“Tolerance” or “Preventive Strike”:Strategic Choice and Strategic Interaction in the Context of Nuclear Proliferation
Resource
政治科學論叢, 55, 119-162
Journal
政治科學論叢
Journal Issue
55
Pages
119-162
Date Issued
2013-03
Date
2013-03
Author(s)
Yang, K.H.
Abstract
Since the outset of the development of nuclear technology, nuclear proliferation has been a widespread concern in international society. Many states feel that their security is threatened by nuclear proliferation as non-official nuclear states acquire nuclear weapons. Thus, responses toward the proliferators have become an important component of security strategies. Possible responses include granting economic incentives, sanctions, and preventive strikes. However, there is a tradeoff between these strategic choices. The purpose of this paper is to investigate the causal mechanisms that impact the strategic choices of both counter-proliferators and proliferators and to generalize as well as theorize strategic choices and strategic interactions. The paper develops, solves, and analyzes a game-theoretical model to identify equilibrium points, and enumerates the substantive meanings using comparative static analysis. Furthermore, the paper analyzes the cases of the North Korea Nuclear Crisis and Iraq War as empirical counterparts, extending the empirical implications of the theoretical model and provide preliminarily verification for the model. The paper finds that the degree of threat and the technology constraints faced by proliferators, the incentives offered by the counter-proliferators, the cost of launching an attack, the damage caused by an attack, and the expectations of each side affect the likelihood of an outbreak of conflicts under such situations.
Subjects
核擴散；預防攻擊；賽局理論；北韓核武危機；伊拉克戰爭；Nuclear Proliferation；Preventive Strike；Game Theory； North Korea Nuclear Crisis；Iraq War
SDGs
Type
journal article
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