Abstract
摘要:Brander and Spencer (1985)以一進口國與兩出口國的基本模型,提出了策略性出口補貼政策的論點,引起了後續許多學者對出口補貼政策的研究興趣,文獻顯示出口補貼政策的適用與否與理論模型中某些假設有關,而且大部分文章是在進口國採取自由貿易政策的假設下來分析出口國的出口補貼政策。
此外,有些文章主要探討進口國的關稅政策,而假設出口國採取自由貿易政策。Gatsios (1990)及Hwang and Mai (1991)指出,進口國應對生產成本較小的外國出口廠商課徵較高的關稅。Choi (1995)及Horiba and Tsutsui (2000)則是比較進口國採行單一關稅或歧視性關稅制度對外國出口廠商技術選擇的影響。
因此,本計畫欲研究在此一進口國與兩出口國的基本模型中,當三個國家均採行各自的貿易政策時,進口國關稅政策與出口國出口補貼政策的相互影響,主要探討的重點如下:
一、 在進口國課徵關稅的情形下,分析出口國使用出口補貼的策略性誘因。
二、 探討出口廠商競爭型態及進口國關稅制度對出口國出口補貼政策的影響。
三、 從進口國、出口國的福利觀點來探討最適的廠商競爭
Abstract: This project attempts to combine two branches of literature on strategic trade policies together, and to analyze two strategic trade policies in a unified framework in order to provide a better insight into the policy interactions among the governments of two exporting countries and an importing country.
Brander and Spencer’s (1985) paper initiates a great deal of interest on the proper use of export subsidies. It has been shown that Brander and Spencer’s result is sensitive to some of the assumptions in the model. Moreover, in the Brander-Spencer and related models, the government of the third country, which imports the goods from the two countries, is assumed to be inactive.
On the other hand, there is a separate literature which analyzes the optimal policies for an importing country facing foreign oligopoly. Gatsios (1990) and Hwang and Mai (1991) show that the importing country will optimally impose a higher tariff on the import from the more cost-efficient exporter. Choi (1995) and Horiba and Tsutsui (2000) extend the literature by comparing the impacts of discriminatory and uniform tariffs on the level of technologies chosen by the exporting firms. All these papers focus on the policies of the importing country, while assuming that the exporting governments are inactive.
In this project, we allow all three governments to be active in choosing the optimal values of the policy parameters: an export subsidy/tax for each exporting country and a tariff/subsidy for the importing country. We want to construct a theoretical model to examine the policy interactions among these three countries with alternative plausible specifications, such as timing of the policy moves, industry conduct, and asymmetric information. We also want to analyze the impacts of two different tariff regimes: a uniform tariff regime, as required by the “Most-Favored-Nations” clause of the GATT/WTO, and a discriminatory tariff regime. The main issues addressed in this project are summarized as follows:
1. The strategic incentives of an exporting country to use an export subsidy/tax in the presence of a future tariff imposed on the products from itself and its rival.
2. The sensitivity of the rational for an export subsidy/tax to industry conduct, i.e., Cournot or Bertrand, in the presence of a future tariff.
3. The effects of the tariff regimes on the non-cooperative equilibrium in terms of export subsidies.
4. The optimal industry conduct and tariff regime from the importing and exporting country and the world’s point of view, respectively.
5. The best strategy for each exporting country and the non-cooperative equilibrium under asymmetric information about the firm’s cost.
We expect that this project would provide a better insight into the justifications for strategic trade policies. Moreover, as a new WTO member, Taiwan has more interactions and negotiations with other members. This project would draw some policy implications that would be helpful to Taiwan’s gov
Keyword(s)
策略性貿易政策
出口補貼
關稅制度
不對稱資訊
strategic trade policies
export subsidies
tariff regime
asymmetric information