盈餘操控對購併公司股價長期表現之影響
Other Title
Earnings Management and
the Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms
the Post-Acquisition Performance of Acquiring Firms
Date Issued
2003
Date
2003
Author(s)
湛可南
DOI
912416H002027
Abstract
Previous studies have documented that the acquiring firms in mergers significantly
underperform those in tender offers after acquisitions. Two hypotheses have been proposed to
explain the poor post-acquisition stock performance of mergers: the method of payment (cash
vs. stock) and book-to-market effect (value vs. growth firms). This paper attempts to explore
an alternative hypothesis, earnings management, to account for the long-run performance
after the acquisition. We argue that bidders in stock-financed mergers have incentives to
boost up pre-merger earnings and this manipulation behavior causes the subsequent poor
performance. We find that stock mergers do have aggressive levels of earnings management
than cash mergers, and these high manipulated earnings are significantly and negatively
related to the abnormal returns of stock mergers. However, there is no relationship between
the degree of earnings management and long-run performance of cash mergers. Moreover,
book-to-market ratios cannot explain the long-run abnormal returns of acquisitions when
manipulated earnings are controlled. All these results suggest that the poor performance of
stock mergers is mainly due to earnings manipulations, rather than the book-to-market effect or payment method.
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學財務金融學系暨研究所
Type
report
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