An Experimental Study on Proposal Power in Legislative Bargaining
Date Issued
2015
Date
2015
Author(s)
Tang, En-seen
Abstract
We examine how proposal power, measured by proposer share minus the share of a coalition member, varies in Baron-Ferejohn bargaining model with laboratory experiments. As in the literature, we find that proposal power is smaller than what the model predicts. But consistent with the theory, proposal power decreases in the discount factor and shows greater under simple majority than unanimity rule. Last but not least, the experimental difference between the direct-response method and the strategy method on proposal power is not significant only when the discount factor is high, which is a mixed support for other studies of such comparison.
Subjects
Laboratory Experiment
Legislative Bargaining
Proposal Power
Minimum Coalition
Majority
Unanimity
Strategy Method
Type
thesis
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ntu-104-R00323048-1.pdf
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