On the Definition and Limitations of the Borrowing Powers in the Constitution
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Chu, Tzu-Yuan
Abstract
Democratic states tend to have ongoing debt problems. Taiwan is no exception. The amount of the unpaid government debt in Taiwan has been rising since 2009 and shows no sign of stopping. Numerous factors contribute to the increase of public debt, such as the expanding role of government, an aging population, unequal tax burdens, and policymakers’ reluctance to increase tax revenue. The solutions for each of these are well beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it focuses on the government’s decision to borrow. Since this decision is a governmental power, it should submit to the limitations set out in the Constitution. The purpose of this thesis is to examine how to apply the constitutional limitations properly to solve the debt problems in Taiwan.
This thesis is divided into two parts. The first develops two conceptual categories for borrowing powers based on the nature of the borrowing behavior, namely concrete borrowing power and abstract borrowing power. Concrete borrowing power is connected with budget power, and abstract borrowing power with the power of lawmaking regarding debt issues. Proposing these two concepts not only makes the following analysis easier but also unifies two different fields, budgeting and lawmaking, to demarcate a discrete domain for the discussion of public debt in jurisprudence.
The second part involves examining the proper limitations of these borrowing powers. This thesis introduces two kinds of limitations under the existing constitutional order. The first is generated from the separation of powers between the executive and legislative branches, while the second stems from constitutional review initiated by the opposition party. The applicability and effectiveness of these two kinds of limitations will be discussed to point out possible solutions for constitutional controversies with respect to public debt issues.
Subjects
舉債權
公債
民主原則
代際正義
永續發展
預算權
法律保留原則
預算控制
聯邦體制第二次改革
權力分立
違憲審查
SDGs
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-103-R99a21024-1.pdf
Size
23.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):93b16d9f436c83c9a1f34555e2e39cc4