內部董事超額薪酬和公司未來續效：隱性合約觀點之實證研究
Journal
臺大管理論叢
Journal Volume
25
Journal Issue
2
Pages
149-180
Date Issued
2015
Author(s)
Abstract
This paper investigates the relationship between inside director's excessive pay and the firm's future performance. The excessive pay is derived by subtracting actual pay with reasonable pay. Our paper assumes that the firm's outsiders would consider the reasonable pay as compensation for inside directors' current observable performance measures in three dimensions: performance, complexity, and risk. The excessive pay represents the proportion of compensation unable to be explained by current observable performance measures. However, excessive pay may be due to implicit incentive contracts for unobservable performance measures that contribute to the firm's future performance. Every inside director is rewarded with both of managerial pay and director's pay. Our empirical results show that the excessive pay for the two roles and that only for the director's role are significantly and positively associated with the Tobin's Q from the following year, which supports the existence of implicit contracts. Nevertheless, excessive pay for inside directors' managerial role lacks significant relations to the firm's future Tobin's Q as well as return on assets.
Type
journal article