On the Eudaimonist’s Explanation of the Good Life

What kind of life counts as good life? Many philosophers have tried to provide a satisfactory answer to this question. This thesis aims to reflect on one of the prominent theories concerning this issue: Eudaimonism. Eudaimonists define good life as happiness, and make three claims about this very concept. First, happiness is the final end of action and decision. Second, happiness implies human fulfillment. Third, happiness is correlated with virtue. This thesis defends the three claims sequentially. First, I will defend the first claim from some criticisms, and explain the formal constraints that happy life should meet. Secondly, Eudaimonists presented the function argument to support the thesis. There are a lot of criticisms against this argument. Following Christine Korsgaard’s approach, I appeal to Aristotle’s account of form and matter to clarify the meaning of “function”, and respond the criticisms accordingly. At the end, I will strengthen the third claim by showing that virtue is a necessary condition of happiness, and further argue that whether philosophers take virtue to be the sufficient condition for happiness depends on our understanding of practical wisdom.