交響樂團長聘與甄選制度之經濟分析
Other Title
An Economic Analysis of Dismissal and Audition Procedures in Symphony Orchestras
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Abstract
In academics, the adoption of tenure system not only protects the work rights of the professors, but also makes them have the incentives to recruit the new members with better performance so that it can improve the recruiting efficiency. In symphony orchestras, the members’ work rights are also under the protection by the dismissal procedure, and they can also participate in recruiting new members by the audition procedure. Although the procedures are result from the negotiation between the union consisted of the members and the orchestra, we believe that the adoption of the procedures in symphony orchestras, just as in academics, can improve the recruiting efficiency. We first verify that the adoption of dismissal procedure can accurately protect the work rights of members by empirical evidence so that they do not have to worry about the possibility of being replaced by new members. We also want to verify that, under the adoption of dismissal procedure, whether the participation of the members in audition procedure can improve the level of new members. However, we cannot obtain the consistent outcomes by empirical evidence, that is, after the adoption of the audition procedure in which the members can participate, some orchestras will recruit the better members, some will recruit the worse ones and the others are without enough evidence to say that whether the level of members is significant different or not.
Subjects
Dismissal Procedure
Audition Procedure
Symphony Orchestra
Incentive Compatibility
Union
Type
thesis
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