Four Economic Issues of Water Resources Administration Organization
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
huang, wei-lung
DOI
zh-TW
Abstract
Due to the lack of water resources, an administration organization is needed to manage them appropriately. Therefore, by means of economic theories, the purpose of this study is to discuss some issues and find the solutions for water resources administration organization in Taiwan. It is hoped that this study will provide the government with effective alternatives.
In order to confirm which organization should be discussed, this study started from diagnosing the ownership systems of different stages in water function circulation. Doing so is to clarify which organization should be responsible for managing water resources. According to the conclusion of the first chapter, this study asserted that the public ownership system in which water resources are managed by the government should be adopted at most stages of water function circulation. Thus, the government was considered the administration organization of water resources and discussed in the other chapters.
Afterwards, from the participants of water resources management - central authority, local authorities and firms, this study generalized that the issues of the governmental administration organization of water resources are delegation mechanism, negotiation mechanism, and cooperation mechanism with firms, discussing these mechanisms in the following chapters.
To analyze delegation mechanism, in ch.2 four economic models were developed to clarify its questions and solutions. The results proved that the problems of delegation mechanism are due to the asymmetrical information and the different objectives between central authority and local authorities. Besides, the study also proved that “basin management organization” and “incentive mechanism” are alternative solutions.
To analyze negotiation mechanism, in ch.3 a cooperative game of two local authorities negotiating their quantity of water resource management was set to analyze the influence of two negotiation mechanisms, one involved by central authority and the other not. The results proved that the local authorities prefer the central authority to be the agent negotiating “inter-regional water resource management”, but receive smaller quantity of water resource management and less net social welfare. Thus, this study suggested that negotiation mechanism should be exogenously set and two local authorities should directly negotiate “inter-regional water resource management”.
To analyze cooperation mechanism, in ch.4 the game in which firms spontaneously prevent or control water pollution was set to understand how the moral restraint of voluntary agreement influences the behaviors of firms. The results proved that voluntary agreement makes firms agree with the moral restraint of firm interaction, Kantian Maxim, which meets the same moral evaluation and ration assumption. In Kantian Maxim, all firms provide Lindahl equilibrium quantity and Plato efficiency solution.
Subjects
所有制
水資源管理組織
自發性方案
協商機制
代理機制
delegation mechanism
negotiation mechanism
voluntary agreement
ownership system
water resources administration organization
Type
thesis