多產品下品質改善的技術授權
Journal
經濟論文叢刊
Journal Volume
48
Journal Issue
4
Date Issued
2020
Author(s)
張瑞雲(Ray-Yun Chang)
黃鴻(Hong Hwang)
彭正浩(Cheng-Hau Peng)
Abstract
In practice, a low-quality licensee may continue to produce its low-quality product after receiving product licensing from a high-quality licensor. This paper assumes this is the case and constructs a vertically differentiated products model to investigate the optimal licensing contract and the resulting social welfare. We show that the licensee produces both the low-and highquality products under royalty licensing; whereas only the high-quality product is produced under fixed-fee licensing. In addition, from the licensor's perspective, fixed-fee licensing is superior (inferior) to royalty licensing if the quality difference between the two products is small (large). Finally, the optimal two-part tariff licensing by the licensor should consist of a positive royalty and a positive fixed fee and the licensee necessarily produce both products after licensing. These results are in sharp contrast to those in the licensing literature with the licensee producing only the high-quality product after licensing.
Publisher
臺灣大學經濟學系
Type
journal article