Power Index Approach to Cooperative Game in the Legislative Yuan of R.O.C.
Date Issued
2007
Date
2007
Author(s)
Chang, Chao-Hua
DOI
zh-TW
Abstract
There are many parties now in the Legislative Yuan of R.O.C.. The rapid growing of party’s number from one party to seven parties has given rise to complex problems. In particular, the power of the party requires differ methodologies to capture this competitive situation. Every party in the Legislative Yuan intends to enhance their power by forming coalitions. Cooperative game theory is famous for modeling coalition. In cooperative game theory, individuals may form coalitions so as to maximize their profit. Well-known concepts for cooperative game to describe this situation are Shapley value and the Banzhaf power index, and both of all are called Power index. In this paper we present a new way to research coalitions between parties using power index. But, Dixit & Skeath(2004) considered that Shapley value can’t reflect the true power what small parties have. Also, we investigate this point of view.
Subjects
合作賽局理論
結盟
Shapley value
Banzhaf index
權力指數
Cooperative game
coalition
the Banzhaf power index
Power index
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-96-R93341038-1.pdf
Size
23.53 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):323187bb5b478681bef5cbd653292717