Formal politics VS. Informal Politics:he Impact of Institutional and Factional Factors on Chinese Personnel Appointment at Provincial Level
Date Issued
2008
Date
2008
Author(s)
Huang, Kuo-Chun
Abstract
Abstract Since early 1980''s, the Chinese government started the economic reformy decentralizing its administrative decision power. As a result, the provincial government became the main promoter to develop local economy, and it caused rampant localism simultaneously. In such background, this article takes a structural perspective, the transition of totalitarian regime, and tries to clarify how the central, including the party and state, utilized the totalitarian legacy, personnel appointment power (nomenklatura system) and its institutional innovation, to curb localism in the transitional progress. his article assumes that institutional and factional factors are the two main independent variables to explain how the central utilized the personnel power to respond to localism. Specifically, We observe provincial cadre management institutions and the ‘‘Shanghai Gang’’ faction as research objects for clarifying the central’s institutional innovation to control localism and the role of faction in this process.ur research argues that the manipulation of personnel appointment powery the central has demonstrated a complicated picture. First of all, the central-local relation tends to reach a dynamic equilibrium. The central’s control of localism has been reflected by the development of provincial cadre management institutions, however the central’s compromise to localism, such as the provincial governor’s localization and regular promotion of provincial leaders, has also been shown by empirical evidences. Secondly, the case study of the ‘‘Shanghai Gang’’ faction indicates that the central’s institutionalized control and promotion has resulted an obvious limit to factions on the one hand, but on the other hand, the central faction’s leader had also promoted his clients through this process as an unintended consequence. However, the whole picture shows that ‘‘faction alternation’’ seems to exist in Chinese elite politics, and it brought a relative peaceful power rotation between factions.
Subjects
personnel appointment power (nomenklatura system)
cadre management institutions
political institutionalization
faction alternation
Shanghai Gang
central-local relation
Type
thesis
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