Do Managers Give Extended Credit to Avoid Reporting Losses ?
Date Issued
2005
Date
2005
Author(s)
Wang, Lan-Fen
DOI
en-US
Abstract
Similar to Jackson and Wilcox (2000), this study investigates whether managers give extended credit terms at the end of year to accelerate distributors purchases and, as a result, avoid reporting losses. This study also investigate whether this kind of earnings management affects the informativeness of earnings, and whether a relatively reliable measure of management’s exercise of channel stuffing over earnings--unexpected accounts receivable (UAR)--can provide incremental information under this phenomenon.
Consistent with expectations, I find that firm managers are likely to grant extended credit terms at the end of year to meet annual financial reporting target, and this kind of manipulation reduces the association between returns and earnings. Finally, my results also show that under this phenomenon, UAR can provide incremental information.
Subjects
盈餘管理
避免報導損失
塞貨
裁量性應計項目
Earnings management
Avoiding reporting losses
channel stuffing
Discretionary accruals
Type
other
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