目標廣告下獨佔廠商之最適垂直產品線與媒體策略

目標廣告的出現使得廠商更容易接觸特定的消費族群。本研究旨在探討在上標廣告下面對高、低端兩類消費者之獨佔廠商的最適廣告媒體與垂直差異化?品線策略。本研究試圖建立－賽局模型，廠商先決定?品線策略、再選定媒體策略，最後制定價格。假設目標廣告較大眾廣告更容易接觸特定的消費族群，但對兩類消費者接觸率相同的大眾廣告則擁有較目標廣告更高的平均接觸率。本研究主要獲致的結果包括：一、目標廣告的出現，有助於雙?品廠商能更精細地切割消費市場，因而可減緩?品線競食問題，並抽取更多的高端消費者剩餘。此時儘管消費者必須仰賴廠商廣告才可知曉?品資訊，但廠商仍可能獲致相較於消費者擁有完整?品資訊而無須仰賴廠商廣告時更高的獲利。二、當目標廣告接觸率夠高時，目標廣告的出現讓廠商可採用雙?品策略並運用高、低端目標廣告分別宣傳高、低端?品且不提供高端?品優惠價。三、有別於僅有大眾廣告的情境，目標廣告的出現，可能使廠商在消費者需仰賴廠商廣告才知曉?品存在時，相較於消費者擁有完整?品資訊而無需廣告的情境更加傾向於向上延伸?品線。The presence of targeted ad allows a marketer to reach some specific segment more effectively. In this paper we analyze the optimal vertical product line and advertising media strategies for a monopoly facing both the high-end and the low-end segments. We build a game-theoretic model where the monopolistic firm first chooses its product items, then advertising media strategy, and finally prices. Assuming targeted advertising can reach a specific segment more effectively while mass advertising can reach the whole market uniformly with a higher average rate, we obtain the following results. (i) The presence of targeted ad might allow a firm to segment the market to a finer level, thus alleviating the cannibalization problem, and hence extracting more rent from consumers of the high-end segment. When it happens, the firm can obtain a higher profit in spite profit in spite of its advertising expenditure than when consumers are all aware of its products. (ii) When the reach rate of targeted ad is sufficiently high, the targeted high-end and the targeted low-end ads allow the firm to optimally achieve perfect price discrimination through both the high-end and the low-end items. (iii) When the firm has to spend ad to make consumers aware of its products, the presence of targeted ad makes it more likely for the firm to extend its product line upward than when consumers have perfect information about products.