行政院國家科學委員會補助國內專家學者出席國際學術會議報告

報告人姓名	張漢良	服務機構及職稱	台大外文系(所)教授
時間 會議 地點	2001 年 9 月 19 日至 21 日 義大利比薩大學	本會核定 補助文號	NSC89-2411-H-002-087
會議 名稱	(中文) 主體性面面觀 (英文) Dimensions of Subjectivity		
發表 論文 題目	(中文) 哲學論爭的互為主體及意識型態問題 (英文) "Intersubjectivity in Controversy: A Story from the Taoist Philosopher Zhuangzi", Or, "Ideologeme or Sememe? – Discursive Constraints on Polemical Subjectivity" (附件三)		

報告內容應包括下列各項:

一、<u>會議背景</u>

　　本人承國科會補助執行「哲學性對話專題研究」(NSC89-2411-H-002-087),第一年度計畫原訂於民國 89 年 8 月 1 日至 90 年 7 月 31 日執行,其中包含出席國際會議經費新台幣 120,000 元。原出國計畫中,包括出席本人所參與之「哲學論爭國際研究群」所舉辦之國際會議,訂於 90 年 4 月在印度召開。後因計畫變更,改訂於 90 年 9 月 19 日至 21 日假義大利比薩大學舉行。因此本人前曾致函國科會,請求同意計畫變更,並承國科會函覆同意在案(附件一)。

　　哲學論爭國際研究群由以色列特拉維夫大學達斯卡教授(Prof. Marcello Dascal)發起,目的在研究思想史(包括科學史)上的重要論爭。該研究群會員有以色列、義大利、法國、德國、美國、瑞典、巴西、墨西哥等國學者,原則上每年配合大型國際會議在各地舉行。今年 9 月由義大利比薩大學哲學系、佛羅倫斯大學現代語言學系共同主辦,會議分別在比薩 (Pisa) 及盧卡 (Lucca) 二地舉行。案比薩大學哲學系有一個「主體性研究」中心,該系巴洛塔教授(Prof. Pierluigi Barrotta)為本研究群成員,本次會議由其策劃,主題為「主體性面面觀」(Dimensions of Subjectivity)。本次會議為中型研究會議,除了研究群成員外,主辦單位並邀請如 Karl Otto Apel 等當代重要哲學家共襄盛舉。全程共發表論文 25 篇(附件二)。

比薩大學創辦於十三世紀，為歐洲古老大學之一。該校在歷史上出現的重要學者不乏其人，最有名者當推伽利略(Galileo Galilei)，其與羅馬教會之論爭，是西方哲學史上極有影響力的事件，為後世學者文人不斷討論、詮釋；因此，哲學會議在比薩大學召開，有深遠的意義。

二、會議經過

　　本人於 9 月 15 日由英國轉赴義大利，由於 911 事件發生後不久，航空旅行管制嚴格，增加不少旅途上的困難。當天抵達比薩，進駐主辦單位提供之旅館 Royal Victoria。

　　會議於 19 日上午 9 時在比薩大學「古會堂」(Aula Magna Storica) 舉行，由大會主辦人 Massimo Barale 引介比薩大學校長致歡迎詞，開幕後由 Apel 教授發表主題演講。本會議因係研究性會議，論文發表未再分多場同時進行，全體與會學者皆參與、聆聽及討論。本會議有一特色，發表之論文分別由德、法、義及英文四種語文撰寫及宣讀，全場無同步口譯或其他翻譯之服務，顯然假設與會學者均能充分運用四種語言。本人語言條件不足，在德語及義大利語論文發表時，面臨很大的困難，這是本人參與無數學術會議以來最獨特的經驗之一。

　　為期三天的會議中，一半以上的論文是以德語、法語、義大利語發表，另一半以英語發表。其中有二篇德文論文論及主體性的自然化問題(naturalization of subjectivity)，引進當前自然科學對意識及主體性的新研究，發表的學者為瑞士伯恩大學的 Eduard Marbach 教授，以及德國杜賓根大學之 Manfred Frank 教授。本人對二位學者討論之課題極感興趣，然僅能一知半解，深感遺憾。

　　大會於 9 月 21 日移師盧卡。案盧卡為一保留完整之中世紀小城，該地為歌劇家普契尼(Puccini)之故鄉，文藝風氣鼎盛。盧卡市當局對本次會議頗為重視，提供不少人力與物力上之資助。本人於 21 日上午 9 時 30 分之場次發表論文，題目為 "Intersubjectivity in Controversy: A Story from the Taoist Philosopher Zhuangzi", or, "Ideologeme or Sememe? – Discursive Constraints on Polemical Subjectivity"。

　　本人發表之論文是承接前此國科會「符號學史研究」計畫而來，研究群召集人達斯卡教授希望本人討論中國哲學史上之論爭問題。因此論文選擇之語料為《莊子》中的哲學論爭。莊子與惠子之對話可顯示哲學論爭上互為主體(intersubjectivity)以及意識形態和對話結構之間的辯證關係。論文主要的理論架構分二部分，第一部分討論互為主體性(intersubjectivity)究竟是 I-thou 的二元關係，如本維尼斯特(Emile Benveniste)所述；或係你、我、他三元關係，如法國哲學家賈克(Francis Jacques)修正本維尼斯特方案後所云。本文從言談結構出發，批判賈克之神學三位一體論有違語言學的基本理念。第二部分討論到底言談及對話之中，意識形態扮演了什麼角色；論文特別討論巴赫汀(M.M. Bahktin)和克莉斯蒂娃(Julia Kristeva)二人所提出之意識形態元(ideologeme)所扮演的形式主義功能。

　　因成稿倉促，論文第二部分未能充分發揮，有待補強。雖然如此，與會學者對本人論文反應頗為熱烈，Frederic Cossutta 有意翻譯為法文，在其主編之哲學對話文集中出版，此事值得一記。

　　本次會議論文即將由主辦單位覓求出版社在義大利出版。

三、感想：

1、過去十年，國內研究主體性者不絕如縷，其理論架構泰半係由美國引進之法國精神分析學說，但對主體性其他角度之考察，如自然科學方面，國內似乎尚未有人介紹。

2、此外，Apel 的論文從歐陸超越哲學的觀點出發，對美國之新實證主義提出頗為嚴厲之批判。案 Apel 為與迦達瑪(Hans-Georg Gadamer)齊名之重要詮釋哲學家，老而彌佳。大體上，此次會議是以胡塞爾(Husserl)哲學傳統為主力。參與之德國學者多對英美分析哲學提出針貶。

3、哲學與語言學之間的傾軋，在歷史上源遠流長。本人覺得與會的哲學家在討論主體性的語言結構時，未能充分掌握及發揮現代語言學之長處，比方說，雅克慎(Jakobson)規模耶斯裴森 (Jespersen) 的轉換詞(shifters)觀念，對主體的認知頗有發現。達斯卡教授特別提出自我批判的心理實證學(psychopragmatics)，但是對心理實證學和心理語言學(psycholinguistics)之間的差異，卻未能提出明確的區分，同時對心理學及精神分析截至目前為止，已提出之貢獻也未能充分援用。這是科際之間的鴻溝需要進一步跨越的明顯例證。

4、本研究群訂於明年 7 月 1 日假瑞士盧卡諾舉行下屆研討會。

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
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COMUNE DI LUCCA

Dimensioni
della
Soggettività

**Pisa e Lucca
19-21 Settembre 2001**

Ore 9,00   Indirizzo di saluto

Ore 9,30   Presiede: **MASSIMO BARALE** (Pisa).

KARL OTTO APEL (Frankfurt)
Transzendentale Inter-subjektivität und das Defizit einer Reflexionstheorie in der Philosophie der Gegenwart

CLAUDIO CESA (Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore)
Il soggetto e l'assoluto: tra Germania e Italia

VIRGILIO MELCHIORRE (Milano, Università Cattolica)
Io e mondo. Per un'analisi trascendentale

Ore 12,15   Discussione

Ore 15,30   Presiede: **GIUSEPPE CANTILLO** (Napoli)

MANFRED FRANK (Tübingen)
Selbstgefühl: zur präreflexivistischen Theorie des Selbstbewusstseins im 18. Jahrhundert

EUGENIO LECALDANO (Roma, La Sapienza)
Soggetto morale e identità personale

Ore 17,15   Discussione

Ore 18,00   Presiede: **REMO BODEI** (Pisa)

ANDRÉ PESSEL (Paris)
Montaigne Pascal, Spinoza: la résistance à l'idée du sujet comme principe

HÉLÈNE VÉDRINE (Paris, Sorbonne)
Sujet, subjectivité et imagination

Ore 19,30   Discussione

Ore 9,00   Presiede: **CLAUDIO CESA** (Pisa, Scuola Normale Superiore)

EDUARD MARBACH (Berne)
Lässt sich Subjektivität naturalisieren? Überlegungen im Ausgang von Husserl.

DIETER LOHMAR (Köln)
Begriff, Anschauung und Selbstaffektion

Ore 10,45   Discussione

Ore 11,15   Presiede: **MICHELE CILIBERTO** (Pisa)

FRANCESCO SAVERIO TRINCIA (Roma)
Io psicologico e io trascendentale nella "Crisi" di E. Husserl

MASSIMO BARALE (Pisa)
Forme di soggettività e modelli di razionalità

Discutere con se stessi

Ore 15,30   Presiede: **ALESSANDRO FERRARA** (Parma)

MARCELO DASCAL (Tel Aviv)
On the psychopragmatics of self-criticism

ADEMAR FERREIRA (São Paulo)
Scientific controversies of a subject with him - or herself

FREDERIC COSSUTTA (Paris XIII)
Controversies and dialogic intersubjectivity

SHAY FROGEL (Tel Aviv)
Disagreement, self-agreement, and self-deception

Ore 9,15   Saluto del Sindaco di Lucca dott. **PIETRO F**...

La Prima persona

Ore 9,30   Presiede: **MARCELO DASCAL** (Tel-Aviv)

ADELINO CATTANI (Padova)
Subjectivist interpretations of controversy-b... classical thought

HAN-LIANG CHANG (Taiwan)
Inter-subjectivity in controversy: A story] the Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi (Chuang]

YARON SENDEROWICZ (Tel Aviv)
Externalism, internalism, and self-knowled...

GERD FRITZ (Giessen)
First person singular in 17th century controve...

THOMAS GLONING (Marburg)
Early modern theories of controversy: The r... of the game and the role of the persons into...

Il soggetto politico

Ore 15,30   Presiede: **SEBASTIANO MAFFETTONE** (Roma, LU...)

PIERLUIGI BARROTTA (Pisa)
The controversy between liberals and commu... tarians on the notion of the self

LEÓN OLIVÉ (Ciudad de México)
The Sokal affair: The role of subjectivity in s... ping the controversy

OMAR BARGHOUTI (Tel Aviv)
Ethical implications of de-dichotomization ... identities in conflict

ALAN G. GROSS (St. Paul, Minnesota)
The role of subjectivity in public controve... over national identity)

YVES-CHARLES ZARKA (Paris, C.N.R.S.)
The two ways of subjectivity in the 17th cent... The source of the controversies

Inter-subjectivity in Controversy:

A story from the Taoist Philosopher Zhuangzi

Or, Ideologeme or sememe?
--Discursive constraints on polemical subjectivity

Professor Han-liang Chang

National Taiwan University

Paper presented at "Dimensions of Subjectivity" the International Conference on the Study of Controversies

University of Pisa, Italy

19-21 September 2001

The topic I originally submitted to our IASC leader organizing committee as you have seen from the Programme, is "Inter-subjectivity in Controversy: A story from the Taoist Philosopher Zhuangzi." I chose to use the word "intersubjectivity" rather than "subjectivity" because it seemed to me that controversy and subjectivity make strange bed fellows and need much negotiation. Whilst etymologically "controversy" already means "contradiction," a discursive situation in which two voices are set against each other precludes the articulation of subjectivity, unless "subjectivity" means "contra-subjectivity," a term hitherto unused perhaps for its implied violence.

On the other hand, "controversy" and "intersubjectivity" seem to go hand in hand or in any event are mutually implicative. Communicational ethics aside, discursive exchange deprives the interlocutors of autonomous, solipsistic subjectivity and replaces it with intersubjectivity. Now what is intersubjectivity? Is it a phenomenological category? psychological category? or ideological category? The answer to all these questions can be positive depending on the nature and scientific enquiries.

According to Emile Benveniste, subjectivity is a pronominal category and discourse as language socialized necessarily presupposes the participation of interlocutors and interaction between the two parties which are reciprocally registered as pronominal I-Thou. Now since dialogue suggests logos carried across by multi-vocality rather than shared -- so goes the corruption -- by bi-vocality, the subjectivity of dialogue is multi-faceted and multi-voiced. The interlocutors that constitute this trans-subjectivity are mutually implicated, interfered, and contaminated in ideology and shape of belief. A polemics involving Benveniste and his critic Francis Jacques is whether dialogue is performed by the two persons involved in the speech situation or involves an absent third person. I shall dwell on their debate.

Because neither Benveniste nor Jacques is concerned with the ideological dimension in discourse, I shall avail myself of the concept of ideologeme in Mikhail M. Bakhtin's and Julia Kristeva's discussions of intersubjectivity and intertextuality under the term ideologeme," and finally re-enact the famous debate on intersubjectivity between the Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi (Master Zhuang) and his dialectician opponent Huizi (Master Hui) in the China of approximately the third century B.C. My ultimate concern is to inquire whether it is ideology that constitutes discourse or, the other way around, whether discourse lays formal constraints upon ideology, or they intersect as deployment of ideologemes.

The first volume of Benveniste's *Problems in General Linguistics* (French 1966, English translation, 1971) contains five chapters (chs. 18-23) which deal with, and are accordingly put under the general heading of, "Man and Language." Among the numerous topics to which the author addresses, relevant to us are (1) subjectivity in language or, more precisely, discourse, and (2) human subjects as pronominal categories. Rather than rehearsing the Saussurian distinction between *langue* and *parole*, Benveniste is concerned with *discours* (discourse). His argument can be summarized as follows. Performed by human agents, discourse is language in action (223), it is an "act of speech" (224). One could say that man constitutes himself as a "subject" in and through language, i.e., speech or discourse. It goes without saying that Benveniste's use of discourse is different from the American stylistic use of the term in discourse analysis beyond the sentential level, and has little to do, though it may lead to, the Foucaultian discourse charged with power. Benveniste observes whether "subjectivity" is placed in phenomenology or psychology, it emerges "as a fundamental property of language." (Ibid.) Finally, the foundation of "subjectivity" is determined by the linguistic status of "person." (Ibid.) In other words, subjectivity is to begin with a problem of pronouns.

Benveniste further distinguishes between the personal and a-personal systems in the pronominal category. The persons that construct, and are thus involved in, the discursive situation are the first-person "I" and the second-person "you," while "he" or "she" is reduced to the a-personal (217ff).[1] Jakobson (1956 [1971]), following Otto Jespersen (1922),[2] terms these personal pronouns "shifters" precisely because of the shifting role they play in identifying and defining human relationship which confuses children. Jespersen does not restrict shifters to personal pronouns though he admits they are the most important class. This class of words which puzzles children in their language acquisition includes father, mother, enemy, and home. He observes, "A class of words which parents grave difficulty to children are those whose meaning differs according to the situation, so that the child hears them now applied to one thing and now to another." (1922, 123). The child says I, but hears his allocutor also

says "I" and is confused.   According to Jakobson, discursive categories which imply a reference to the speech event (procés de l'énonciation) are "shifters" (134).   A notable example would be a situation which involves both the narrated person and the speech performer.   As he observes, " [F]irst person signals the identity of a participant of the narrated event with the performer of the speech event, and the second person, the identity with the actual or potential undergoer of the speech event." (Ibid.)   Both persons are therefore "marked," not only by the indexical signs of "I" and "you" because for that matter the third person is also likewise marked by a "he" or "she" but also by the discursive and dialogic reciprocity which serves to construct their subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

We shall return to the discursive situatedness and its relation to ideology later. For now, we ought to consider the alternative project of Francis Jacques who bases his theory on Benveniste but takes a polemic thrust against the latter.   Unlike Benveniste who has reduced the third person to a non-person because of its absence from the speech situation, Jacques tries to reinstate this third person in order to construct a theological trinity of subjectivity via the neat-looking tripartition of the pronominal (127).[3]   There are two main points on which Jacques takes issue with Benveniste: first, the relationship between utterance and subjectivity, and second, the role of the third person.   I shall examine these in turn.

Jacques criticizes Benveniste's claim that "utterance . . . installs subjectivity within discourse" for being "clumsy" and "in the final analysis, inaccurate." (1991, 6). He says and I quote, "For the language user does not immediately establish his or her subjective reality simply by saying I.   The meaning of I is not created at the moment when the speaker appropriates the first-person singular pronoun to designate him or herself, and thereby bear witness to his or her presence.   To believe otherwise would be to forget that the speaker's activation of language conventionally occurs within a dialogue.   In other words, at the moment when language's potential for conversion into discourse is realized in the act of utterance, what is inserted into the statement is not the speaker alone but the speakers, plural.   Or better, what is created is the completely inescapable interlocutive relationship which links them together and constitutes them as co-utterers." (Ibid., emphasis mine.)

Jacques is quite right in pinpointing the essentially dialogic structure of language's social use.   However, one suspects there is an innate linguistic competence before human communication: as *homo loquens*, man is endowed with that competence, and it qualifies him as human subject in the first place.   This competence Benveniste terms, as we shall see, capacity."   Therefore, the issue can be complicated by a series of transformations from linguistic competence to performance, from subjectivity established by the enunciating subject and intersubjectivity

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established through human interlocutive relationship, the latter involving such psychological mechanisms as mirror identification, miscognition, and interpellation. To untangle the issues, it would require, among other things, the discovery procedures of pyscho-linguistics and pragmatics, if not psychoanalysis. The preliminary observation one might make here is that enunciation does not amount to monologue or dialogue but serves as its foundation, indeed the very foundation of all linguistic signification and communication. It is a manifestation of corporeality, in the manner of mobilization and discharge of physical energy, known as articulation. This physical aspect of language belongs to semiotic firstness, so to speak, irrespective of the participation of secondness, i.e., without the subject's, say, the child's being apellated. When a person, be he male or female, newly born or moribund, utters a sound, however incomprehensible and meaningless, he announces his existence as a human subject though not yet "subjectivity." Note that Benveniste does not say "immediately" and "simply" when he observes, "The 'subjectivity' we are discussing here is the capacity of the speaker to posit him as 'subject.' (la capacité du locuteur ? se poser comme ⟨sujet⟩.) It is defined not by the feeling which everyone experiences of being himself . . . but as the psychic unity that transcends the totality of the actual experiences it assembles and that makes the permanence of the consciousness." (224, emphasis mine). What follows from this initial enunciation is appropriately interpersonal discourse which Benveniste defines in terms of I-Thou relationship. Posing the human capacity of enunciation does not suggest, as Jacques has put into Benveniste mouth, a transcendental I. Nor does it mean that subjectivity can be equated to enunciation. In fact, subjectivity develops along with the sophistication and socialization of enunciation, such as the distinction between enunciation (*énonciation*) and enunciated (*énoncé*), locutor, allocutor, and interlocutor. That's where and why Benveniste introduces the second person. Ideology gets involved only when this semiotic secondness has a role to play. One cannot reverse the order of first and second persons; nor can one, at any rate, valorize the third person who is not available in the speech situation. The a priori category which Jacques posits instead of the first person is *primum relationis*.

> [T]he human relation is indeed primordial . . . The relation is independence of its components, and in principle it even takes priority over them. (117).

"Indeed, a relation no longer has to be conceived of only as an emergent reality, one derived to a certain extent from the terms from which it emerges; it can also be seen as primary. In that case, the relation calls its terms into existence, constituting them and establishing them on either side of itself." (122) Several reservations can be

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raised about his postulate. First, the *a priorines* of this triangular structure. Then, the total independence of the structure from its components as if the latter did not have any semantic value, and as such, had no effect on the structure and would not cause its mutation. To many, both critiques would sound familiar because they seem to be rehearsing the well-known semanticist critique of grammarians in the history of structuralism. In fact, there is nothing wrong with structural thinking, and between binary dyad and tertiary triad there is no winner, just as in semiotics one can opt for the model of a Saussure or that of a Peirce. The problem with Jacques model is that it is neither linguistic, nor logical, but theo-teleological, and in particular, trinitary theology, and that it attempts to reconcile theology with linguistics.

Like almost everything else, his model is St. Augustine though even the saint is faulted for not extending the relational concept of trinity to humanity. "It is therefore not surprising that Saint Augustine, in his great desire to discover analogies for the trinitary mode of existence, should have found them more readily in being in general, in human rational activity or the structure of the human soul, than in the relational structure of the person. To be sure, no analogy with the person was reasonably accurate.(68) In my opinion, the personal identity of communicating persons is the most Beautiful mirror of the Trinity: when a human person turns to look at herself, she is present to herself as a trinity (I, you, he/she.)"(68) Let us examine what kind of difficulty Jacques runs into when relating discourse to this trinitary notion.

I am quoting him again, "Let us dwell on the case of interlocution, which will serve as a paradigm. Asserting that interlocution is primary obviously does not mean in terms of set theory that the relation, taken extensionally, is prior to its terms. On the other hand, it does imply first that the concept of interlocution is a primitive one, whereas those of locutors (locuteur) and allocutor (allocutaire) are derivative. Second, these two concepts cannot be assimilated to particular empirical beings: locutor and allocutee are agencies brought about by and in discourse, and not concrete individuals -- even if in the real world they can be secondarily attributed to individuals. In particular, the locutor must not be confused with the speaking subject, from which it is explicitly distinguished, for instance in indirect discourse. Equally, the allocutee must not be confused with the listener, a particular real individual who overhears the discourse or eavesdrops on it when it was not intended for his or her ears. Furthermore, just because an utterance is addressed to someone, this does not automatically make that person the allocutee. The direct addressee, or 'intended' recipient (Lyons) is not yet a partner in an interlocutive relation. If I do not understand the words you are saying to me—poor me—I am only their recipient and not your allocutee!" (122-3)

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It is not easy to make sense out of this linguistically confused passage. First of all, it violates the commonsense that speech communication is directional (i.e., sender-to-receiver) and dialogic (where the direction is reciprocal and the relation bilateral), performed by and between two human agents who act alternately as addresser and addressee, or interlocutors. This precondition has precluded other non-dialogic uses of language, such as the monologue of a "speaking subject" or the eavesdropping of a third party. These uses can be integrated into the larger system, but they do not belong here. For further discussion, one could refer to Benveniste on the distinction between discursive and historical utterances and their applications in various speech and written genres. The idea of "mutual understanding" is indeed superfluous because a shared code is essential to successful communication. Furthermore, we all agree that the six elements in the Jakobsonian model, including addresser and addressee, are functions rather than real people and entities, and no sensible reader would confuse the functional *actant* with the performing *acteur* because a function can be performed by an infinite number of actors. However, if the above baffling passage is cast in a non-human context, it becomes decipherable. For example: God the locutor speaks only to his chosen allocutee, and as allocutee himself listens only to he who in his image speaks his language, etc., and all the others are either eavesdroppers or aphasia sufferers.

In language study, a pre-conceived theological model can be more a hindrance than help if it fails to account for language universals. What Jacques terms *primum relationis* that links the two relata does not render them secondary; on the contrary, it has to be a third entity of another functional category that links them. Therefore, the so-called primary relation is actually a third party, a *tertium relationis*, or more precisely, *tertium comparationis*, which exists outside the discursive situation in which I and thou are registered. Jacques's argument suggests that the third party is as inaccessible as an absolute alterity and thus he confirms ironically Benveniste's designation of it as non-personal.

Ideology and theology do not seem to go hand in hand. However, ideology has been regarded as a modern version of theology (Todorov, 1982). Like theology, there is a textual problem to be solved, i.e., how expression and content, syntactical structure and semantic system can be reconciled. Earlier we noted that the here-and-now situatedness of discourse brings along the interlocutors respective ideological interests and thus making complicated their interlocutive relationship. It was Bakhtin/Medvedev (1985 [1928]) who introduced the concept of ideologeme in his early writings on novelistic discourse. As "an inseparable element of the unified ideological horizon of the social group" (21), the ideologeme can be both ethical-philosophical or artistic, depending on its location outside or inside the artistic

text (23).   The coinage of the word obviously follows the tradition of linguistic analysis in segmentalizing phone into phoneme, graph into grapheme, with Algirdas-Julien Greimas, seme into sememe, and finally with Claude Lévi-Strauss, myth into mytheme.   Given the fact that ideology, whether inside or outside the text, remains fundamentally a semantic element, one fails to see the necessity of this neologism.   But Bakhtin's coinage was later picked up by Julia Kristeva (1980, 59, n.2; 1969, 114, n.2), and redefined in a new light.

"The ideologeme is the intersection of a given textual arrangement (a semiotic practice) with the utterances (sequences) that it either assimilates to its own space or to which it refers in the space of exterior texts (semiotic practices).   The ideologeme is that intertextual function read as 'materialized' at the different structural levels of each text, and which stretches along the entire length of its trajectory, giving it its historical and social coordinates." (1980, 36). Here ideologeme becomes an intertextual function where various kinds of semiotic practice intersect.   We shall be able to testify its use in the dialogues of Zhuangzi.

The well-known dialogues between the Taoist philosopher Zhuangzi (circa. 4th-3rd centuries, B.C.) and his logician friend Huizi are worth rereading from the perspectives of controversy and subjectivity.   First, some background knowledge is in order. The book of Zhuangzi bears the name of the philosopher who presumably flourished in the third century B.C.   Despite the speculations of authorship and dating, the work is generally regarded as expounding the philosophy of Zhuang Zhou or Master Zhuang. Among other things, the scepticism, agnosticism and relativism preached in the work have attracted a long tradition of followers, and numerous comparisons in the West have been drawn by sinologists.   The text is a collection of short pieces, which can be variously categorized as philosophical treatises, allegories, animal fables, and above all philosophical dialogues.   In addition to expounding his own philosophy, Master Zhuang is often dramatized as a powerful critic of his predecessors and contemporaries who belong to other contending schools, in particular Confucianism and Mohism, a point to which we shall return.

One of the popular themes of Master Zhuang is his scepticism of universal truth as well as his severe questioning on language's claim in representing truth.   In an essay from the famous book entitled Qiwulun (On the Equality of Things), Master Zhuang is found questioning the semantic substance of the deictics: ci (this or now or self) and bi (that or then or other).   According to the Master, these two seemingly opposing terms can be easily reversed as soon as the speaking subjects change roles, i.e., both the locutor and allocutee are legitimate to refer themselves now as ci, now as bi, especially in dialogues. Interestingly, the expressions ci and bi are shifters according to Jespersen and Jakobson or indexical signs according to Charles Sanders

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Peirce.   At the end of his argument for discursive relativism, Zhuang alludes to the controversy between the Confucianists and the Mohists.   One does not see an actual exchange between these two "other" philosophical camps, but it is frequently re-enacted by the dialogues between Master Zhuang himself and his best friend the logician Master Hui who, unlike his non-conformist friend, served as the Prime Minister of the Kingdom of Wei.   In the following, I will cite an interesting dialogue between the two philosophers on the subjectivity of fish, and then discuss another dialogue of theirs concerning the philosopher's commitment to politics.

Before so doing, maybe I should allude to a recent news story I read in UK last month about the Australian Miss Piggy who made the headlines by diving off a 13 feet platform into a pool of water at the Royal Brisbane Show (The Daily Telegraph, Friday17th August 2001, p. 15).   The news writer observed, judging by all appearances, i.e., in the photograph, Miss Piggy seems to be enjoying the dive.   But queried the writer: "A more relevant issue for this animal-loving kingdom [i.e., UK] is whether Miss Piggy enjoys the experience, fears it, or does not care much either way. Our guess is that, like a winning racehorse, she likes it but who knows? We should be wary of those who claim to read the minds of pigs or fish – or foxes."

Now it is fish that concerns human in the philosophical dialogue under discussion, on whose subjectivity Master Zhuang and the logician Master Hui engage in a debate.

> Master Zhuang and Master Hui are wandering on the dam of river Hao.
> Master Zhuang says, "Lo! yonder white fish enjoy swimming down there."
> Master Hui asks, "You are not a white fish.   How do you know they enjoy it?"
> Master Zhuang replies, "You are not I.   How do you know that I do not now they enjoy it?"
> Master Hui replies, "Indeed I am not you; hence do not know what you know.   Since you are not fish either, you cannot possibly know what the fish feel.   This is undeniable."   Master Zhuang says, "Let's get back to the original argument.   You first asked me, 'How do you know they enjoy it?' Apparently you know me, i.e., knowing that I was not fish.   Knowing me does not imply that you have to be me.   I know because I am on the dam [as human and do not have to be in the water].'[4]

> (Guo Qingfan ed., 1975, 606-8)

This dialogue is too well-known to provide us with food for thought. The discourse is a dialogue, performed by two interlocutors and it would be absolutely unnecessary to identify them as locutor and allocutee who alternate the role of I-Thou. The third person is not involved except the non-human fish. Now what theoretical implications can this banal story have? First of all, in this purely phenomenological debate, Master Hui believes that humanity and fish cannot become intersubjective, hence his question "How do you know they enjoy it [swimming in the river]?" However, he does not seem to have any doubt about human communication. Only when asked "You are not I. How do you know that I do not know they enjoy it?" does he reply "Indeed I am not you; hence do not know what you know." The counter-question of Master Zhuang actually questions the very possibility of human intersubjectivity (Chang 1986, 138). Our next question would be "Why there is no intersubjectivity between these two philosophers who are old friends? The text itself provides no answer, and we must seek elsewhere for an adequate interpretation. That is why Michael Riffaterre says whenever we run into an interpretive impasse we run into a place which calls for an intertext.

Within the corpus of the book of Zhuangzi and indeed in the larger ideological context during the Warring States Period of China, the above dialogue serves as a nodal point, an ideologeme -- where at least two philosophies and indeed two kinds of political praxis clash, represented respectively by Master Zhuang and Master Hui. Hence the message of the text is embedded in a heavily semanticized code, and the interlocutors, (i.e., addresser and addressee) verbal contact is staged in a socio-political context which in turn serves a referential function.

Now all the six elements of the Jakobsonian communication axis are mobilized. There are several other dialogues in the book dramatizing Master Zhuang's commitment to a recluse life rather than public service. I shall give one example which I have discussed in length elsewhere (Chang, 1998, 19-20). Master Zhuang and Master Hui engage in a dialogue. Hui opens the dialogue by asking Zhuang the use of two natural objects: seeds of gourd and a tree. It runs as follows.

> Master Hui told Master Zhuang, King of Wei had given me some seeds of big gourd, and I had them sown and grown. Now the fruit was as large as five stones. I tried to use the gourd to contain water, but it was too heavy to carry. I halved it to serve as dippers, but they were too shallow to contain much. You can't say it was not big enough, but I had found it so useless that I smashed it.
>
> Master Zhuang said, 'Now you had a gourd of five stones. Why didn't you make a wine bowl out of it, so that with it you could wander

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about in rivers and lakes [outside public life]? Your mind is not liberated, so you worry about the gourd's lack of use.' On another occasion, Master Hui then told Master Zhuang, There is a big tree in my garden which is called *shu*. Its trunk is too cankerous and its branches too twisted to be useful in construction and carpentry. Left on the road, it was ignored by carpenters. Master Huang said, . . . Now you are worried that your tree is useless. Why don't you idle by its side and repose beneath it? Thus like all useless things it has no danger of being harmed. What's the worry then?

(Guo, 36-39)

If we compare this dialogue with the previous one on fish by the same philosophers (i.e., the projection of two sets of interlocutive function), we find more information about Master Hui the dialectician-turned-politician (but not about the locutor because the dialogic function remains the same). He is concerned about material gain and utilitarianism, whereas Zhuang poses as a Taoist recluse. Through an interpretant shaped and governed by the ideology he subscribes to, each reified and historicized locutor perceives the material signs of gourd and tree entering into a series of metaphorical substitutions. Thus the seeds of gourd are transformed respectively into water container or dippers and wine bowl, and the tree into timber and means of repose. This metaphorization is realized, in the original Chinese writing, by a semic element *mu* (wood) shared by all the signs. One could say, pace Kristeva, the material wood, after semantic and ideological investment, becomes a kernel and catalytic ideologeme inside and outside the text, linking textual practice and social practice. Whilst Master Hui's semiosis ends in social and political use, Master Zhuang's in non-use, and indeed in spiritual transportation.

What is our conclusion? It is indeed very banal: Interlocutors are textual and discursive functions, and as such, are potentially intersubjective. As discursive functions, ideology plays a relatively minor role, if at all, under the formal constraints. Only when each instance of verbal communication is historicized can one perceive the force of ideology.

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[1] Earlier Benveniste observes, when talking about bee communication, "the language of the bees lacks the dialogue which is distinctive of human speech" (53).

[2] Jakobson used the 1923 American edition, but the edition I consulted is the 1922 British edition.

[3] Jacques acknowledges that "[he] discovered the priority of the [interlocutive] relation within the theological paradigm of the Trinity" as follows. "The 'personal' properties that constitute the three Persons are a way of expressing their relations. For the true God is He in whom the relation produces Being. The Word made flesh with a terrestrial body and born of a woman. This union of Word and body is indestructible." (127).

[4] Master Zhuang's argument is cryptic and infelicitous. But his knowledge should be understood in a larger context. In the book of *Dazongshi* (The Masters), Zhuang uses Confucius to comment on the Taoist sages who become "forgetful" [about differentiation] "having acquired the way of nature [beyond nature], just like fish which become forgetful [about differentiation], having acquired rivers and lakes." (Guo, 272.) The fish is a recurrent motif in Zhuangzi; it actually opens the corpus.

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