Does Managerial Ability Affect the Agency Cost between Boards and Minority Equity Holders?
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Huang, Hong-Fei
Abstract
This study explores the relation between the managerial ability and the agency problems between boards and minority equity holders (later denoted as B-E agency problem) by employing CEO turnover data in the past 20 years. We employ Demerjian (2012) to estimate CEO ability and Chen, Liao, Chen (2012) to estimate the cost of B-E agency problem.The empirical results of this study show that, CEO’s ability significantly affects the firm’s B-E agency problem. The higher a firm''s CEO''s ability, the more serious the firm''s B-E agency problem. Furthermore, we find that the instability in a firm''s CEOs’ ability also significantly affect the firm''s B-E agency problem.
Subjects
代理問題
小股東
董事會
CEO經營能力
Type
thesis
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