信任是否影響彈性？-以實質選擇權觀點評價國際合資之限制
Date Issued
2002
Date
2002
Author(s)
DOI
902416H002005
Abstract
Real option is an option which takes real assets as underlying assets. A real
option has both the features of strategic and financial options. Since traditional
capital budgeting methods may undervalue the investment projects, assessing projects
in real option terms will provides decision-makers with managerial flexibility to adapt
and revise future decisions in order to capitalize on upcoming profitable opportunities.
Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that inter-organizational competitive advantages
spanning firm boundaries or being embedded in interfirm resources/routines are able
to generate “relational rents,” such gains may be at the sacrifice of a firm’s strategic
flexibility. As trust or “guanxi” grows steadily, a partner may find it difficult to
make use of real options to attain strategic flexibility, mainly because most
relationship-specific interfirm linkages encourage risk-taking, equity preservation,
communication, and mutual adaptation. Within highly interdependence relationships,
a partner may interpret its counterpart’s adjustments (e.g., downsizing of purchase
orders, contraction of operating scale, delaying of investments, and abandoning of
current operation) as an indication of a lack of continuing commitment, a possible
shake-up in current consensus, or even a potential breakdown of relational bonds.
To avoid negative implications, firms may feel obliged to refrain from “trustless”
moves, and they tend to practice “mutual forbearance.” It is therefore impossible for
a firm to reap the full benefits of “options” while at the same time maintaining a
long-standing reputation as a trustworthy partner. In this sense, there may be a cap
on the value of any real option, and the discretionary power of any partner is
theoretically overestimated and must be re-evaluated. This study integrates the
"trust" dimension in strategic management with the main stream "flexibility school"
of thoughts in MNC theories. Taking international joint ventures (IJVs) as an
example, if one of the parent firms holds a put option and is somewhat obliged to take
the trust dimension into account, the value of strategic options may be reduced.
Following Chi & McGuire (1996), we propose that when a firm’s respect for trust
outweighs its concerns for flexibility, relational gains begin to compensate for the loss
of strategic flexibility. When indeed a JV partner who owns real options must take
"trust" into consideration, the reduction of the value of its real options is considered,
in economic terms, the opportunity cost of sustaining trust in the partnership. The
proposed conceptual framework may also apply to global outsourcing, supply chain
management and other forms of inter-firm, collaborative arrangements.
Subjects
flexibility school
real options
valuation models
trust
international joint ventures
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學國際企業學系暨研究所
Type
report
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