Property Rights, Legal System, and Investment Incentives
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Lin, Wei-Yu
Abstract
We present a world with a large population and random matching rule in trade and investigate the investment incentives under different court rules. The transparency of the decision made by the court is not able to implement the social optimal investment level; even the function improvement of investment efficiency by securing the property rights is doubted. Only under the circumstances the court is available to the information of the production, it is possible for the court to secure property rights to accelerate investment efficiency. We also confirm the solution provided by Coase (1960), which results in the social optimality.
Subjects
Contracts
Legal system
Property Right
Investment
Type
thesis
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ntu-97-R95323006-1.pdf
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