Flat-Rate Pricing and Truthful Offloading Mechanism in Multi-Layer Edge Computing
Journal
IEEE Transactions on Wireless Communications
Journal Volume
20
Journal Issue
9
Pages
6107-6121
Date Issued
2021
Author(s)
Abstract
Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) is a promising paradigm to ease the computation burden of Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices by leveraging computing capabilities at the network edge. With the yearning needs for resource provision from IoT devices, the queueing delay at the edge nodes not only poses a colossal impediment to achieving satisfactory quality of experience (QoE) for the IoT devices but also to the benefits of the edge nodes owing to escalating energy expenditure. Moreover, since the service providers may differ, computationally competent entities' computing services should entail economic compensation for the incurred energy expenditure and the capital investment. Therefore, the workload allocation mechanism, where we consider flat-rate and dynamic pricing schemes in the multi-layer edge computing structure, is much-needed. We use Stackelberg game to capture the inherent hierarchy and interdependence between the second-layer edge node (SLEN) and first-layer edge nodes (FLENs). A truthful admission control mechanism grounded on the optimal workload allocation is designed for FLENs without violating end-to-end (E2E) latency requirements. We prove that a Stackelberg equilibrium with the E2E latency guarantee and truthfulness exists and can be reached through proposed algorithm. Simulation results confirm the effectiveness of our scheme and illustrate several insights. ? 2002-2012 IEEE.
Subjects
Internet of Things (IoT)
mechanism design
Mobile edge computing (MEC)
pricing
Costs
Economics
Edge computing
Investments
Quality of service
Computing capability
Computing services
Economic compensation
Internet of Things (IOT)
Quality of experience (QoE)
Resource provisions
Stackelberg equilibrium
Workload allocation
Internet of things
Type
journal article