Random Access Control in Energy-Harvesting Wireless Sensor Networks: A Game-Theoretical Approach
Date Issued
2011
Date
2011
Author(s)
Tsuo, Fu-Yun
Abstract
Traditional wireless sensor networks (WSN) are powered by batteries. Once the batteries run out, the devices become useless until they are replenished. However, for some kinds of applications, such as building structure monitoring, it is nearly impossible to replenish the batteries of devices. To overcome this problem, people turn to the energy-harvesting(EH) WSNs which can harvest energy from the environment. In this work, we construct theoretic models where devices are competing for limited transmission resource. Since the devices are selfish, they all choose to transmit regardless of others’ strategy, which leads to the severe network congestion. We propose two incentive mechanisms, a pricing scheme and an intervention scheme, that prohibit the system outcome from the worst case. The incentive scheme can induce the desired optimal outcomes whichmaximize the social welfare or the proportional fairness. In the last part, we also build an extension model in which the energy can be stored for the future. We show that it is more likely that the device chooses to save some energy for the period when the energy harvesting probability
is comparatively low. On the other hand, the devices will choose a higher transmission probability at the period when the energy harvesting probability is comparatively high.
Subjects
game theory
Nash equilibrium
energy-harvesting WSNs
incentive mechanism
social optimal
proportional fairness
Type
thesis
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