A Feasibility Analysis of Congestion Discount
Date Issued
2009
Date
2009
Author(s)
Lin, Shyh-Kae
Abstract
Congestion discount is one solution for congestion control. The scheme is intended to shift demand during congestion periods to periods of lower demand by offering price discounts as an incentive to users to delay service during high demand periods. The price-discount offer acts as a congestion-avoidance scheme that also balances communication traffic across different time periods. This research focuses on the feasibility study and pricing problem of this scheme. ifferent network environments have different features, such as different average holding time, different flow gap between peak and off-peak. These features may impact the feasibility of congestion discount. Therefore, we develop an M/M/c model in queuing theory to simulate this scheme for this feasibility study. This simulation uses flow of peak period, average holding time, and price-discount acceptance ratio as input. The output of this experiment includes total service time, the proportion of requests blocked, and proportion of requests deferred. The popular method of experimental design, orthogonal array, is used in this research in order to take interaction of different input into consideration.ser of this network service is possible to forecast the peak period, in which he can get discount for next period. Therefore they may connect the network for this discount, not for network service in current period. In the long term, this behavior will make the service provider lose revenue. In this thesis, we propose a pricing method of congestion discount with mixed strategy equilibrium in game theory to eliminate the incentive of this behavior. inally, the main findings of this thesis are as follows..Feasibility study: The scheme with suitable deferring criterion is workable for different network environments. If the same deferring criterion is applied to peak and off-peak in one network, the utilization of the network could be declined. .Discount pricing: mixed strategy equilibrium and changing the rule of offering discount are both useful to eliminate the incentive for getting discount, not for network service..Mixed mechanism: The utilization of network can be improved by a strict deferring criteria and a discount with high acceptance ratio offered when the congestion is imminent.he congestion discount with suitable deferring criteria not only can improve the utilization of network and benefit of service provider, but also can mitigate the impact to customer satisfaction during network congestion.
Subjects
congestion discount
congestion control
queuing theory
pricing
game theory
mixed strategy equilibrium
Type
thesis
File(s)![Thumbnail Image]()
Loading...
Name
ntu-98-P95922003-1.pdf
Size
23.32 KB
Format
Adobe PDF
Checksum
(MD5):ee6225e509e1cc4ade11239ce0f48634