A Study on the Compromise Mode of Interaction between President and Par liament under Semi-presidentialism: Poland and the ROC
Date Issued
2002-07-31
Date
2002-07-31
Author(s)
DOI
902414H002002
Abstract
The impact of political institution on
political performance is a major research
topic in the study of political consolidation.
The ROC has adopted a semi-presidential
system with its greatest challenge in forming
a new government and managing the
legislative-executive relation when the two
branches are incongruent. This study
attempts to analyze the factors leading to four
types of interaction between the president
and the parliament under incongruence, and
demonstrates the validity of the theory
through the cases of Poland and Taiwan. We
find that presidential strategy is determined
by the president’s appointing power, his
expectation of the next parliamentary
elections, and whether he was elected with a
majority or a plurality. On the other hand, the
parliamentary strategy is determined by the
parliament’s expectations of the outcome of
its next elections, discipline of the opposition
party (or parties), and fractionalization of the
opposition. By assigning values to the six
considerations on the president’s and the
parliament’s sides, we find there is a high
correlation between the power positions of
the two players, and the four
president-parliament interaction modes
(parliamentary supremacy— cohabitation,
compromise, conflict, and presidential
supremacy). The reason that Poland takes the
compromise mode while the ROC takes the
president supremacy mode is found in the relative power positions of the two presidents
vis-à-vis the two parliaments.
Subjects
democratic consolidation
semi-presidential system
Poland
Taiwan
Publisher
臺北市：國立臺灣大學政治學系暨研究所
Type
report
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