Social recognition: Signal or reward in dictator games
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Graveland, Oscar
Abstract
Standard economics theory has been complemented with fairness theories in an attempt to explain the anomalies found in choice type experiments, most of which are done as either dictator games, ultimatum games or tournaments of such games. The distinct success of fairness theories exposed a basic preference for a level of equalitarianism, but it has not revealed the motivation for the preference for fair outcomes. The experiments were carefullyesigned to avoid framing, but as a result lost some connection to real life situations, in which monetary compensation is only exchanged for the delivery of goods or services. In that case it is possible that the outcome strongly reflects the perceived or assumed kinship of the agents.e present a modified version of a dictator game where two agents get rewarded for performing a collaborative task in and where the “dictator” is responsible for sharing theeward with the other agent. We are interested in how information about the other agents’ performance and social recognition of the dictator interact with the choice behavior of the dictator.
Subjects
Fairness
dictator game
transaction
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