The Metaphysics of Color
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Chang, Feng-Bin
Abstract
Do objects have colors? Are colors real? What is the nature of color properties? What is the relation between color property and color perception? Philosophers have studied these questions for centuries, but a lot of disputes remain. According to anti-realism, color properties are not instantiated by external objects. All color perceptions are illusions. Physicalism holds the view that color, like shape, is a physical property of object. It identifies color with surface spectral reflectance. Relationalists claim that color is a relational property standing between object, subject and viewing condition. In the first part of this dissertation, I examine the arguments of these theories of color. I argue that 1) anti-realism is implausible. It cannot explain why visual systems would have evolved to represent properties that nothing has. 2) Physicalism has failed to answer ‘the puzzle of true color’. 3) The argument from perceptual variation does not support relationalism. In the second part, I introduce the biophysicalism, a novel form of color realism. It maintains that colors are real, objective, and perceptual system-dependent properties. I argue that a biophysicalist position best accommodates scientific theories of vision and provides us with a better understanding of the metaphysical status of color.
Subjects
color
biophysicalsim
physicalism
relationalism
perceptual variation
the puzzle of true color
Type
thesis
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