Comparison from F-Share Firms – Aspects of Corporate Governance, Information Transparency and Performance

This thesis investigates whether F-share firms in Taiwan differ from the size- and industry-matched firms in terms of corporate governance, information transparency, and financial performance. It also analyzes whether corporate governance and information transparency affect the performance of F-share firms. The empirical results of the thesis show that, compared with the matched firms, F-share firms have smaller boards and lower information transparency. Their controlling shareholders have higher ownership, and their CEOs are less likely to serve as board chairmen. On the other hand, F-share firms are similar to their peers in other important corporate governance features, and they have higher asset returns. These results suggest that, although F-share firms do have lower information transparency, they do not have worse corporate governance or poorer financial performance. It is also shown that the asset return of F-share firms is positively associated with controlling shareholding and negatively associated with CEO-board chairman duality. In addition, F-share firms with higher information transparency have better stock performance.