不確定需求下通路競爭之最適控制機制
Other Title
The Optimal Control Mechanisms for Rivalry among the Channels
with Uncertain Demand
with Uncertain Demand
Date Issued
2000
Date
2000
Author(s)
翁景民
DOI
892416H002035
Abstract
This research considers a
manufacturer facing uncertain demand.
Despite its best forecasting efforts, a
manufacturer may produce and sell to its
independent retailers more output than they
can subsequently resell at the joint profit-maximizing
price. Having paid for the output,
these rival retailers do not fully internalize
the manufacturer’s market power and may
sell more than the joint profit-maximizing
quantity. If retailers anticipate this possibility
ex ante, they reduce the wholesale price they
will pay the manufacturer to reflect the
dissipation of these quasi rents. Without
some mechanism to prevent rivalry, the
manufacturer ultimately bears the costs. The
stylized model assumes two periods, two
retail locations, linear demand, and two
possible outcomes: high demand and low
demand. Anticipating this, they will not pay
as much for the merchandise ex ante as they
would if the manufacturer could commit to
preventing rivalry. The quantity model and
empirical study found that vertical
integration, minimum resale price, reward,
and exclusive dealer can reduce the loss
result from intra-competition.
Subjects
Uncertain Demand
Channel
Rivalry
Rivalry
Transaction Cost
Control
Mechanism
Mechanism
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學工商管理學系
Type
report
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