JS Mill’s Electoral Design and Political Thought: And a Reflection on Modern Democracy
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Lo, Yichen
Abstract
This thesis deals with the moral assumptions behind modern concept of political equality, based on the political and ethical writings of JS Mill. “One person, one vote” is a fundamental principle of modern democracy and constitutionalism, but while democracy has been widely accepted and taken as a premise of contemporary political theories, the moral assumptions behind that imperative has gradually moving out from the spotlight. If equality of all mankind is considered an exalted universal value and it is not a counter-factual presumption, but a moral imperative, when it turns into a political one, taking on legal force, how is it related to our modern political institutions? And what is the connection between this principle and the modern concept of political equality, especially the right to equal vote? The aim of this theoretical investigation is to find out, whether there is any plausible moral justification behind this principle, and only with an affirmative answer can we confirm a moral foundation of our acceptance of political equality.
The moral and political writings of JS Mill, which were written in the nineteenth century, before modern democracy has received its steady form and a widespread acceptance, are able to provide us a reference point to our concept of political equality, because they inquired into the necessity of this form of governance, instead of treating it as a prerequisite. Most importantly, the abundance of his writing is to serve as a keystone to build up a link between a political ideal and the moral assumptions behind it. This thesis tries to take advantage of these two qualities, as a means to answer –or at least, clarify –the above mentioned questions. Based on Mill’s political ideas elaborated in Considerations on Representative Government, his ideas about the ideal form of governance, popular representation, and voting rights are presented in the second chapter of the thesis. Their connection to Mill’s moral theory is discussed in the following chapter, and as a conclusion, I try to draw a comparison between the Millian construction of democracy and our modern ones.
Written in 1861, Considerations on Representative Government is a collection of Mill’s political writings, which were proposed in a time when the reform of parliament concerning constituency and expansion of voting rights was in a highly debated progress. Mill begins with affirming democracy as the better form of governance than despotism, in that democracy secures moral agency of individuals and improve the average level of knowledge of the people. However, democratic representative government results in the risks of insufficient mental qualifications in the controlling body, or parliament, and class legislation on the part of the numerical majority. To offset these dual evils consequently becomes the objective for further designs. Mill’s ideal of the representative parliament can thus be viewed in three layers: first, comprehensive representation concentrates votes from different constituencies and secures that every minority of the society is to be represented in the state organ. The importance of minority’s returning to the parliament means that the parliament would be “certain of containing the very elite of the country.” Following this leading principle, universal suffrage provides an educational function, especially for the working class, who is more in the need of social education. By means of public discussion and collective political participation, people would be informed and brought beyond their limited life circle, motivated to “feel for and with his fellow citizens, and becomes consciously a member of a great community.” The third layer –and also the most interesting one–? is the plural voting system introduced by Mill, which entitles people with different number of votes according to their occupations. The liberal professions, for example, deserve more votes than an employer in general, because their occupation implies their possession of “individual mental superiority.” Under the leading principle of comprehensive representation, the additional votes accumulated from the minority elite should not excess the majority, since plural voting is only to symbolize and manifest the value of knowledge, and to provide an incentive for the ordinary citizens.
Some contradictions seem to arise from this sophisticated scheme. If democracy is to guarantee a sphere, in which individuals are able to make moral decisions based on independent exercise of judgment, and universal suffrage is to enable the realization of individuality of the participants, plural voting nonetheless recognizes superiority of certain kinds of “realization of individuality,” giving them higher influence in public domain and expect the changes they may bring to the ordinary people. Most literature prefers to either neglect the existence of plural voting in Mill’s electoral design, or regard it contradictory, in principle, to the rest of the system. However, this thesis believes that Mill’s ideas about election as a whole can only be fully understood and appreciated in combination with his moral theories. Based on Utilitarianism and on Liberty, I try to reconstruct Mill’s utilitarian and idealistic ethics, which highly correspond to his ideas about election and political rights, in this sense providing a moral justification behind these practical institutions.
According to utilitarianism, happiness is the end of action, therefore the end of life. This kind of principle concerning the ultimate end of life cannot be proofed by reasoning; instead it can only be “the subject of a direct appeal to the faculties which judge of fact.” It is due to this empirical epistemology adopted by Mill that the general concept of happiness bears less importance than the aggregate of particular happiness, which come from and can be confirmed by individuals. But how is this difference arising from particularity be understood? Mill’s utilitarianism is notable for its idealistic character, which is well expressed in the famous words, “It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.” He differentiates happiness, or the ends of life for individuals, and believes that “some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others.” In this sense, Mill cannot be classified as a pluralist; however, such position does not lead him to intolerance. The minority, who have the originality and genius that the society needs for improvement, have –and only have– “freedom to point out the way,” instead of imposing their opinions and judgments on others. Diversity is therefore the result of differences in human capacity, and its value lies in the friendly environment it creates, which encourages and facilitates people with superior intelligence to express themselves. To lead a meaningful life, realization of individuality of every person should be protected, but it does not necessarily mean an equal judgment on the value of every end. Real difficulty arrives in public sphere, where differences in the ends of life turn into competition and contradiction. Mill’s much criticized harm principle, that “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others,” indeed lacks the clarity to be materialized. His use of the term “public utility” nonetheless implies a general application of the utilitarian rule, or the greatest happiness principle, to these issues.
We could see a corresponding relation between Mill’s moral theories and electoral design at this point, which proves a coherency in Mill’s political ideas. Universal suffrage can be seen as the materialization of the greatest happiness principle at state’s scale: aggregation of particular happiness is transformed through individual’s political participation into accumulation of votes. The greatest happiness principle is applied only when other secondary principles, or doctrines, bring about conflicting considerations and result in incompatible obligations; in this sense, the ends of life are concrete versions of these secondary principles, and election is designed to solve the deadlock. It is not difficult to deduce a mechanism like plural voting, if we notice the differentiation Mill makes in various categories of happiness. The greatest happiness principle should not only take account of quantitative amount, but its quality as well, so the superior end may not necessarily be the one that the most number of people support; in other words, the better ones should receive greater emphasis. And it is also perceivable that giving people with mental superiority larger power –yet not large enough to override others– is preferred to authorizing the very one or few wise men to carry out certain points of view directly, because for Mill, there is no better or best ends of life that are already known; fallibility and corrigibility of all human beings explain the role of education presumed by Mill.
The isomorphic relation of Mill’s moral theory and political ideal provides a good epistemological and moral justification for his practical suggestions. Some other questions are therefore brought forth; for example, for those who appreciate Mill’s differentiation of happiness, how is it possible not to embrace Mill’s plural voting at the same time? And can plural voting still be considered democratic? These questions boil down to Mill’s concept of equality. Apart from the weak version of equality as impartiality (equal treatment), which can be dispensed for a greater utility, the strong version requires that “society should treat all equally well who have deserved equally well of if, that is, who have deserved equally well absolutely;” and “this great moral duty rests upon a still deeper foundation, being a direct emanation from the first principle of morals, and not a mere logical corollary from secondary or derivative doctrines.” These definitions, which lie in the closing paragraphs of the book Utilitarianism, deserve much attention because of the hints they may imply in democratic context. This strong version of equality originates from the consequentialist moral position, which, according to utilitarianism, claims that the same kind of utilities should be counted the same in proportion to their volume, regardless of their possessors; in the language of politics, it means that all welfare should be taken into account, regardless of the social status (external factors), or the moral or intellectual capacity (internal factors) of the people. In other words, if election is the process where welfare of individuals is accumulated by their voting, exclusion of any particular person is to count out a part of welfare, which is groundless in the eye of utilitarianism. To conclude, a consequentialist concept of equality is compatible to universal suffrage, but it is confined to a negative position that the quality of the subjects is disregarded, instead of considered identical.
The aim of this thesis is never to promote plural voting, let alone to reject equal voting; by means of retracing and reconstructing the moral foundation of the former, I try to draw a comparison between it and contemporary democracy, and to have a closer look at the Zeitgeist behind the modern political participation, in order to clarify the moral presumptions we generally possess and impose on the participants through these institutions. Could equal treatment stand for a neutral moral position? Is it possible to have a completely neutral moral stance? Or is it actually situated on a hidden one? Epistemological agnosticism tends to equalize the value of all kinds of happiness, because they are the same dubious; after separating public and private spheres, liberal neutrality requires the state to abstain from making moral, or value, judgments. In the last chapter of the thesis, the above mentioned moral stances are discussed. And I wish that an inquiry into the moral foundation of modern democracy could better describe the political conditions surrounding every righteous-conscious individual, and thus bring some hints for future improvement.
Subjects
JS Mill
Political Equality
One person one vote
Utilitarianism
Plural voting
SDGs
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-101-R97a21033-1.pdf
Size
23.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):3d9e40ebc3be88a9fe9409338a3dbf1f