The Corporate Governance Mechanism and Long-term Investment Activities
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
Tsai, Chia-Hua
DOI
en-US
Abstract
The major purpose of this research is to examine the relationship between corporate governance mechanism and firm’s long-term investment activities of all the listed companies in Taiwan. Although some companies diversify their operating risk through these kinds of investment activities, some long-term investment activities may benefit the controlling shareholder of the parent company at the expense of minority shareholders through the transfer of funds and technology to the invested subsidiaries.
The empirical results indicate that corporate governance mechanism does influence the strategies of the parent company’s long-term investment activities. The better the independency, professionalism and monitoring function of the board of directors, the higher the shareholding of the subsidiaries. Furthermore, the existence of a pyramid structure of the parent company’s ownership structure results in a negative influence on the shareholding of the subsidiaries. Although the second largest shareholder is not associated with the long-term investment activities in our results, we still come to the conclusion that board composition and ownership structure do have impacts on the pattern of long-term investment activities of the parent companies.
Subjects
公司治理
長期投資
財富剝削
Corporate governance
long-term investment
wealth expropriation
Type
thesis
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