the mean scores and standard deviations of the six indicators across urban mainland China, rural mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong, as well as a comparison of the results of our 1993 survey with those of our 2001-02 survey. In terms of the level of modernization, Hong Kong is clearly the most advanced by any measure among the four, Taiwan the second, urban China the third, and rural China the least. On the other hand, in terms of the degree of democratization, Taiwan is the most democratic, Hong Kong is significantly less democratic, and mainland China is the least democratic. There is no significant difference in democratization between rural and urban China, aside from the grass-roots elections implemented in most of rural China in the last decade.

Table 1 shows that, on the macro-institutional level, the six indicators measuring different aspects of Confucian ethics are related to the level of democratization in the four samples. There is also a corresponding relationship between Confucian values and the degree of modernization, in both our 1993 and 2001-02 data. For example, for our 1993 data, the average score of the six indicators for rural China is 0.1674, followed by −0.3010 for urban China, −0.1045 for Taiwan, and −0.2224 for Hong Kong (the last row of table 1). This means that on average people living in rural China were the most tradition-oriented in terms of adherence to Confucian ethics while the people in Hong Kong showed the strongest detachment from Confucian values. The rank order of the four average scores matches that of their respective degrees of modernization perfectly. Our 2001-02

Table 1
Confucian Values in Three Chinese Societies

	1993 Mean (Std.)					2002 Mean (Std.)				
	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Q064 (trad02) Even if parents' demands are unreasonable children still should do what they ask	-0.3140 (1.0461)	-0.6504 (0.9286)	-0.2217 (1.0579)	–	-0.5242 (0.9755)	-0.3216 (1.0174)	-0.4557 (0.9700)	-0.1561 (1.0499)	-0.5379 (0.9373)	-0.6048 (0.9804)
Q065 (trad10) When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends	-0.3065 (0.9742)	-0.6460 (0.8849)	-0.2138 (0.9766)	-0.6394 (0.8961)	-0.6485 (0.9225)	-0.2637 (0.9361)	-0.4272 (0.9144)	-0.0619 (0.9235)	-0.3106 (0.9902)	-0.5396 (1.0094)
Q066 (trad06) When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person	0.2810 (0.9860)	-0.0454 (1.0414)	0.3705 (0.9511)	0.4136 (0.9893)	0.0305 (1.0808)	0.4247 (0.9316)	0.3124 (0.9733)	0.5633 (0.8578)	0.3207 (0.9780)	-0.1422 (1.1143)
Q071 (trad01) If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute	0.7204 (0.8375)	0.3644 (1.0175)	0.8176 (0.7527)	-0.1590 (1.0534)	0.5495 (0.9867)	0.4601 (0.9910)	0.2570 (1.0419)	0.7108 (0.8610)	-0.2828 (0.9832)	0.3636 (1.0538)
Q072 (trad05) When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother	0.1546 (1.0693)	-0.1756 (1.0568)	0.2446 (1.0547)	-0.3180 (1.0258)	0.0469 (1.1089)	0.0280 (1.0542)	-0.1183 (1.0506)	0.2086 (1.0307)	-0.2551 (0.9971)	-0.0946 (1.1372)
CN74E (trad03) Work hard for the fame of family	-0.1346 (0.9937)	-0.6529 (0.8288)	0.0073 (0.9882)	-0.4090 (0.9830)	-0.0812 (1.0678)	-0.3229 (0.9603)	-0.5903 (0.8696)	0.0072 (0.9644)	-0.2146 (1.2002)	-0.3035 (1.0897)
Average	0.0668	-0.3010	0.1674	-0.2224	-0.1045	0.0008	-0.1704	0.2120	-0.2134	-0.2202

Table 1 (Continued)

	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan
			1993～2002 Difference		
Q064 (trad02) Even if parents' demands are unreasonable children still should do what they ask	−0.0076	0.1947	0.0656	−0.5379	−0.0806
Q065 (trad10) When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends	0.0428	0.2188	0.1519	0.3288	0.1089
Q066 (trad06) When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person	0.1437	0.3578	0.1928	−0.0929	−0.1727
Q071 (trad01) If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute	−0.2603	−0.1074	−0.1068	−0.1238	−0.1859
Q072 (trad05) When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother	−0.1266	0.0573	−0.036	0.0929	−0.1415
CN74E (trad03) Work hard for the fame of family	−0.1883	0.0626	−0.0001	0.1944	−0.3847
Average	−0.0661	0.1306	0.0446	0.0090	−0.1157

Source: East Asia Barometer, 2001-2002.

14

data show a nearly identical pattern. People living in rural China were on average most tradition-oriented, followed by urban China, Hong Kong, and then Taiwan as the least Confucian, with average scores of 0.2120, –0.1704, –.2134, and –.2202, respectively. Finally, in terms of the difference between the two time periods, it is interesting to note that only the urban and rural mainland China samples experienced any significant strengthening of Confucian values in the decade between the surveys. We should point out that on a –2 to +2 scale, differences among the four groups are significant but not very substantial. Elements of similarity coexist with elements of dissimilarity, suggesting the influence of their common cultural heritage.

To substantiate our claim that the six indicators are the manifestation of the same latent construct, we perform standard psychometric tests on our Confucian values battery. Factor analysis (using the Direct Oblimin Rotation method) is applied to the six-item battery across the four groups. As shown in table 2, only one factor can be meaningfully extracted out of the responses to the six questions for all four samples. In other words, regardless of whether they are villagers in rural China or residents of the most cosmopolitan part of China, i.e., Hong Kong, the values of people in the three Chinese societies conform to the same factor structure. This provides very strong evidence for the robustness of our measurement.

Democratic Values

Our battery measuring democratic values is based on the five power structure relationships of constitutional liberalism theorized by Professor Fu Hu (　　) as corresponding to democratic values.[39] In Linz and Stepan's framework, modern democratic polities can be divided into three different arenas of contestation. The first is the state, composed of the bureaucratic and law enforcement apparatus exercising state authority. The second is political society, composed of political organizations, such as parties and

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[39]Fu Hu, *Zhengzhi wenhua yu zhengzhi shenghuo* (Political culture and political life) (Taipei: Sanmin, 1998).

Table 2
The Confucianism Dimension in China (Urban and Rural), Hong Kong, and Taiwan (Loadings on First Principal Component in Factor Analysis)

	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Q064A Even if parents' demands are unreasonable, children still should do what they ask	0.61977	0.59435	0.65626	0.51456	0.58394
Q065A When hiring someone, even if a stranger is more qualified, the opportunity should still be given to relatives and friends	0.52450	0.53399	0.42138	0.63516	0.57574
Q066A When one has a conflict with a neighbor, the best way to deal with it is to accommodate the other person	0.51596	0.54238	0.4375	0.56661	0.6122
Q071A If there is a quarrel, we should ask an elder to resolve the dispute	0.60509	0.5673	0.58446	0.66842	0.49437
Q072A When a mother-in-law and a daughter-in-law come into conflict, even if the mother-in-law is in the wrong, the husband should still persuade his wife to obey his mother	0.64106	0.62358	0.65953	0.64775	0.6741
CN74EA Work hard for the fame of family	0.66165	0.65146	0.59002	0.0138	0.65982
Initial Eigenvalues	2.14	2.068	1.924	1.856	2.181
KMO and Bartlett's Test (P-value)	1,806.408 (<=0.001)	886.818 (<=0.001)	595.173 (<=0.001)	294.437 (<=0.001)	806.139 (<=0.001)
% of Variance	35.672	34.461	32.073	30.93	36.357
Analysis N	3,106	1,716	1,390	792	1,364

Source: East Asia Barometer, 2001-2002.

interest groups, performing the functions of interest articulation and aggregation. The third is civil society, made up of social and economic organizations, pursuing their own organizational interests.[40] Democratic systems regulate the principles applying to the power relations between members of political groups in civil society. They also regulate the principles applying to relations between members of the political system and government leaders. Finally, they regulate the principles applying among different parts of the government. From these three arenas, five different kinds of power relations can be used to distinguish democratic from non-democratic value systems.

First, relationships in democratic regimes are founded on the basis of equality, meaning that all people should be treated equally under the law and share the same rights regardless of race, gender, education, wealth, religion, class, or social background. In contrast, the majority of people in many societies adhere to hierarchical social relations, such that particular groups or individuals are entitled to greater political status and can exclude others from the right to participate in political affairs. Second, a democratic government should be responsible to its citizens, since government authority is based on the consent of the people. The majority in many societies, however, cannot accept the notion that the people should control the government, as they fear this arrangement will cause chaos and instability. Third, in Western liberal democratic thought, state power is limited, such that an individual acting within the range of his or her individual rights, especially the rights (freedoms) of speech, action, and movement, is outside the jurisdiction of the state. In contrast, people in many societies do not have these rights (freedoms), and the state intrudes upon their affairs as it wishes. Fourth, most people in Western democracies believe in the right of spontaneous association, and that the state is not allowed to curtail this right using the excuse that it threatens social stability. In some societies, however, people believe that the state should intervene in civil society for

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[40]Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Toward Consolidated Democracies," *Journal of Democracy* 7, no. 2 (1996): 24-33.

the sake of social stability. Finally, Western democratic regimes stress the principle of institutionalized checks and balances to prevent the abuse of state power. This is in contrast to societies in which people believe that undivided state power is necessary to strengthen the state's ability to manage national affairs and intervene in society.

The discussion above highlights five discernible principles: "political equality," "popular sovereignty," "political liberty," "political pluralism," and "the separation of powers." Each of the above indicators is represented by one question. As in the previous section, there are five possible responses to each question: "highly disagree" (2 points), "disagree" (1 point), "don't know" (0 points), "agree" (–1 point), and "highly agree" (–2 points). Since the first question was asked differently from the other four, the scoring was: "highly disagree" for –2 points, "disagree" for –1 points, "agree" for 1 points, "highly agree" for 2 points, and "don't know" for 0 points. Note that unlike the scale used to measure Confucian values, the last four out of the five questions in this battery were asked such that a negative answer represented support for democratic values. Higher total scores indicate stronger democratic values, and lower total scores indicate weaker democratic values.

In table 3, we show descriptive statistics for the above battery of questions. On the whole, the two surveys both show a direct relationship between the strength of democratic value orientations and the extent of democratization. While the Taiwanese sample had the strongest democratic values, Hong Kong had the second strongest, followed by urban China, and then rural China. For example, for our 1993 data, the average score of the five indicators among residents of rural China is –0.4745, followed by –0.1219 for urban China, 0.2051 for Taiwan, and 0.2792 for Hong Kong (for which there were only four questions in 1993). This means that on average people living in rural China were the most tradition-oriented in terms of adherence to democratic values, while the people in Hong Kong showed the strongest attachment to democratic values. The rank order of the four average scores matches their respective degrees of modernization perfectly. Our 2001-02 data show a nearly identical pattern. People living in rural China were on average most tradition-oriented,

Table 3
Democratic Values in Three Chinese Societies

	1993 Mean (Std.)					2002 Mean (Std.)				
	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan
Q132 (sysrg01) People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people	-0.4961 (0.8408)	-0.2086 (0.9714)	-0.5733 (0.7846)	0.0508 (1.0985)	0.2795 (1.0800)	0.8765 (0.6770)	0.9415 (0.6550)	0.7962 (0.6951)	0.8411 (0.7122)	0.9159 (0.8423)
Q133 (sysrg05) Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions	-0.5847 (0.8445)	-0.3307 (0.9947)	-0.6534 (0.7847)	0.5404 (0.9719)	0.3161 (1.0561)	-0.1829 (0.9918)	-0.0209 (1.0208)	-0.3833 (0.9163)	0.3717 (0.9786)	0.3862 (1.0279)
Q134 (sysrg09) The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society	-0.3608 (0.8564)	-0.0176 (1.0033)	-0.4532 (0.7877)	0.4446 (0.9616)	0.2743 (0.9839)	-0.1961 (0.8726)	-0.0764 (0.9276)	-0.3442 (0.7745)	0.3730 (0.9141)	0.4688 (0.9435)
Q135 (sysrg10) Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups	-0.1507 (0.8949)	-0.0886 (0.9903)	-0.1672 (0.8670)	0.0808 (1.0202)	-0.3229 (0.9901)	-0.4559 (0.8646)	-0.5248 (0.8737)	-0.3708 (0.8458)	0.0488 (0.9982)	-0.2268 (1.0533)
Q136 (sysrg07) When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch	-0.4068 (0.9102)	0.0362 (1.0423)	-0.5256 (0.8325)	–	0.4783 (0.9860)	-0.0938 (0.9704)	0.1170 (0.9973)	-0.3545 (0.8682)	0.1277 (0.9969)	0.4196 (1.0247)
Average	-0.3998	-0.1219	-0.4745	0.2792	0.2051	-0.0104	0.0891	-0.1313	0.3525	0.3927

Table 3 (Continued)

	China (overall)	China (urban)	China (rural)	Hong Kong	Taiwan
			1993 ~ 2002 Difference		
Q132 (sysrg01) People with little or no education should have as much say in politics as highly-educated people	1.3726	1.1501	1.3695	0.7903	0.6364
Q133 (sysrg05) Government leaders are like the head of a family; we should all follow their decisions	0.4018	0.3098	0.2701	−0.1687	0.0701
Q134 (sysrg09) The government should decide whether certain ideas should be allowed to be discussed in society	0.1647	−0.0588	0.1090	−0.0716	0.1945
Q135 (sysrg10) Harmony of the community will be disrupted if people organize lots of groups	−0.3052	−0.4362	−0.2036	−0.032	0.0961
Q136 (sysrg07) When judges decide important cases, they should accept the view of the executive branch	0.3130	0.0808	0.1711	0.1277	−0.0587
Average	0.3894	0.2109	0.3432	0.0733	0.1877

Source: East Asia Barometer, 2001-2002.

followed by urban China, Hong Kong, and then Taiwan as the most democratic, with average scores of –0.1313, 0.0891, 0.3525, and 0.3927, respectively. It is interesting to note that of the five indicators of democratic values, people from the three Chinese samples as a whole gave the highest scores to political equality, and the lowest to political pluralism. Finally, in terms of the difference between the two time periods, it is worth noting that democratic consciousness has increased most rapidly on the mainland, while increasing slightly less rapidly in Taiwan, and increasing the least in Hong Kong. An obvious conclusion to draw from this is that the institutional environment in these countries is an important factor in these results, stemming from the deepening of reform and transition to a market economy in China, and the transition to genuine democracy in Taiwan.

The Relevance of Confucian and Democratic Values

To test the structural relationships between Confucian values and democratic values, this paper employs a multiple-regression model. Confucian values and democratic values are our dependent variables, the latter represented by an index based on the cumulative score of the five separate items on democratic values, and the former represented by their factor scores. We choose explanatory variables to address the following concerns. First, can differences in socioeconomic background, such as gender, age, education, and degree of modernization, account for different levels of Confucian and democratic values? Second, are Confucian and democratic values related to one another? Finally, will traditional culture in East Asian societies be an obstacle to the further development of democratic consciousness?

Socioeconomic Background, Confucian Values, and Democratic Values

Table 4 shows how socioeconomic background and Confucian values account for varying levels of democratic values across the samples. In the multiple-regression model, we find that these independent variables can explain the degree (high or low) of democratic consciousness. In both the

Table 4
Influence of Confucian Values on Democratic Values: Multiple-Regression Analysis

Regions	China (Overall)		China (Urban)		China (Rural)		Hong Kong		Taiwan	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (M)	0.191	0.076*	0.425	0.107***	-0.01	0.104	0.466	0.187*	0.292	0.15
Age	-0.001	0.003	0.003	0.004	-0.017	0.004***	-0.006	0.008	-0.006	0.006
Years of education	0.082	0.01***	0.106	0.015***	-0.007	0.016	0.182	0.024***	0.099	0.023****
Confucianism	-0.785	0.042***	-0.813	0.057***	-0.545	0.053***	-0.967	0.098***	-0.725	0.087***
(Constant)	-0.713	0.169***	-0.909	0.276**	0.119	0.227	0.099	0.503	1.025	0.436*
Adjusted R^2	0.199		0.204		0.105		0.292		0.119	
N	2,987		1,655		1,331		744		1,208	

Dependent variable: Democratic Values

Note: *Signif. LE .05, **Signif. LE .01, ***Signif. LE .001

Source: East Asia Barometer, 2001-2002.

Hong Kong and urban China samples, more than 20 percent of the variance is explained (adjusted R^2 of .292 and .204, respectively), while the model does not fit the Taiwan and rural China samples as well, with the former explained better than the latter (adjusted R^2 of .119 and .105, respectively). In table 4, we have ranked the independent variables in terms of their effect on democratic values in increasing order: gender, age, years of education, and Confucian values (with the strongest effect). The Beta coefficients for Confucian values for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China, and rural China are –.967, –.725, –.813 and –.545, respectively. This means that people with stronger Confucian values have less attachment to constitutional liberalism, and vice versa. This result is mirrored in years of education, whose Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China, and the entirety of China are .182, .099, .106 and –0.007, respectively. This indicates that people with less education have weaker democratic consciousness, and vice versa. Age is an effective variable only for rural China, and gender has little explanatory power aside from urban China and Hong Kong.

Table 5 shows how socioeconomic background and democratic values account for varying levels of Confucian values across the samples. In the multiple-regression model, we find that these independent variables can explain the degree (high or low) of Confucian values. In the Hong Kong, Taiwan, and urban China samples, more than 20 percent of the variance is explained (adjusted R^2 of .253, .246 and .243, respectively), while the model does not fit the rural China sample as well (adjusted R^2 of .18). In table 5, we have ranked the independent variables in terms of their effect on Confucian values in increasing order: gender, age, years of education, and democratic values (with the strongest effect). The Beta coefficients for democratic values for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China, and rural China are –.119, –.76, –.135 and –.136, respectively. This means that people with stronger attachment to constitutional liberalism have weaker Confucian values, and vice versa. This result is mirrored in years of education, whose Beta coefficients for Hong Kong, Taiwan, urban China, and the entirety of China are –0.042, –0.79, –0.071, and –0.074, respectively. This indicates that people with more education have weaker Confucian

Table 5
Influence of Democratic Values on Confucian Values: Multiple-Regression Analysis

					Dependent variable: Confucianism					
Regions	China (Overall)		China (Urban)		China (Rural)		Hong Kong		Taiwan	
Independent Variables	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.	Beta	S.E.
Gender (M)	0.095	0.031**	0.031	0.044	0.148	0.051**	0.282	0.065***	0.262	0.048***
Age	-0.001	0.001	-0.001	0.002	0.004	0.002*	0.003	0.003	0.008	0.002***
Years of education	-0.082	0.004***	-0.071	0.006***	-0.074	0.008***	-0.042	0.009***	-0.79	0.007***
Democratic values	-0.136	0.007***	-0.135	0.009***	-0.136	0.013***	-0.119	0.012***	-0.76	0.009***
(Constant)	0.603	0.07***	0.743	0.112***	0.037	0.113	0.35	0.176	0.497	0.14***
Adjusted R^2	0.286		0.243		0.18		0.253		0.246	
N	2,987		1,655		1,331		744		1,208	

Note: *Signif. LE .05, **Signif. LE .01, ***Signif. LE .001

Source: East Asia Barometer, 2001-2002.

values, and vice versa. Gender is an effective variable in all samples except for urban China, and age has little explanatory power aside from Taiwan and rural China.

Conclusion

While it is not surprising that traditional Confucian values remain strong in the face of democratization, modernization will cause shifts in Confucian values, albeit not across the board. Its effect on Confucianism will be non-linear and very difficult to measure, let alone predict, since long-term historical processes have cultivated deeply entrenched traditional and cultural systems that hinder change, especially changes that directly undermine existing political institutions.[41] As Brian Girvin points out, when the established political culture meets pressures that force it to change, the micro-level culture will change first, followed by the meso-level culture, and finally the macro-level culture, composed of highly resilient collective values, goals, and symbols, built on the beliefs of the entire society.[42]

More importantly, as the cultural relativists argue, Confucian values and democratic consciousness are incongruous value systems. The results of this paper have shown that Confucian values might be an obstacle to the further development of democratic consciousness in the three Chinese societies. Nevertheless, we need not be too pessimistic about the future of democracy in mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong. On the one hand, modernization will have a dampening effect on traditional values, as shown by how highly modernized Hong Kong and Taiwan show less support for Confucian values than mainland China does. On the other hand, our results demonstrate that education has an important role in the development of

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[41]Larry Diamond, "Political Culture and Democracy," in *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries*, ed. Larry Diamond (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1993), 13.

[42]Brian Girvin, "Change and Continuity in Liberal Democratic Political Culture," in *Contemporary Political Culture*, ed. John R. Gibbins (London: Sage, 1989), 34-36.

democratic consciousness. As education rises, democratic consciousness increases, and the same point holds in reverse: lower education results in lower democratic consciousness. As mainland China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong continue to make progress along the road of democratization, these two factors will broaden the social, political, and economic space necessary for the further development of democracy.

Appendix 1
A Note on the Methodology of EAB Survey in Three Chinese Societies

The East Asia Barometer Survey

The three surveys were administered under the auspices of the project "Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes in East Asia" (also known as East Asia Barometer Survey). The project was launched in summer 2000 and funded by the Ministry of Education (MOE) under the MOE-NSC (National Science Council) Program for Promoting Academic Excellence of Universities, and is headquartered at the Department of Political Science of National Taiwan University (NTU) in Taipei and under the co-directorship of Professors Fu Hu (   ) and Yun-han Chu (   ) of NTU. The project involves eight country teams and more than thirty leading scholars from across the region and the United States. Coordination for the surveys was also supported by supplementary funding from NTU, the Academia Sinica (   ), and various national funding agencies across East Asia.

Leaders of the eight local teams and the international consultants collaboratively drew up a 125-item core questionnaire designed for a 40-45-minute face-to-face interview. The survey was designed in English and translated into local languages by the national teams. Between July 2001 and February 2003, the collaborating national teams administered one or more waves of this survey in eight Asian countries or territories—Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Thailand, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and the PRC—countries that have experienced different trajectories of regime evolution and are currently at different stages of political transition.

The Taiwan Survey. The Taiwan survey was conducted in June-July 2001, by the Comparative Study of Democratization and Value Changes project office at NTU. The target population was defined as ROC citizens aged 20 and over who had the right to vote. This population was sampled according to the Probabilities Proportionate to Size (PPS) method in three stages: towns/counties (/   ),

villages/*li* (/   ), and individual voters. Taiwan was divided into eight statistically distinct divisions. Within each division four, six, or eight towns/counties were selected; from each of these two villages/*li* were selected; and in each of these between thirteen and sixteen individuals (not households) were sampled. In the municipalities of Taipei (   ) and Kaohsiung (   ), only *li* and individuals were sampled.

The sampling design called for 1,416 valid interviews. In order to replace respondents who could not be contacted or refused to be interviewed, a supplementary pool of fifteen times the size of the original sample was taken. If a respondent could not be interviewed, he or she was replaced by a person from the supplementary pool of the same gender and age. Seven hundred and fourteen of the original sample of 1,416 were successfully interviewed for a success rate of 50.4 percent for the original sample. To produce the other 701 successful cases, a total of 1,727 supplementary respondents were contacted. Overall, we attempted to interview a total of 3,143 people and successfully completed 1,415 interviews for a response rate of 45.0 percent.

In a chi-square test, the sample failed to reflect the characteristics of the sampled population on the dimensions of age and education. It oversampled citizens between the ages of 30 and 50, and those with educational levels of senior high school and above. Although the sample passed the chi-square test for gender, it contained about 4 percent fewer males and 4 percent more females than expected. Weighting variables for the sample were therefore calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.[a]

The questionnaire used in Taiwan was composed of two main parts: the core questionnaire used in all participating countries and a supplemental module employed in the three predominantly Chinese societies of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong.

The interviews were conducted by 140 interviewers, all of whom were university students. Over 300 students interviewed for these jobs, and we chose among these applicants based on their ability to communicate in both Mandarin and Taiwanese, previous interviewing experience, and our geographical needs. These interviewers were overseen by fifteen supervisors, most of whom had previously served as interviewers in a survey on the 2000 presidential election. All interviewers attended a day-long training session.

More than 64 percent of the interviews were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Mandarin; 14.1 percent were conducted predominantly or exclusively in Taiwanese; 20.5 percent of the interviews used a mixture of Mandarin and

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[a]Raking is a procedure to bring row and column totals of a table of survey estimates into close agreement with independent estimates of those totals by adjusting the entries in the table.

Taiwanese; and the remaining 0.6 percent were conducted in other languages.

To check the quality of the data collected, we conducted post-tests of all 1,415 cases: 15 percent of these were done in person, and the other 85 percent were conducted by telephone. Kappa values for all eight of the variables retested ranged between .328 (fair) and .860 (almost perfect). None of the kappa values fell in the "poor" or "slight" ranges, evidence that the data possess a fairly high degree of internal validity.

The Hong Kong Survey. The Hong Kong survey was conducted in September-December 2001 by Kuan Hsin-chi (　　) and Lau Siu-kai (　　) under the auspices of the Hong Kong Institute of Asia-Pacific Studies, the Chinese University of Hong Kong. It yielded 811 valid cases out of 1,651 sampled cases for a response rate of 49.12 percent. The target population was defined as Hong Kong people aged 20 to 75 residing in permanent residential living quarters in built-up areas. The sampling method involved a multistage design. First, a sample of 2,000 residential addresses from the computerized Sub-Frame of Living Quarters maintained by the Census and Statistics Department was selected. In selecting the sample, living quarters were first stratified with respect to area and type of housing. The sample of quarters selected is of the EPSEM (equal probability of selection method) type and is random in the statistical sense. Where a selected address had more than one household with persons aged 20 to 75, or was a group household (such as a hostel), a random numbers table pre-attached to each address was used to select one household or one person. If the drawn household had more than one person aged 20 to 75, a random selection grid, i.e., the modified Kish Grid, was employed to select one interviewee. A face-to-face interview was conducted to complete the questionnaire. The interviewers were recruited from the student body of the Chinese University. Apart from the core items, the questionnaire contained questions unique to the local context of Hong Kong.

SPSS nonparametric chi-square tests were conducted to compare the gender, age, and educational attainment of the sample with the same attributes of the target population as reported in the Hong Kong 2001 population census. The gender and educational attainment distributions of the sample did not differ significantly from those of the target population. Raking was used to generate a weighting variable to correct for the underrepresentation of the younger age group (aged between 20 and 39) in the sample.

The China Survey. The China survey was conducted in March-June 2002 in cooperation with the Institute of Sociology of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. It yielded 3,183 valid cases out of 3,752 sampled cases for a response rate of 84.1 percent. The sample represents the adult population over 18 years of age residing in family households at the time of the survey, excluding those living in the Tibetan Autonomous Region. A stratified multistage area sampling procedure with probabilities proportional to size measures (PPS) was employed

to select the sample.

The Primary Sampling Units (PSUs) employed in the sample design are counties (, *xian*) in rural areas and cities (, *shi*) in urban areas. In province-level municipalities, districts (, *qu*) were used as PSU. Before selection, counties were stratified by region and geographical characteristic, and cities or districts by region and size. A total of sixty-seven cities or districts and sixty-two counties were selected as the primary sampling units. The secondary sampling units (SSUs) were townships (, *xiang*) and districts (*qu*) or streets (, *jiedao*). The third stage of selection was geared to administrative villages in rural areas and neighborhood committees (, *juweihui*) or community committees (, *shequ weiyuanhui*) in urban areas. We selected 249 administrative villages and 247 neighborhood or community committees in the third stage of the sampling process. A total of 496 sampling units were selected. Households were used at the fourth stage of sampling.

In the selection of PSUs, the National Statistical Bureau's 1999 volume of population statistics[b] was used as the basic source for constructing the sampling frame. The number of family households for each county or city was taken as the measure of size (MOS) in the PPS selection process. For the successive stages of sampling, population data were obtained from the All-China Women's Federation (ACWF,   ), using data collected by that organization for a 2000 survey on women's status in China. For areas not covered in the ACWF survey, we asked local ACWF chapters to collect sampling data for us. At village and neighborhood committee levels, household registration (, *hukou*) lists were obtained. The lists were used as the sampling frame for the fourth stage of the sampling process.

The response rate for urban areas was lower than that for the rural areas. For urban areas, the response rate was 82.5 percent, and in rural areas it was 86.5 percent. Weighting variables for the sample were calculated along the three dimensions of gender, age, and educational level using the method of raking.

The questionnaire used in mainland China varied from the core questionnaire used in other societies in two ways. First, for all the questions in the core questionnaire asking respondents to compare the current situation in their society to that of the authoritarian past, we asked respondents to compare the current situation to that in the Mao era. Second, the questionnaire included additional questions used in our 1993 mainland China survey, to facilitate possible cross-time comparison.

Retired middle school teachers were employed as interviewers for the survey. Before interviews began, our collaborators in China contacted the association of

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[b]National Bureau of Statistics, *Zhongguo renkou tongji nianjian* (Yearbook of population statistics of China) (Beijing: Zhongguo tongji chubanshe, 1999).

retired middle school teachers in the Dongcheng (   ) and Haidian (   ) districts of Beijing to ask their help in identifying newly retired teachers. We invited retired teachers aged 55 to 62 to apply for jobs as interviewers. About 150 retired teachers applied, and we chose 67 as interviewers. The interviewers went through an intensive training program, which introduced basic concepts of social science research, survey sampling, and interview techniques, and familiarized them with the questionnaire to be used in the survey. After a course of lectures, the interviewers practiced among themselves and then conducted practice interviews with residents of a rural village near Beijing. At the end of the training course, interviewers were subjected to a rigorous test.

The mainland team adopted two measures of quality control. First, we sent letters to prospective respondents, stating that an interviewer would come to his or her home to conduct an interview within a month. The letter included a self-addressed envelope and an evaluation form asking the respondent to report (1) whether the interviewer arrived as promised, and (2) the respondent's evaluation of the interviewer's attitude toward his or her job. Second, field supervisors randomly checked 5 percent of respondents to evaluate the quality of the interview. We informed interviewers about the control mechanisms to deter them from cheating.

Mandarin was used for most interviews. To interview respondents unable to understand Mandarin, interviewers were authorized to hire interpreters.

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