Gilbert Harman's Moral Relativism
Resource
國立臺灣大學哲學論評, 13, 363-374
Journal
國立臺灣大學哲學論評
Journal Issue
13
Pages
363-374
Date Issued
1990-01
Date
1990-01
Author(s)
Lin, H.W.
Abstract
Gilbert Harman firmly believes that his moral theory, first published in his paper "Moral Relativism Defended" has succeeded in defending moral Relativism which has been previously attacked as being inconsistent. Harman claims that his version of moral relativism is a thesis concerning the logical form of a certain kind of moral judgments, i. e., inner judgments. Although Harman's moral relativism avoids the charge of inconsistency, it is not free from serious defects. In this article, I embark on evaluating some crucial points which underlie Harman's theory.
Type
journal article