Does Value Pluralism Conflicts with Liberalism?
Date Issued
2004
Date
2004
Author(s)
Hsu, Hsin-Ping
DOI
zh-TW
Abstract
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss the question whether the political implications of value pluralism are consistent or conflicting with liberalism. In contrast to Isaiah Berlin who believes that value pluralism is consistent with liberalism because of the importance of negative liberty, recently, some theorists argue that according to the main ideas of value pluralism, values are incommensurable and there will be many rational resolutions when they come into conflict, thus neither liberal values and liberal principles have general priority, nor liberal regimes have universal authority and legitimacy. However, other theorists think that value pluralism implies the maximization of the diversity of goods and lifestyles, which lead to the adoption of liberal institutions.
In this thesis, I assess the arguments about the debate of the relation between value pluralism and liberalism. Besides, I point out that this debate comes from the vagueness of the political implications of value pluralism, and attempt to clarify and reconstruct them. In my interpretation, value pluralism needs not to pursuit the maximal diversity, and it needs only to avoid the dangers that might be incurred by some monism. Basing on these implications, I suggest that some non-liberal regimes might also pass the normative requirements of value pluralism and consequently the political implications of value pluralism are not fully consistent with liberalism. Finally, I try to indicate a kind of qualified non-liberal regime, and discuss the difficulty it faces in resisting liberalization.
Subjects
自由主義
差異
價值多元主義
不可共量
incommensurability
value pluralism
liberalism
diversity
Type
thesis
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