Supply Chain Dual Sourcing Model with Credit Guarantee Mechanism
Date Issued
2014
Date
2014
Author(s)
Lin, Chia-Ping
Abstract
In the trend of globalization and lowering cost, low-cost or emerging country sourcing is attracted highly attention in practice and academy. In the low-cost or emerging country sourcing, finding the cheapest contract manufacturers (CMs) is transaction orientated, and brand firm will sourcing though sourcing companies. Sourcing companies have to bear the risk of defected by CMs. The CMs who are usually small and medium enterprises and lack of work capital need to grant a loan from banks. However, the condition of the loan would be very disadvantage on the CMs or the bank even does not approve the loan because the CMs’ incomplete accounting records, absence of historical loan records, and lack of collateral. Those would seriously affect the margin of CMs, and the CMs even reject the order from sourcing company on account of insufficient working capital to produce the order.
Therefore, in order to solve the difficulty encountering by sourcing companies and CMs in low-cost sourcing, this study attempt to propose a supply chain dual sourcing model with credit guarantee mechanism. The relationship between a sourcing company and two CMs is taken into consideration in the proposed model though formulating the model as a stackleberger game. In the game, the sourcing company is a leader and the two CMs are followers. The backward induction is used to solve the proposed model. After solving the optimal behaviors of the sourcing company and CMs, the numerical experiment is employed to explore the effect of model parameters on the movement among the equilibriums.
Subjects
供應鏈風險
廉價採購
信用擔保
領導者追隨者賽局
混合0-1規劃
Type
thesis
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ntu-103-D95741004-1.pdf
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