集團企業股權結構與公司價值之關聯性研究

Rescently, there are many financial scandals occurring in Taiwan,
including Procomp Informatics Co., Ltd. and Infodisc Technology Co.,
Ltd., etc. These scandals had damaged the belief to the investing market of many investors. By the way, there is a common characteristic between these scandals: the percentage of directors controlled by the controlling shareholders tend to be much higher than the percentage of their cash flow rights. In other words, the ultimate controlling shareholders input less cash flow to gain the most of the control right. It also highlights that the major principal-agency problem in the ownership concentrated countries centered on the problems between the controlling shareholders and minority shareholders, more than the equity agency problems between the management and the shareholders.
The research adopts the method developed by La Portal, Lopez-de- Silanes and Shleifer(1999) to trace the ultimate controlling shareholders and compute the voting rights and the cash flow rights of those companies that stocks are openly traded on the Taiwan Stock Market in 2003. Then, the study measure the degree of expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling shareholders by focusing on the deviation of controlling rights from cash flow rights and whether the controlling shareholders participating the operation of business. Empirical results suggest:
1. The high concentration of ownership is more common in Taiwan publicly listed companies and those firms are typically controlled by families.
2. The more the controlling shareholders’ controlling rights deviate from cash flow rights, the more the controlling shareholders expropriate minority shareholders, and the lower the market valuation is.
3. In average, when the controlling shareholders interfere with the business operation by occupying the position of the board chairman or CEO,they are more likely to gain their private benefits by sacrificing the equity of minority shareholders.
4. If the controlling shareholders do not use the mechanisms to enhance their voting power over their equity ownership and they do not serve as the board chairman or CEO, these firms tend to have the relative higher market valuation.