First-Person Authority and Privileged Access
Date Issued
2006
Date
2006
Author(s)
Lee, Kok-Yong
DOI
en-US
Abstract
A complete analysis of the epistemic superiority of first-person perspective should consist of three parts: firstly, an account of first-person authority, secondly, an account of privileged access, and, finally, a warrant for first-person authority. These parts are indeed interdependent. Different answers to any of them will cause different answers to the others. My aim in this thesis is to offer a theory of first-person perspective whose accounts of these parts are unified. The merit of such a theory is that it provides us a complete view of the subject matter.
In chapter one, I offer an investigation into principles of first-person authority. I conclude that the most promising principle of first-person authority is the so-called principle of luminosity (PL), which claims that, necessarily, one is always in a position to know one’s mental states. I argue that PL is most promising since it is the most general principle which is also immune to counterexample. Moreover, PL can well explain our intuition about first-person authority, and it also has merits in dealing with philosophical questions. I will point out that PL is extremely useful in explaining Moore’s paradox.
I examine privileged access in chapter two. The base of privileged access is a particular form of self-awareness. I offer my own account of privileged access which claims that the very self-awareness consists (partly) of a particular mode of representation I call I-mode of representation. Accordingly, the mind does not consist of mental subject (or the self), but solely of mental objects. What is usually known as the self is in fact not an object at all. By contrast, what is sense as the self is just a sense of selfhood caused by activations of I-mode of representation. However, some philosophers, e.g. Davidson and Shoemaker, go further to reject the existence of mental objects. I argue that they are in a wrong track.
In chapter three, I give my own account of warrant for first-person authority. Davidson and Shoemaker have offered their own justification, but none has succeeded. My justification rests on the philosophical notion of supervenience. I argue that, given that mental states supervene on brain states, the violation of PL is implausible.
Timothy Williamson (2000) offers two subtle arguments against PL. In chapter four, I analyze his arguments in detail, and show that it is not PL, but some other premises in his arguments which should take responsibility of rendering mistaken conclusion. So since his arguments are incorrect, the arguments themselves cannot reject PL.
Subjects
自我知識
第一人稱權威
內省
自我意識
self-knowledge
first-person authority
privileged access
principle of luminosity
introspection
self-awareness
self-consciousness
Type
thesis
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