The Present Status of the Party Caucus Negotiation in Legislative Yuan (Feb. 1st, 2008 - Jun. 16th, 2009)
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Chou, Chien-Pang
Abstract
Previous studies have found a robust link between legislative efficiency and the party caucus negotiation; however, successful negotiation is based upon communicative rationality. Since the Nationalist Party (KMT) has held an absolute majority of seats in the 7th Legislative Yuan (since Feb. 1st, 2008), the conflicts between ruling and opposition parties might become more intense, resulting in irrational communication.fter examining the outcomes, methods and directions of cross-party negotiation, the current study found that the effects of negotiation on legislative efficiency may have weakened or even become negative in Legislative Yuan. The negative effects of negotiation may lead people to question the value of negotiation as documented in previous studies. One possible explanation is that the lack of trust may make cross-party cooperation difficult, endanger rational communication, and subsequently curb the process of reaching consensus. egislative bodies in modern societies like the U.K., U.S., and Germany have long histories in the practice of negotiation. These countries have not only accepted the importance of negotiation in resolving political conflicts but have also successfully implemented negotiation in the process of legislation. Taiwan, however, has just started learning democratic practices and might only know the majority rule. The current study suggests that “negotiation first, majority rules” may bridge the gap between democratic ideals and the current political situation in Taiwan.n ideal democratic society may heavily rely on negotiation to resolve conflicts, suggesting that negotiation should come first when facing conflicts but that majority should rule when dealing with negotiation deadlock in order to make progress. On the one hand, the minorities can voice themselves through negotiation, which is in accordance with the value of respecting the minority in democratic systems. On the other, minorities should not boycott meetings but follow the decisions made by the majority after negotiation has provided the channel for mutual communication.herefore,“negotiation first, majority rules” may be one possible solution to reach consensus during legislative process. The mechanism of cross-party negotiation is made for mutual communication among parties. In addition, the transparent negotiation process may give the minority party a right to express its appeals in public, which may decrease the chance of boycott during legislative meetings. Negotiation may not only manifest minority rights in democratic representation but also legitimate majority rule in legislative practice, through which legislative efficiency can be maintained.n order to discover the factors which predict the outcomes of negotiation, I analyzed legislative processes of the general budget proposal for central government (2009), Assembly and Parade Act, Renewable Energy Development Act, and Rural Renewal Regulations. Several suggestions about resolving political conflicts, enhancing rational communication, and facilitating successful negotiation were made through a series of examinations of negotiation process in each case.his study applied the frameworks of communication behaviors to examine cross-party negotiations; however, negotiation may be adopted by parties as a strategic behavior for political appeals, which is different from rational communication as discussed in this study. Future research may approach the issues of negotiation via the applications of political strategies for broadening our understanding.
Subjects
the party caucus negotiation
legislative efficiency
Legislative Yuan
legislative dispute
the theory of communicative action
majority rule
minority rights
SDGs
Type
thesis
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