行政總裁的薪酬組合與公司決策的關係
Other Title
The Impact of CEO Compensation Structure on
Firm Decisions
Firm Decisions
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
董水量
DOI
932416H002027
Abstract
We investigate the effect of CEO compensation structure (CS) on firm
decisions, including internal decisions (financing, investing and operating decisions) and
external decisions (financial analysts and stock-holders’ decisions.). Based on agency
theory, we predict that the influence of CEO compensation on firm decisions varies
according to its structure level. Consistent with our prediction, our results suggest that
higher CS increases CEO’s incentive to manipulate reported earnings. We also find that
higher CS is likely to encourage CEO’s to decrease debt to equity ratio by financing
internally or issuing stock.
Subjects
CEO compensation structure
firm decisions
internal decisions
external
decisions
decisions
incentives
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學會計學系暨研究所
Type
other
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
932416H002027.pdf
Size
217.74 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):865bb2e5303ffd5e8a272e5613fbd802