公司自願性停止在盈餘宣告中提供擬制性盈餘的原因與經濟後果之研究
Journal
會計評論
Journal Issue
63
Pages
1-46
Date Issued
2016-07
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper investigates why firms voluntarily stop providing non-GAAP earnings disclosure in their earnings releases (hereafter, stopped firms) and whether this decision affects their subsequent financial reporting policies. Using hand-collected non-GAAP earnings disclosure data between 2002 and 2010, we observe that about one-fifth of our sample firms stopped non-GAAP earnings reporting altogether during our sample period. Consistent with the idea that the SEC’s increased scrutiny and the transparency of non-GAAP disclosure required by Regulation G increase the costs and decrease the benefits of non-GAAP reporting, we find that firms issuing non-GAAP disclosure to mislead investors and firms deriving fewer benefits from non-GAAP reporting are more likely to relinquish non-GAAP disclosure. Moreover, firms receiving the SEC’s comment letters questioning their use of non-GAAP financial measures in SEC filings are more inclined to stop providing non-GAAP disclosure in earnings releases. Furthermore, we find that stopped firms that are more likely to be opportunistic non-GAAP reporters tend to substitute accrual management for non-GAAP disclosure after they stop non-GAAP reporting. Interestingly, investors react less strongly to unexpected earnings of these firms after they stopped disclosing non-GAAP information, consistent with the market perceiving earnings news of opportunistic reporting firms as less informative after their stop decision.
SDGs
Type
journal article