The Ideology and Organizational Traits of the Chinese Nationalist Party
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Shih, Chia-Yin
Abstract
Most of the studies on the post-WWII political development of Taiwan have referred to the Chinese Nationalist Party, or the Kuomintang, as either a Leninist or a quasi-Leninist party, and considered its party organization a pillar of the regime before it lost power in 2000. However, this view is only based on some clauses of the party constitution as well as superficial aspects of the regime. In fact, the Kuomintang did not satisfy the prerequisites for a Leninist party in terms of ideology and organization, and its party organization did not have the mobilization capability, which is characteristic of a Leninist party, both among its members and in society.f we differentiate a Leninist party from its regime, and consider the former only a means, i.e., the “organizational weapon,” to an end, we can then specify three essential elements of such a party. First and foremost, all the party members must have a strong consensus in its ideology, i.e., its political goals and party lines. Secondly, its organization must be based on the principle of democratic centralism. And thirdly, the whole party is composed of cells as its basic units, which are capable of taking actions collectively. It is not necessary for a Leninist party to embrace Communist society as its final aim, to pursue a revolutionary path towards power, to believe in the “law” of class struggle, or to adopt a party-state system once in power.he ideology of a Leninist party is to guide the platforms of the party and its members’ collective actions. It consists of analyses of the current situation, the choice of goals, and the elaboration of the party lines. How effective the ideology is depends on the precision of its analyses of current situations, the moral appeal of its goals, and the feasibility of the party lines. A Leninist party must constantly work on the construction of its ideology, that is, review unremittingly the current situation, goals and party lines, so that the ideal can be materialized in the answer to “what is to be done?”he official ideology of the Kuomintang is “Three Principles of the people,” which was invented by Dr. Sun Yat-sen over a century ago. If we take it as a system of theory, it is too incoherent to serve as a base of a belief. But it can also be seen as a framework of three important political issues, and then we can keep the framework intact while we change its contents. As long as its fundamental values, say national independence, democratic constitutionalism, and equitable affluence, remain unchanged, the Three Principles can be reformulated into new party platforms according to the needs of the time. Therefore, it is surely possible for the Kuomintang to construct an effective ideology based on the Three Principles.evertheless, since the purge of Communist elements in 1927, the Kuomintang had never paid enough attention to ideological construction. In the thought of Chiang Kai-shek, the doctrines and current policies were disconnected. In other words, the urgent tasks of the present were not related to the future ideal. Hence the latter lost its appeal. To make things worse, Chiang substituted moral preaching of Confucianism and Führer worship of Fascism for ideological leadership, and, consequently, he ignored ideological construction even further. Although in the first decade or so after the Kuomintang moved to Taiwan in 1949, Chiang tried to build an ideological basis for the consensus among the Kuomintang members, he did not succeed. The major reasons for his failure include mistakes in the judgment on current situation, insufficient moral appeal of its political goals, and low feasibility of the party lines. The Kuomintang eventually gave up any further effort in ideological construction in the 1970s. Without an ideological basis for its members’ consensus, the party organization of the Kuomintang could only be a tool of factional politics.oreover, the primary organizational principle of the Kuomintang had always been the Fascist Führer principle since 1938. The democratic centralism in its constitution could hardly function under a dictatorial leader like Chiang Kai-shek. Besides, its basic units had neither power nor capability of collective actions, and, as a result, the morale of its members was generally low.ollowing a historical approach, this dissertation examines the history of the Kuomintang after Sun Yat-sen reorganized it in 1924, and finds out that it is definitely not a Leninist party. Instead of party organization, what makes the Kuomintang regime capable of penetrating Taiwan’s society is its secret service and the administrative system left behind by the Japanese colonial government. The party organization of the Kuomintang was too weak to take root in the local society, nor could it overcome the conflict between Mainlanders and native Taiwanese, which is the fundamental political-societal cleavage within Taiwan society. Once the Kuomintang regime is forced to change, the main course of change could only be towards Taiwanization. In addition, because of the dependence of the Kuomintang regime upon the U.S., the timing of regime change was determined by changes in the U.S.’ foreign policy, which brought about successive legitimacy crises to which the Kuomintang regime had to respond.
Subjects
the Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang)
Leninist party
ideological construction
Three Principles of the People
democratic centralism
Fuehrer principle
SDGs
Type
thesis
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