The Rise of China and the Transformation of International Institutional Rules: the Cases of Anti-dumping Rules and Special Safeguard Mechanism during the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization
Date Issued
2011
Date
2011
Author(s)
Chiang, Yee-Chun
Abstract
Since the Chinese economic reform started in 1978, China’s economic power has attracted the world’s attention because of its rapid development. A lot of literatures have argued that is China proving to be a status quo power or a revisionist power, when she faces the current international order which reflected the interests of the United States?
This thesis compared two cases, which are “Anti-dumping Rules” and “Special Safeguard Mechanism” during the Doha Round of the World Trade Organization, to analyze: (a) the intention and capability of the behavior of China in the WTO; (b) the impact of economic and trade interests on China’s intention in the negotiations; (c) the impact of the negotiation power on the result of changing the regime.
This thesis borrowed the concept of the Power Transition Theory and the framework of the negotiation literatures to define China’s economic and trade interests according to the domestic economic structure and international rules on economic and trade, and to define the negotiation power of the coalition according to its relative economic and trade power compared with the rival coalition. Based on the concept and framework, this thesis proposed two hypotheses, which are: (a) the bigger the economic and trade interests of China are, China will be more active attempting to change the rules; (b) the bigger the negotiation power of China’s coalition has, the result of changing the rules is more obvious.
After observing and comparing the two cases, this thesis found out that, (a) anti-dumping measures have little impact on export trade of China, otherwise China is one of the principal users of anti-dumping measures, therefore, China has little incentive to substantially modify the Anti-dumping Agreement. FANs as the main advocate of the negotiation on anti-dumping rules, has influential negotiation power though, the negotiation on anti-dumping rules has made little progress because of fierce opposition from the United States; (b) SSM is a useful remedy for China that could reduce the damage causing by import surges, hence China has enough incentive to opposite the proposal of the United States. In the meanwhile the negotiation power of the rival coalition is weaker, the current trend of the negotiation on SSM consequently is towards to the proposal of China’s coalition.
Two hypotheses were both proved.
Subjects
World Trade Organization,
China
Anti-dumping Rules
Special Safeguard Mechanism
International Trade Negotiation
Type
thesis
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