Western Sahara: The Three-Level Game
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Wong, Catherine
Abstract
In an era where colonialism has become but an anachronism and despite its status as a Non-Self-Governing Territory, Western Sahara has yet to be decolonized. International law and countless UN resolutions favour the Sahrawis, yet their de jure right to self-determination seems immaterial juxtaposed against decades of de facto Moroccan occupation. utnam’s model of multi-level games shows us that conflict resolution is not something that just happens at the negotiation table and that domestic and external factors exert equally salient effects on overall outcomes. Deadlock in the second game can be attributed to first game factors; internal pressures mean neither side can make real concessions and that the negotiation process itself becomes hollow. Whilst most research focuses on the first and second games, this study looks to the third game, the wider geopolitical environment for explanation of the longstanding impasse. Specifically, it attempts to explain the effect of changing American, EU, French and Spanish policy, and strategic interests in the Maghreb and changes within the region itself may effect developments in Western Sahara conflict.
Subjects
multi-level games
international negotiation
Western Sahara
the Maghreb
decolonization
self-determination
autonomy
Type
thesis
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