The Use of Strategy Methods in Experimental Pivotal-Voting Game
Date Issued
2012
Date
2012
Author(s)
Kuo, Yen
Abstract
Many papers have been published for solving paradox of voter turnout. In this paper, we adopt the strategy method to mimic Levine and Palfrey (2007)'' voting games. Ｗe find the underdog effect and competition effect supported by our data, but we cannot replicate the Levine and Palfrey (2007)’ result for neither the strategy method, nor direct response method. We also find evidences indicates that subjects don''t use fixed cut-off strategies. Finally, out data shows that voters are highly responsive to historical pivotal event, which the most important implication of rational choice model.
Subjects
Rational Choice Model
Pivotal Voter Game
Paradox of Voter Turnout
Strategy Method
Experimental Economics
Type
thesis
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